Author: Ayushi Raj, Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla
To the Point
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, which allows the imposition of President’s Rule in a state, was envisioned as a constitutional safety valve — a means to protect the democratic fabric of the nation in times of constitutional breakdown in a state. However, its practical application has often betrayed the principle of federalism, revealing a troubling history of political manipulation. Though constitutionally valid, the frequent misuse of Article 356 has transformed it from a protective measure into a political weapon used by the Union government to destabilize opposition-ruled states. From the arbitrary dismissal of elected governments to the stifling of political dissent, the history of President’s Rule underlines an enduring tension between the Centre’s authority and the States’ autonomy. While landmark judgments such as S.R. Bommai v. Union of India have attempted to restrict its misuse, the provision continues to provoke debate over whether it safeguards constitutional order or endangers democratic balance.
Abstract
This article undertakes a critical exploration of Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, focusing on the tension between its constitutional purpose and political misuse. Originally intended as a safeguard to maintain constitutional machinery in a state, Article 356 has frequently been invoked for political motives, often against democratically elected governments. The research method involves a doctrinal analysis of constitutional provisions, Constituent Assembly debates, and landmark judicial pronouncements such as S.R. Bommai v. Union of India and Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India. This article also examines statistical data of its use and the political contexts that shaped it, thereby uncovering patterns of central overreach. The study evaluates constitutional safeguards, judicial oversight mechanisms, and legislative proposals to limit misuse. Ultimately, it argues for a stricter standard of review and a federalist rebalancing to ensure that Article 356 functions as a constitutional emergency tool and not as an instrument of partisan power.
Use of Legal Jargon
Article 356 embodies the principle of constitutional emergency, allowing the President to assume control of a state government if there is a failure of constitutional machinery. This action must be based on a Governor’s report or otherwise, if the President is satisfied. However, the term “satisfaction of the President” is not absolute and is subject to judicial review, as held in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, which emphasized justiciability of Presidential Proclamations under Article 356. The doctrine of federalism, a basic structure of the Constitution, limits arbitrary central intervention. Additionally, the misuse of Article 356 violates the principles of representative democracy and popular sovereignty. Legal scholars have also drawn parallels between misuse of Article 356 and executive despotism, calling for an institutional mechanism that ensures constitutional morality and political neutrality in its invocation.
The Proof
The Constitution of India, under Part XVIII, outlines Emergency Provisions, including Article 356. Since its inception, Article 356 has been used over 125 times, with its most rampant misuse occurring during the era of Indira Gandhi. In 1977, after the Emergency ended, the Janata Party came to power and dismissed nine Congress-ruled state governments under Article 356 — an act purely driven by political vengeance.
In the landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court significantly curtailed the arbitrary use of Article 356. The Court ruled that the President’s satisfaction is not immune to judicial scrutiny, and a proclamation under Article 356 is justiciable. It also held that floor tests in the Legislative Assembly are the only legitimate way to test majority.
Despite this, misuse continued. In Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006), the dissolution of the Bihar Assembly was declared unconstitutional as it was based on hypothetical defections, not a genuine breakdown of constitutional machinery.
The Sarkaria Commission (1988) and the Punchhi Commission (2010) also underscored that Article 356 should be used sparingly and only as a last resort, not as a tool to resolve political rivalries. Yet, central governments have often invoked it for electoral gain or to install puppet regimes.
Case Laws
1. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1
The Supreme Court laid down stringent guidelines for the imposition of President’s Rule and emphasized federalism as a basic feature. It ruled that the proclamation under Article 356 is justiciable and must pass judicial review. The judgment established that floor tests are the only legitimate means to determine majority.
2. Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1
The dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly was declared unconstitutional. The Court held that even the apprehension of horse-trading is not sufficient ground for invoking Article 356 unless a breakdown actually occurs.
3. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592
This case upheld the Centre’s power under Article 356 but took a broad view of the President’s satisfaction. However, it was later diluted by the stricter Bommai guidelines.
4. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, (2016) 8 SCC 1
Though not directly on Article 356, the case reinforced the judiciary’s role in safeguarding legislative autonomy and democratic processes against arbitrary executive actions.
Conclusion
President’s Rule, as envisaged in Article 356, is constitutionally valid but politically controversial. While it was intended to protect the integrity of the Constitution in states, its use over the decades has often violated the spirit of federalism and democracy. Judicial safeguards like those in S.R. Bommai have created some checks, but loopholes remain. The Union’s dominant role in deciding state fate through a loosely worded clause is problematic for Indian federalism. Reforms, including mandatory floor tests, strict adherence to judicial review, and perhaps even constitutional amendment, are needed to prevent political misuse. The key lies in upholding constitutional morality, ensuring that President’s Rule is a rare exception — not the norm — in a thriving democracy.
FAQS
Q1: What is Article 356 of the Indian Constitution?
Article 356 empowers the President to impose President’s Rule in a state if the constitutional machinery breaks down. It allows suspension of state government functions and centralizes power temporarily in the Union.
Q2: Is the use of Article 356 subject to judicial review?
Yes. The Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai ruled that the President’s satisfaction is justiciable. Courts can strike down unconstitutional or mala fide use of Article 356.
Q3: How has Article 356 been misused?
Article 356 has been misused over 100 times, often to dismiss state governments run by rival parties. Political motivations have guided many such instances, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s.
Q4: What safeguards exist against misuse?
Post S.R. Bommai, safeguards include mandatory floor tests to prove majority, judicial review of the President’s decision, and constitutional conventions emphasizing restraint and federal balance.
Q5: What do commissions recommend regarding Article 356?
The Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions recommend that Article 356 should be used only as a last resort. They suggest that the Governor’s report must be objective and that democratic remedies like floor tests should be prioritized.
Q6: Can Parliament stop the imposition of President’s Rule?
Yes. A proclamation under Article 356 must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within two months. If not approved, it lapses. Parliament can also revoke an ongoing President’s Rule by passing a resolution.
