Author: Baidehi Mangal
College: National Law School of India University
LinkedIn Profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/baidehi-mangal?utm_source=share_via&utm_content=profile&utm_medium=member_android
To the point
People often confuse the silence of courtroom to reverence, but it can also mean resignation. Recently the case where an advocate abused CJI, and the other where an advocate hurled a shoe at the then CJI B.R. Gavai, the public had diverging opinions. Both the episodes deserved criticism, but the more interesting questions lies beyond the act: why does the public resonate with such moments?
Contrary to some people views, these two incidents cannot prove that people’s faith in Indian judiciary has collapsed. Millions of people are approaching the courts, having faith in the system. The justice might be slow but remains reliable and reachable. But it will be wrong to ignore these instances. These events highlight how the delay, mounting costs and procedural capacity has become an institutional strain, and is exhausting by the litigants.
The constitutional significance highlighted here was the response of the Court. The Supreme Court chose not to initiate contempt proceedings against the litigant. It shows that the system is resilient to recognise that every insult doesn’t deserve coercive sanction. This also shows that judicial dignity is protected less by punishment, but by the perception that the judiciary is accessible and fair.
Use of Legal Jargon
The constitutional provisions which govern the contempt, tryto reconcile two contrasting democratic values, which is judicial authority and freedom of speech. Article 129 makes the Supreme Court, a court of record, giving it inherent power to punish for contempt, and Article 215 gives the same power to the High Court. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides the statutory detail, distinguishing civil from criminal contempt. Under Section 2(c), criminal contempt covers acts that scandalise the court, prejudice pending proceedings, or obstruct the administration of justice.
This definition contrasts with Article 19(1)(a) ‘s guarantee of free speech, effected only by the reasonable restriction under Article 19(2) permits for contempt. Not every harsh criticism of a judgment qualifies as contempt, since democratic institutions depend on informed public scrutiny, including of courts. Contempt exists to guard the administration of justice, not the personal comfort of judges, and the Court’s recent restraint reads as a quiet reaffirmation of that principle.
The Proof
The constitutional weight of these incidents is substantiated against India’s institutional backdrop. The National Judicial Data Grid records over five crore cases pending across the Supreme Court, High Courts, and subordinate courts, with civil disputes sometimes outlasting the litigants who filed them. The World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index has repeatedly flagged delay as one of India’s most persistent institutional weaknesses, and shortage of judges and rising litigation costs. None of this excuses misconduct in a courtroom, but it helps explain why frustration occasionally erupts in public and dramatic form.
India’s experience can be compared to other jurisdictions. The United Kingdom abolished the offence of scandalising the court through the Crime and Courts Act, 2013, on the view that mature institutions should withstand criticism rather than criminalise it. The United States goes further, requiring a clear and imminent threat to justice before speech about courts can be restricted. This shows an international pattern of other jurisdictions engaging with the matter of contempt.
Abstract
A constitutional court’s legitimacy rests more on the confidence citizens place in its independence and fairness and less on its power to punish disrespect. These two incidents inside the supreme court have revived an old constitutional question: Are these types of incidents some isolated acts of indiscipline, or are signs of the deeper strain and frustration piled up in the hearts of the litigants? This article is arguing that such misconduct matters less than what they reveal about the institutional authority, judicial legitimacy and the frustration bred by delay and procedural cost. Drawing on the constitutional framework governing contempt, the philosophy of judicial restraint, and leading Supreme Court decisions, it contends that courts preserve authority not through swift punishment but through constitutional maturity and fidelity to the rule of law.
Case Laws
1. Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1953) : The Supreme Court of India ruled that fair criticism of judicial officers does not constitute criminal contempt unless the allegations are “calculated to interfere with the due course of justice” or clearly undermine public confidence in the administration of law.
2. Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court (1974): the Supreme Court established that the power to punish for contempt should not be used to suppress independent, constructive criticism of judges’ fragilitiesor systemic judicial shortcomings.
3. In Re: Arundhati Roy (2002): The court stated that the freedom of speech and expression is subject to reasonable restrictions and cannot be used as a cloak to scandalize or erode public confidence in the judicial institution.
Conclusion
Every constitutional democracy faces with a choice: to base respect for its judiciary on coercion or on legitimacy. Events inside the Indian judiciary now raise this issue with an immediate urgency. It is wrong to conclude that the public has lost respect for the court, as one can also argue that the number of incidents is small and that they were initiated by dissatisfied minorities. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that our society has crossed another threshold of democratic development, where the judiciary enjoys high constitutional credibility, but there is a growing need for it to be more open, transparent, and provide equal opportunities.
It is important to understand that the Supreme Court’s decision not to use the power of contempt of court in this case demonstrates that it understands its own attitude. However, the strength of the judiciary will be demonstrated not so much through such confrontations as through the daily work of bringing cases to court hearings, which are often delayed for months and sometimes years. In his speech in the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar argued that the key ingredient in the success of the new constitutional democracy is the personnel factor. Thus, the vitality of the judiciary depends on these same qualities of leadership. Perhaps this is the lesson that we should take from the incident with the contempt of the court. Its value is probably in the fact that it helps realize that the authority of the Supreme Court does not come because of attempts to establish complete domination and control of all areas of society by the judiciary.
FAQs
Q1. Does every insult to a judge amount to contempt of court?
No. Contempt applies only where conduct substantially interferes, or is likely to interfere, with the administration of justice. Personal dislike or an isolated insult is ordinarily not enough.
Q2. Can citizens criticise Supreme Court judgments publicly?
Yes. Fair, reasoned criticism is protected under Article 19(1)(a). The constitutional line is crossed only when criticism obstructs justice or scandalises the court in a manner the law recognises.
Q3. Why does the Supreme Court’s restraint in the recent incident matter constitutionally?
It signals that judicial authority is strengthened by proportion and confidence rather than by frequent recourse to contempt,which reinforces that contempt protects the justice system rather than the personal dignity of judges.
Q4. Has India abolished scandalising the court as an offence, like the United Kingdom?
No. The UK abolished it under the Crime and Courts Act, 2013, but India retains criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, given the central constitutional role its judiciary continues to play.
References
Constitution of India, Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2), 129 and 215.
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10
Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar, Orissa HC, (1974) 1 SCC 374.
In Re: Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC 343
National Judicial Data Grid, Government of India; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index.
