Author: Avni Tripathi, Student of National Law University and Judicial Academy, Assam
ABSTRACT
Honour crimes and child marriage continue to be troubling manifestations of patriarchal dominance in India, despite constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity, and personal autonomy. These practices are deeply rooted in caste, kinship, and community notions of honour, where women and children are often denied their independent personhood and are instead viewed as tools to uphold family reputation. This article offers a socio-legal perspective on these issues, critiquing how current legal frameworks often fall short in dismantling the social structures that maintain them. For example, while the Supreme Court of India has repeatedly emphasized the importance of constitutional morality to protect individual rights, laws on the books often lag behind social realities. Honor killings are treated as ordinary murder under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which overlooks their collective and patriarchal nature, and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, makes child marriages merely voidable, effectively allowing these practices to persist. Drawing on constitutional law, feminist legal theory, and sociological insights, the article argues that these gaps bolster patriarchal authority and deny women and children meaningful legal recognition. The way forward involves recognizing honour crimes as specific offenses, declaring child marriages void from the outset, and implementing social and economic measures to enable women and children. Only through such reforms can statutory laws truly reflect the Constitution’s vision of dignity, equality, and freedom.
Honor crimes and child marriage are two interconnected yet distinct ways in which patriarchal societal norms exert control over women and children in India. Both practices are deeply embedded within social structures rooted in caste, kinship, and community notions of honour, where a woman’s autonomy, especially regarding her sexuality and marriage is perceived as a threat to established social hierarchies. While the Indian Constitution, through Articles 14, 15, and 21, promises equality, non-discrimination, and dignity, these constitutional guarantees are often undermined by longstanding customs that claim authority over women’s lives. To truly understand the issue, a socio-legal analysis must go beyond merely punishing surface-level violence and instead examine how law often fails to challenge the deeper social structures that sustain these harmful practices.
The ongoing prevalence of honour killings emphasizes the persistent gap between legal provisions and societal practices. In the case of Shakti Vahini v. Union of India, the Supreme Court explicitly condemned honour killings as a “barbaric, feudal practice” that violates fundamental rights. It also directed states to take concrete steps to prevent such violence and penalize those behind it, including khap panchayats that endorse these acts. Despite this, incidents of honour killings continue to surface, especially in northern states like Haryana, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh, where social norms strongly uphold caste endogamy and control over women’s choices in marriage. The law, however, generally classifies honour killings as simple murder under Section 103 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). This approach tends to overlook the broader, widespread nature of these crimes, which are often carried out with community approval. By framing honour killings as individual acts of homicide, the law inadvertently shifts responsibility away from collective social mechanisms and fails to recognize that many of these acts are sanctioned by entire communities as a way of maintaining patriarchal control. This situation exposes a troubling disconnect: while the judiciary has emphasized that constitutional morality should take precedence over social customs, the lack of a specific legal category for honour crimes allows such practices to continue unchecked, often with impunity.
From a sociological perspective, it becomes clear that these acts cannot be fully understood without considering the wider context of caste, kinship ties, and patriarchal control over women’s sexuality. Experts like Veena Das and Patricia Uberoi have emphasized how the family functions as a small-scale reflection of social order, where a woman’s body often becomes a symbol of communal honour and male authority. In this view, when a woman asserts her right to choose whom to marry, something which is protected by law, she is not just challenging her family but also disrupting broader social norms. That is why honour killings frequently involve collective action by relatives, community elders, and even local caste councils. Unfortunately, the current legal system tends to overlook this collective aspect, focusing instead on individual guilt. To address this gap effectively, laws need to explicitly recognize honour crimes as separate offenses, reflecting their unique social and cultural dimensions, and their constitutional significance.
Child marriage, although it manifests differently, is another area where tradition undermines the recognition of individuals’ legal rights. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA), makes the practice illegal, but it considers child marriages to be voidable rather than void. This means that unless the minor actively seeks annulment after reaching adulthood, the marriage remains legally valid. This legal approach subtly recognizes that social acceptance of child marriage still persists, especially in rural and impoverished communities where poverty, the practice of dowry, and deeply rooted kinship ties sustain it. From a sociological perspective, child marriage often is a means for families to control female sexuality, uphold caste endogamy, and ease economic pressures. Legally, however, by placing the responsibility on the child, who is often disempowered the law inadvertently supports the existing social hierarchies it aims to challenge. As a result, patriarchal customs continue to hold sway as normative, while constitutional protections for dignity and autonomy remain more of an ideal than a reality.
The sociological critique of child marriage emphasizes that viewing such marriages as voidable reveals an ongoing reliance on patriarchal ideas that see women and children as dependent individuals without full decision-making power. From a legal perspective, this approach effectively denies children(particularly girls), the status of full legal persons, placing their independence under the influence of parents and community norms. Scholars like Flavia Agnes have noted that Indian family law has traditionally prioritized societal standards over individual rights, which undermines the constitutional commitment to gender equality. Recognizing marriages involving children, even in a voidable form, shows that this tension still exists within modern legal systems.
A common thread connecting honour killings and child marriage is the way patriarchal systems control women’s sense of personhood. In liberal constitutional ideas, personhood usually implies that individuals are capable of making their own choices, especially in personal matters like marriage and sexuality. But in societies where caste and kinship are central, women’s autonomy is often systematically overridden through traditions that prioritize collective honour over personal freedom. Feminist legal theory points out this issue, arguing that patriarchal laws and customs tend to see women not as independent individuals with rights, but as beings defined by their family and community roles. Child marriage effectively strips young girls of their legal right to consent, and honour killings are brutal punishments to enforce conformity when women choose to exercise their independence. Together, these practices show how patriarchal customs weaken women’s legal personhood initially by denying their autonomy through early marriage, and later by punishing their independence through violence when they seek independent marriage choices.
The Indian judiciary has been striving to address these challenges by invoking the idea of constitutional morality. In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, the Supreme Court made it clear that protecting individual dignity and autonomy should take precedence over the majority’s social norms. Similarly, in Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court affirmed a woman’s right to marry outside her caste and strongly condemned any violence or coercion by families or communities. However, despite these rulings, the concept of constitutional morality as a guiding principle is still undermined by existing laws that do not fully account for social realities. For example, the POCSO Act classifies child marriage as voidable rather than outright void, showing a hesitation to fully criminalize a practice so deeply embedded in social customs. Similarly, the law does not recognize a separate category for honour-related crimes, reflecting an unwillingness to confront the collective nature of patriarchal violence. In this way, while judicial decisions promote progressive ideals, existing statutes often fall short, allowing traditional patriarchal social structures to continue largely unchallenged.
A look at different legal perspectives reveals various approaches that India might consider. For example, countries like Jordan and Lebanon have enacted specific laws addressing honour crimes, which often serve to reinforce patriarchal norms. Likewise, some jurisdictions automatically declare child marriages invalid, recognizing that minors are generally unable to give legal consent, regardless of cultural traditions. India’s cautious stance on adopting such measures reflects an ongoing struggle to balance respect for cultural practices with the need to uphold constitutional principles. As B.R. Ambedkar famously pointed out in the Constituent Assembly debates, social reform cannot be postponed forever simply because of tradition when basic rights are at stake. The law must play a proactive role in dismantling practices that conflict fundamentally with constitutional morality.
A more detailed critique also emerges when we consider what autonomy and dignity truly mean. J.S. Mill emphasized that autonomy is fundamental to individual freedom and the pursuit of personal well-being. However, in many patriarchal societies, this sense of independence is often systematically undermined for women and children, with claims of protecting community honour or ensuring safety serving as justifications. Feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon clarifies how laws tend to uphold patriarchal systems by appearing impartial while actually reinforcing gender-based subordination. Taking the example of the PCMA, rather than explicitly banning child marriage, the law’s failure to do so effectively endorses patriarchal dominance under the guise of safeguarding minors. Similarly, the reluctance to recognize honour-related crimes separately allows such acts of violence to slip into the category of regular murder, concealing the underlying gendered power dynamics. These cases demonstrate how current legal frameworks often coexist with patriarchy rather than challenge or dismantle it.
Realising what it means to recognize legal personhood provides a promising path forward. It is important to see personhood not just as a formal legal status but as real, substantive autonomy, meaning individuals have genuine agency. This involves breaking down social structures that often deny people this agency. For example, honour crimes and child marriages both deprive individuals of this true autonomy, effectively turning them into tools for family or community reputation. To reflect this understanding, laws should clearly criminalize honour crimes as forms of collective patriarchal violence and declare child marriages invalid from the outset. Such legal changes would bring statutory law into line with constitutional principles, upholding the dignity and autonomy of women and children as fundamental rights that cannot be compromised. In addition to legal reforms, proactive measures like education programs, community outreach, and enabling women economically are essential to tackling the social roots of these harmful practices.
In conclusion, the persistent issues of honour crimes and child marriage in India emphasize the limitations of legal reforms that overlook the deep-rooted sociological realities of patriarchy and tradition. When honour killings are treated as just ordinary murders and child marriages are considered voidable rather than unacceptable, the law unintentionally reinforces existing patriarchal systems that deny women and children their full rights and personhood. While constitutional law champions the ideals of autonomy, dignity, and morality, current statutory frameworks need to evolve to reflect these core principles. A critical socio-legal perspective shows that tackling honour crimes and child marriage isn’t just about penalizing the acts of violence, but about fundamentally dismantling the underlying social customs and patriarchal norms that sustain them. True progress comes only when the legal definition of personhood is rethought in a meaningful way, one that ensures equality and human dignity for everyone, moving India closer to a just and comprehensive legal order.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs)
Why do we need a separate law for honour crimes when murder is already punishable under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita?
While the BNS does cover murder and its penalties, it does not fully address the underlying societal and patriarchal motives behind honour killings. These crimes are often committed by families or communities seeking to enforce social norms around caste, kinship ties, and female sexuality. Having a dedicated legal framework would help recognize this specific social context, hold collective groups like khap panchayats more accountable, and uphold the constitutional value of individual autonomy over community reputation.
Why does the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) treat child marriages as voidable rather than void from the start?
The PCMA considers such marriages voidable at the choice of the child involved, which means the marriage is still legally recognized unless someone formally seeks to annul it through the courts. This approach is a compromise influenced by deep-rooted cultural traditions that regard marriage as sacred, sometimes even when it involves children’s rights violations. If the law declared these marriages void immediately from the outset, it would outright challenge and potentially eliminate such practices. However, lawmakers have been cautious, mainly because of societal pressures and concerns about upsetting family stability.
What role does constitutional morality play in addressing these issues?
The Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India made it clear that constitutional morality should take precedence over social morality. When it comes to honour-related crimes and child marriage, this means putting the dignity, autonomy, and choices of individuals, especially women and children, above traditional societal norms. By referring to constitutional morality, courts are enabled to challenge and change deeply rooted patriarchal practices that may otherwise go unchallenged.
How does sociology contribute to our understanding of honour killings and child marriage?
Sociology reveals the deep-rooted social structures behind these practices like caste systems, gender expectations, kinship networks, and economic dependence. Simply implementing laws isn’t enough to eliminate them; understanding how these issues are woven into the fabric of community life is essential. Adopting a socio-legal perspective ensures that reforms target not just individual incidents but also the broader social conditions that sustain them.
Do international human rights frameworks play a role in strengthening India’s approach to these issues?
Absolutely. India has ratified key international agreements like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). These agreements obligate the government to eliminate harmful traditional practices and promote true equality for women and children. By integrating these commitments into Indian law, the country would not only bolster protections on the ground but also demonstrate its dedication to upholding global human rights standards.
What are the main obstacles in enforcing tougher laws against honour-based crimes and child marriage?
One of the biggest challenges is enforcement, which is often hampered by community resistance, social stigma, limited awareness, and even complicity from local authorities. Victims frequently face pressure from their families to stay silent, while law enforcement may hesitate to intervene in issues considered “private” or rooted in tradition. To make real progress, legal reforms need to be supported by ongoing community education, enablement initiatives for women, and clear accountability measures for those responsible for enforcement.
