Author- Ashwin R Nair, Lloyd School of Law, Greater Noida 

ABSTRACT

The ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla case, arising from the 1975 emergency declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, is a landmark in Indian legal history. After her election annulment due to electoral malpractices, Gandhi’s emergency proclamation suspended citizens’ rights to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32. The government used the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) to detain political opponents, leading to consolidated appeals in the Supreme Court. The majority judgment by Justices Ray, Beg, Chandrachud, and Bhagwati held that no writ petitions could be filed in High Courts to challenge detention orders during the emergency, emphasizing the executive’s broad powers and the suspension of fundamental rights. In dissent, Justice Khanna argued for the enduring sanctity of life and liberty, even in emergencies. This case significantly influenced constitutional safeguards for fundamental rights, highlighting the judiciary’s role in balancing state security and individual freedoms.

KEYWORDS: Emergency Proclamation, Fundamental Rights Suspension, Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), Judicial Review, Executive Powers.

FACTS

The case of ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla arose from the controversial emergency declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. Following the annulment of her election to the Lok Sabha by the Allahabad High Court due to electoral malpractices, Gandhi faced a potential six-year ban from holding office. In response, she declared a state of emergency on June 26, 1975, and suspended citizens’ rights to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 for the enforcement of fundamental rights, including Articles 14, 21, and 22, which protect equality, personal liberty, and safeguards against preventive detention.

During the emergency, with fundamental rights suspended, the government invoked the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) to detain political opponents and critics, such as A.B. Vajpayee, Jayaprakash Narayan, and Morarji Desai. Despite obtaining favorable release orders from various High Courts, these detainees could not secure their freedom due to the suspension of Article 32. The state appealed these High Court orders in the Supreme Court, consolidating the cases into what became known as the ADM Jabalpur case. This led to a landmark decision that significantly affected the interpretation of personal liberties during national crises.

ISSUES

1. Can a writ petition for habeas corpus, which ensures personal liberty, be upheld if the detention order is deemed invalid under the MISA provisions, in conjunction with the Presidential orders issued under Article 359(1)?
2. If the writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable, to what extent can the judiciary scrutinize the Presidential orders issued under Article 359(1)?

Arguments of the Petitioners (State)

The emergency provisions grant the executive full discretion over state affairs, as the state’s considerations take absolute precedence during such times.

The second argument was that the state is not required to release detainees even if the advisory board finds no sufficient reason for detention. The detention is justified despite violating Article 22. The writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be enforced, even though Article 22 is considered a fundamental right. The President’s order under Article 359(1) has suspended the right to approach a court for the enforcement of rights under Article 19.

Suspending an individual’s right to approach any court to enforce the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 is a constitutional mandate and does not imply the absence of the Rule of Law.

Articles 358, 359(1), and 359(1A), along with other emergency provisions, are constitutional mandates essential for maintaining the country’s military and economic security.

Arguments of the Respondents

The first argument asserted that the purpose of Article 359(1) was not to completely restrict the legislature’s power but to allow the creation of laws during an emergency that might violate fundamental rights as stated in the presidential order. Article 359(1) only prohibited moving the Supreme Court under Article 32 to enforce certain rights. This restriction did not apply to Article 226, meaning the prohibition did not affect the enforcement of common law and statutory rights of personal liberty in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The presidential order’s validity was limited to fundamental rights and did not extend to natural law, common law, or statutory law. The proclamation of emergency under Article 352 limited the scope of the state’s executive powers to what is mentioned under Article 162 of the Indian Constitution. Article 21 is not the exclusive source of the right to life and personal liberty.

The presidential order could not affect non-fundamental constitutional rights arising under Articles 256, 265, 361(3), natural rights, contractual rights, and other statutory rights. The state and its officers had the right to arrest only if the disputed act met the conditions specified under Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA). If any conditions were unmet, the detention would be beyond the powers of the Act.

Lastly, it was argued that the Preamble of the Constitution, which speaks of sovereignty, democracy, and the republican nature, implies that the executive, being subordinate to the legislature, should not act beyond its powers to the detriment of citizens. It should only act within the limits of laws validly passed by the legislature.

JUDGEMENT

MAJORITY JUDGEMENT(April 28, 1976)
(A.N. Ray C.J., M.H. Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud, and P.N. Bhagwati JJ.)

In light of the presidential order dated June 27, 1975, the Supreme Court held that no writ petition can be filed in the High Court under Article 226 for habeas corpus or any other writ, order, or direction challenging the detention order on grounds that the detention is not in compliance with the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), 1971, that the Act is illegal, or that the detention is based on extraneous considerations or vitiated by malafides. This means that during the proclamation of emergency under Article 359(1) of the Indian Constitution, no individual, whether an Indian citizen or a foreigner, has the right to move the court for the enforcement of fundamental rights, except for Articles 20 and 21. These rights remain suspended during the emergency period or for a shorter period as specified in the order.

The court upheld the constitutional validity of clauses 8 and 9 of Section 16 of the MISA, 1971. Justice Chandrachud stated that all executive actions must conform to laws passed by Parliament. The majority opinion asserted that courts lack the authority to examine the validity of a detention order under MISA, 1971, as the Act does not confer such review powers on the judiciary. Section 16(A)(9) of MISA was deemed constitutionally valid and does not affect the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Article 359(1) does not distinguish between threats to national security caused by ‘external aggression’ and those caused by ‘internal disturbances’. The majority decision clarified the differences between Articles 358 and 359. Article 358 suspends only Article 19 during an emergency proclamation, allowing the legislature to pass laws contravening Article 19, and the executive to take any actions it deems fit. Article 358 does not suspend other fundamental rights, empowering the executive to act within its competence. In contrast, Article 359 suspends the enforcement of any or all fundamental rights and halts any proceedings for their enforcement.

Another significant distinction is that Article 358 provides indemnity, while Article 359 does not offer such indemnity under its proclamation. The majority asserted that the Basic Structure doctrine cannot be invoked to create hypothetical conflicts within the Constitution. Part III of the Indian Constitution should be interpreted in both its restrictive and affirmative dimensions. The scope of judicial review should align with an individual’s right to challenge the infringement of their rights. Article 21 is the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty.

DISSENTING JUDGEMENT BU JUSTICE KHANNA

Justice Khanna argued strongly that laws permitting preventive detention without trial are fundamentally pernicious to personal liberty. He rejected the notion that Article 21 is the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty. Even in the absence of Article 21, the state has no discretion to deprive a person of life and liberty without legal authority. During an emergency proclamation, only the procedural aspects of Article 21 are restricted, while substantive rights remain unaffected. Thus, a person cannot be deprived of their right to life and personal liberty. Justice Khanna emphasized the necessity of upholding the sanctity of life and liberty to distinguish a lawful society from a lawless one.

CONCLUSION

The landmark case of ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla profoundly impacted the interpretation of personal liberties during a national emergency. The majority judgment underscored the extensive powers of the executive during such times, affirming that the enforcement of fundamental rights can be suspended under Article 359(1), thereby limiting judicial scrutiny. This decision, which upheld the constitutionality of MISA provisions, reflected the judiciary’s stance on prioritizing state security over individual freedoms during crises.

However, the dissenting opinion by Justice Khanna highlighted the intrinsic value of life and liberty, emphasizing that these fundamental rights should not be compromised, even during an emergency. His dissent underscored the principle that the right to life and personal liberty cannot be wholly suspended, asserting the need to maintain the rule of law and the sanctity of individual rights.

The ADM Jabalpur case remains a critical reminder of the delicate balance between state security and individual freedoms. It spurred significant constitutional developments, including the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, which ensured that Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended even during an emergency. This case serves as a historical lesson on the importance of safeguarding fundamental rights and the judiciary’s role in upholding the rule of law, particularly in times of national crisis.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs)

Q1. What were the primary arguments made by the respondents in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla?

Ans: Respondents contended that executive powers do not expand beyond constitutional limits during an emergency and that common law, natural law, or statutory rights could still be enforced under Article 226.

Q2. What was Justice H.R. Khanna’s dissenting opinion in the ADM Jabalpur case?

Ans: Justice Khanna asserted that individuals cannot be deprived of life and liberty without authority of law, even during an emergency, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the rule of law.

Q3. What were the key legal questions addressed in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla?

Ans: The case addressed whether a writ petition for habeas corpus was maintainable under Article 226 during the emergency and the extent of judicial scrutiny regarding presidential orders under Article 359(1).