AIR 1962 SC 847
Mayukha Kommoju, Student at Damodaram Sanjivayya National Law University
This landmark judgment compares Spes Successionis under Section 6(a) of the Act to the Rule of Feeding the Grant by Estoppel under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TOPA).
APPELLANT: JUMMA MASJID, MERCARA
RESPONDENT: KODIMANIANDADRA DEVIAH
FACTS:
In a joint family, three brothers—Santhappa (B1), Najundappa (B2), and Basappa (B3) lived together. Santhappa (B1) died unmarried. Basappa (B3) passed away in 1901, leaving behind his widow, Gangamma (W1). Najundappa (B2) died in 1907, survived by his widow, Ammakka (W2), who inherited all the family properties. The brothers also had a sister, who predeceased them, leaving behind two children and three grandsons: Basappa (G1), Mallappa (G2), and Santhappa (G3).
The grandsons, being heirs under spes successionis, were designated to inherit the family property, with Basappa (G1) allocated ½ share and Mallappa (G2) and Santhappa (G3) each receiving ¼ share. On November 18, 1920, the grandsons sold the suit properties to Ganapathi (T), leading him to believe they were the rightful owners. Gangamma (W1) contested this, asserting her ownership. The court ruled in her favor, recognizing her as the rightful owner. However, per Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act (TOPA), 1882, the transfer to Ganapathi was still considered valid. Consequently, Ganapathi applied to the Revenue Authorities to transfer the land patta from Gangamma’s name to his own, as per the sale deed.
Before the second appeal, Gangamma (W1) died, passing the property to the grandsons. At this juncture, the Jumma Masjid, Mercara, intervened, claiming entitlement to the properties on two grounds: firstly, an alleged gift from W1 before her death, and secondly, a deed of release from B1, one of the reversioners, who relinquished his half-share in the properties to the mosque for Rs. 300.
The Revenue Authorities rejected the Masjid’s claim and ordered that Ganapathi’s name be entered as the property owner. Ganapathi contended that he was unaware that the three reversioners lacked actual ownership when they sold him the property. He argued that, under Section 43 of TOPA, 1882, which incorporates the Rule of Estoppel, he should be entitled to the property now that the reversioners were in actual possession following W1’s death.
Conversely, the Masjid argued that the reversioners were merely expectant heirs without any title at the time of the sale, rendering their transfer to Ganapathi void under Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. The Masjid claimed that, given the reversioners’ lack of entitlement to transfer the property at the time, the sale to Ganapathi was invalid.
ISSUE:
Whether a transfer of property, in return for some consideration, made by a person who represents that he has a present and transferable interest in that property, while in reality, he possesses only a spec succession, within the protection of Section 43 of the TOPA, 1882?
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
Considering the scope of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it clearly applies whenever a person transfers property to which they have no title, representing that they have a present and transferable interest therein, and the transferee, acting on that representation, takes the transfer for consideration. When these conditions are satisfied, the section stipulates that if the transferor subsequently acquires the property, the transferee becomes entitled to it, provided the transfer has not been rescinded or cancelled and is still subsisting. There is an exception for transferees who have acted in good faith and without notice of the rights under the prior transfer. Beyond this exception, the section is absolute and unqualified in its operation. It applies to all transfers meeting the prescribed conditions, regardless of whether the defect in the transferor’s title arises from having no interest in the property or from having an interest as an expectant heir.
The appellant argues that Section 43 must be read subject to Section 6(a) of the Act, which states that “The chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman or any other mere possibility of a like nature, cannot be transferred.” They claim that if Section 43 is interpreted to apply to transfers of spes successionis, it would nullify Section 6(a). Hence, Section 43 should be construed as excluding such cases. This argument effectively suggests adding an exception to Section 43, stating, “Nothing in this section shall operate to confer on the transferee any title if the transferor had, at the date of the transfer, an interest of the kind mentioned in Section 6(a).”
However, as Lord Loreburn L.C. observed in Vickers v. Evans, “We are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.”
The appellant’s reason for this interpretation is that applying Section 43 to transfers of spes successionis would nullify Section 6(a). However, Sections 6(a) and 43 address different subjects and do not conflict. Section 6(a) prohibits the transfer of certain property interests, while Section 43 addresses representations of title made by a transferor who had no title at the time of transfer and provides that the transfer shall attach to the title subsequently acquired by the transferor.
The illustration in Section 43 supports this view: “A, a Hindu, who has separated from his father B, sells to C three fields, X, Y, and Z, representing that A is authorized to transfer the same. Of these fields, Z does not belong to A, it having been retained by B on the partition; but on B’s dying, A as heir obtains Z. C, not having rescinded the contract of sale, may require A to deliver Z to him.” When A sold field Z, he had only a spes successionis, but upon inheriting it, he became entitled to it, supporting the argument against the appellant. In conclusion, illustrations appended to a section are valuable in construing its true scope and should not be rejected unless there is a compelling reason. As the Judicial Committee stated in “Mahomed Shedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark,” illustrations provided by the Legislature are intended to be helpful in applying the statute and should not be dismissed unless they are clearly repugnant to the section itself.
PRECEDENT ANALYSIS
The District Judge of Coorg held that the alleged gift by Gangamma on September 5, 1932, had not been established. This ground of title was abandoned by the appellant in the High Court, so it is not considered further. The District Judge then examined the title claimed by the appellant under the release deed, Ex. A, executed by Santhappa. The judge found that Ganapathi had purchased the properties under Ex. III based on the representation that the vendors had acquired them on the death of Ammakka in 1910, thus granting Ganapathi a good title under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court of Madras, and due to conflicting authorities on the issue, the case was referred to a Full Bench. The Full Bench agreed that the purchaser under Ex. III acted on the representation as to title, and since the sale was of a present interest and not a mere future right, Section 43 applied, making the sale effective upon the vendors acquiring the title on Gangamma’s death on February 17, 1933. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The appellant then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(c), which was granted by the High Court of Mysore after the matter was transferred under Section 4 of Act 72 of 1952.
The appellant argued that there could be no estoppel against a statute and that transfers prohibited by Section 6(a) could not be protected by Section 43. While this argument holds weight if considered solely on Section 6(a), the matter also involves Section 43, which protects transferees who rely on erroneous representations of present title. The courts below found that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of this section, raising a plea of estoppel under the statute rather than against it. The appellant also cited cases where estoppel was deemed inapplicable to minors transferring property under false representations of age, noting that Section 43 applies to transfers failing for lack of title, not capacity.
Several important cases have addressed this issue. In “Alamanaya Kunigari Nabi Sab v. Murukuti Papiah,” the Madras High Court ruled that Section 43 protected a mortgage executed by a son over his father’s property, which he inherited after the father’s death, distinguishing it from transfers explicitly prohibited by Section 6(a). However, in “The Official Assignee, Madras v. Sampath Naidu”, a different view was taken, holding that mortgages created by a person with only a spes successionis could not be validated under Section 43. The Madras High Court’s decision in Alamanaya Kunigari Nabi Sab v. Murukuti Papiah was later supported by the Bombay and Patna High Courts, emphasizing that Section 43 applied when a transferor misrepresented a present interest.
Ultimately, the interpretation that Section 43 applies to transfers where the transferor misrepresents a present interest is supported by the majority of judicial opinion. In the current case, Santhappa’s representation in Ex. III was acted upon by the purchaser, thereby conferring title upon the death of Gangamma. Therefore, the subsequent release under Ex. A did not vest any title in the appellant.
COURT’S REASONING
Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act enacts a rule of substantive law, while Section 43 enacts a rule of estoppel, which is evidentiary. These provisions operate in different fields and conditions without conflict. Section 43’s utility would be largely undermined if it did not protect transfers made by individuals with only a spes successionis at the time of transfer. This section embodies a rule of estoppel, meaning a person cannot contradict their previous representations if another party has acted on them. Whether the representation was made fraudulently or innocently is irrelevant; what matters is that the representation was made and the transferee relied on it. If the transferee knew the transferor lacked title, Section 43 does not apply, and the transfer fails under Section 6(a). However, if the transferee acted on the representation, they should benefit from Section 43, regardless of the transferor’s fraudulent intent.
CONCLUSION
The court held that when a person transfers property representing, he has a present interest in that property. In contrast, he has, in fact, only a spes successionis, the transferee (means to whom the property is transferred) is entitled to the benefit of Section 43, if he has taken the transfer on the faith of that representation and for consideration. The Apex Court further held that the courts below were right in upholding the respondents’ title.
