Author: Shreya Gupta, Dharmashastra National Law University
TO THE POINT
The office of the Governor was constitutionally conceptualized as a neutral, non-partisan institution charged with the duty to protect the Constitution and ensure that the State governments ran smoothly within the federal scheme of things. Of late, however, the role of Governors has become increasingly suspect-particularly in Opposition-ruled States-of overstepping constitutional limits: delaying assent to Bills, interfering in the legislative process, questioning the legitimacy of elected governments, and invoking discretionary powers selectively have generated allegations of political bias. This growing friction raises a fundamental constitutional dilemma: whether the Governor continues to function as a constitutional guardian or whether the office has gradually transformed into a political instrument of the Union executive. The issue is no longer merely political but deeply constitutional, impinging on federalism, democratic accountability, and the balance of power between the Centre and the States.
ABSTRACT
Indeed, the Governor holds a crucial location in the quasi-federal structure of the Indian Constitution as a constitutional head of a State but constrained by the bounds of constitutional obedience. While it was originally contemplated by the makers of the Indian Constitution that in keeping with their apolitical nature, the Governor has increasingly been found to have been politicized in most States ruled by non-Centre political formations. This paper critically evaluates the judicially defined terms of powers and constitutional parameters of discretion, as well as judicially circumscribed preventive measures to restrict unbecoming activities as conceived and adjudicated by landmark decisions of the Indian Supreme Court in various constitutional crises.
USE OF LEGAL JARGON
The office of the Governor is constitutionally envisaged as a high constitutional functionary whose authority is derived strictly from the text, spirit, and scheme of the Constitution. The Governor is not an executive sovereign but a formal repository of executive power, required to exercise such power in accordance with the doctrine of aid and advice under Article 163. Any deviation from this principle amounts to a constitutional aberration and undermines the foundational premise of representative democracy. The discretionary powers vested in the Governor are exceptional, situational, and narrowly tailored; they cannot be expanded through political convenience or subjective satisfaction.
Within the Opposition-ruled State’s territories, the selectively expressed use of discretionary authority may present the appearance of the colourable exercise of constitutional power, where apparently lawful actions are taken for non-constitutionally related political purposes. This is contrary to the need for constitutional morality, requiring commitment to the value of democracy, institutional restraint, and political neutrality. The Governor’s refusal to act upon legislative Bills or intervene unconstitutionally within the Assembly proceedings, or partisanship under Article 356, attracts the element of arbitrariness, thereby precipitating judicial review. This impacts the doctrine of federal comity, the indispensable ingredient of the Indian constitutional structure, and the federaocomity relationship established under the doctrine of Cooperative Federalism.
Moreover, the doctrine of pleasure of the President under Article 156, blindly applied, tends to reduce the Governor to an inferior political subordinate of the Union executive. The Supreme Court has held that pleasure under the Constitution is not unlimited but is bound by the limits of unreasonableness and the constraints of non-arbitrariness, apart from upholding institutional integrity. The fiduciary discretion of exercising authority by the Governor, failing to promote the democratic will of an elected State government, violates the spirit of popular sovereignty, which is fundamental to constitutionalism.
THE PROOF
On a literal construction of Articles 153 to 163, it appears that it was never the intention of these Articles that the Governor should become a challenge to the Centre of power within the State. Article 154 of the Indian Constitution bestows the executive powers on the Governor, but its application is actually regulated by the elected Council of Ministers. The discretion left to the Governor is very restricted and situation-specific.
In Opposition-governed states, on the other hand, the role of the Governor tends to make evident the phenomenon of selective assertiveness of the Constitution—characterized by an evident lack of action on legislative Bills introduced to the assemblies, opinions on the correctness of state administration, and interventionism during politically unstable situations. This impacts the elected governments’ powers and achieves indirect control by the Centre. The lack of specified time constraints on such gubernatorial decisions, together with the discretion of “pleasure” under Article 156, only adds to this problem. This, in effect, brings about this inherent weakness of the Constitution, which is vulnerable to political manipulation and lacks integrity with both autonomy and democratic legitimacy of the federation.
CASE LAWS
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) – The Supreme Court made it clear that federalism is a basic structure of the Constitution and judicial review of the Governor’s report about applying President’s Rule under Article 356 of the Constitution is valid. The satisfaction of the Governor about applying Article 356 is amenable to judicial review and challenge. Objectives should be the foundation of a recommendation, and as such, Governor’s decisions should be free of any biased considerations to function as constitutional sentinels and as such, not as mere agents of any particular faction.
Rameshwar Prasas v. Union of India (2006) – In this instance, the Supreme Court struck down the dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly on the assumption of horse-trading in the Governor’s opinion. The court declared that the Governor cannot take actions on assumptions and surmises, let alone on political suspicions. This also highlights that the Governor’s function is not to anticipate and obstruct the democratic process but assist in it.The court has maintained that purely political suspicions are not good ground for interference in the Constitution.
BP Singhal v. Union of India (2010) – This matter concerns the arbitrary removal of the Governors following a change in the administration of the Union. In this matter, the judiciary confirmed that although the Governors serve at the pleasure of the President, such pleasure cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or political manner. This implied that political loyalty could not be a criterion for removal or appointments. This also recognises the fact that such frequent removals hamper the independence and neutrality associated with constitutional posts.
CONCLUSION
The intended character of the Constitutional Office of the Governor under the Constitution is that of a neutral Constitutional Sentinel, tasked with the obligation to maintain the balance between the Union and the States through the Constitution. Nevertheless, the present practical reality of this office, especially in Opposition-dominated States, points towards an ever-widening chasm between intended Constitutional reality and Political reality. The regular instances of deferred assent to legislation bills, discrimination in the discharge of discretionary authority, as well as dogged or subtle involvement in political activism have generated very serious apprehensions about the immanence of unconstitutionality in this regard.
Ultimately, the legitimacy of the office of the Governor flows not from constitutional text but from constitutional conduct marked by restraint, objectivity, and fidelity to democratic values. The route to restoring public confidence involves a renewed commitment to constitutional morality, implementation of long-pending reform recommendations, and respect for democratic mandates of State electorates. It is only then that the Governor can play the true role of a neutral constitutional functionary and not a contested political actor in India’s federal structure and constitutional democracy.
FAQS
QUESTION 1 – WHY IS THE GOVERNOR’S POSITION MORE CONTROVERSIAL WHEN OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE RULING THEIR RESPECTIVE STATES?
The controversy arises in view of the fact that the Governors are nominated by the Union Government and in most States may hold their offices in States ruled by different political parties. Actions such as holding back their assent to Bills or otherwise getting involved in legislative matters are considered to have political overtones. This has resulted in a constitutional conflict between mandate and discretion in most instances. The lack of time constraints in most matters has made this controversy worse.
QUESTION 2 – DOES THE CONSTITUTION ALLOW THE GOVERNOR TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT?
The Constitution permits independent action only in narrowly defined discretionary situations. Article 163 mandates that the Governor ordinarily act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Discretion is the exception, not the norm. Judicial interpretation has consistently restricted this discretion to prevent misuse. Independent action outside these limits is unconstitutional.
QUESTION 3 – CAN JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLY TO DECISIONS OF GOVERNOR DISCRETION?
Although Article 361 provides personal immunity to the Governor, their acts can be reviewed by courts. The courts can scrutinize the relevant matter and reasoning of the gubernatorial acts. If any of these acts are deemed to be arbitrary, mala fide, and unconstitutional, they can be struck down. The judicial review mechanism serves to protect and safeguard the provisions of the constitution.
QUESTION 4 – WHAT CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE TO REINSTATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEUTRALITY OF THE GOVERNOR?
Reforms should bring in a transparent and consultational method of appointment, a fixed tenure, and proper norms regarding the discretionary powers. Decisions should be time-bound, particularly in the context of Article 200. Implementation of the recommendations of commissions such as Sarkaria and Punchhi will help in maintaining a proper balance of power in a federal setup. But, most important of all, one needs to stick to the norms of constitutional morality.
