Author: Meenakshi Tripathi, Sgt University,Gurugram
LinkedIn Profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/meenakshi-tripathi-236466310
To the Point
India’s criminal justice system generates an enormous digital footprint. Every FIR, chargesheet, order, and judgment eventually finds its way onto court websites, legal databases such as Indian Kanoon, and news archives. For a person who is acquitted, discharged, or whose case is quashed, this footprint does not disappear with the verdict. A search of their name continues to surface old allegations long after the law has cleared them, often causing lasting damage to reputation, employment, and social standing. This has revived the debate on whether such individuals possess a “right to be forgotten” (RTBF) that permits them to have their names de-indexed, masked, or removed from publicly searchable criminal records.
The Delhi High Court’s ruling of 29 May 2026 in Laksh VirSingh Yadav v. Union of India has brought this question to the forefront of criminal procedure and constitutional law simultaneously. The Court recognised RTBF as a facet of the right to privacy under Article 21, while also crafting a limited remedy of de-indexing and masking rather than outright deletion, so as to preserve the principle of open justice. This article examines that tension: how criminal procedure, which depends on transparent, permanent, and verifiable records, can coexist with an individual’s constitutional interest in not being permanently defined by a closed criminal case.
Use of Legal Jargon
● Right to be Forgotten (RTBF): The claimed entitlement of an individual to have personal information, including past criminal proceedings, removed or made inaccessible from public digital platforms once it no longer serves a current public purpose.
● Informational Privacy: A component of the right to privacy that protects control over the collection, storage, and dissemination of personal data, recognised as part of Article 21 of the Constitution.
● Open Justice Principle: The doctrine that judicial proceedings and records must remain publicly accessible to ensure accountability, deter arbitrary decision-making, and preserve public confidence in the judiciary.
● De-indexing: Removing a specific web page or document from a search engine’s index so that it no longer appears in name-based search results, without deleting the underlying record itself.
● Masking: Redacting or concealing a party’s name and identifying details from a digitised judgment or order while keeping the substantive record intact and accessible.
● Expungement: The formal erasure or sealing of a criminal record from official databases, distinct from mere de-indexing since it removes the record from circulation altogether.
● Doctrine of Proportionality: A constitutional test requiring that any restriction on a fundamental right, or any competing claim between two rights, be necessary, suitable, and the least restrictive means of achieving the stated aim.
● Sub Judice: A matter that is still under judicial consideration and therefore not appropriate for public prejudgment or premature disclosure.
The Proof
The constitutional foundation for RTBF in India traces back to the nine-judge bench decision affirming privacy as a fundamental right, which held that informational privacy is protected under Article 21 but is subject to reasonable restrictions applying the tests of legality, necessity, and proportionality. Against this stands Article 19(1)(a) and the constitutionally rooted principle of open courts, under which judicial records are treated as public documents open to scrutiny by litigants, researchers, journalists, and the public at large.
Statutorily, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDPA) contains provisions relating to the erasure of personal data on withdrawal of consent, but its rules on erasure are not yet operational, and the Act does not squarely address judicial or criminal records, which fall outside its exemptions for law-enforcement and record-keeping functions. In the absence of a dedicated statutory erasure right for criminal records, courts have stepped in to fashion relief directly from Article 21.
On the procedural side, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) continues the position under the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure that police diaries, case records, and final reports are official documents maintained for institutional and evidentiary purposes, not for indefinite public circulation on private platforms. However, once a chargesheet or judgment enters the public domain through certified copies, media reporting, or online legal databases, procedural law offers no mechanism to recall it. This gap is precisely what recent RTBF litigation has sought to fill through constitutional writ jurisdiction rather than statutory amendment, since BNSS itself is silent on de-indexing, masking, or online erasure.
The evidentiary character of digital court records is also relevant under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), since certified digitised judgments and orders enjoy presumptive authenticity as electronic records. Any judicially ordered masking must therefore be executed carefully so that the integrity and evidentiary value of the underlying record is not compromised, even as its public searchability is restricted.
A comparative reference point is Article 17 of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, which codifies a right to erasure but carves out an express exception for data processed for legal claims, archiving, and public-interest purposes, including judicial records. Indian courts have effectively arrived at a functionally similar outcome, but through constitutional adjudication rather than legislative codification, since neither the DPDPA nor the BNSS presently contains an equivalent carve-out tailored to criminal proceedings.
Applying the four-fold Puttaswamy proportionality test to RTBF claims over criminal records requires that any restriction on open access be backed by law, pursue a legitimate aim such as protecting the dignity of an exonerated person, be a suitable and necessary means of achieving that aim, and be the least restrictive option available. Measured against this test, wholesale deletion of a judgment fails the necessity and least-restrictive-means limbs, since de-indexing achieves the same protective purpose with a smaller institutional cost, which is precisely the reasoning the Delhi High Court adopted in fashioning its 2026 framework.
Abstract
This article examines the emerging conflict between the right to be forgotten and the principle of open justice within the framework of Indian criminal procedure. It analyses how the digitisation of court records and the proliferation of online legal databases have transformed once-obscure criminal records into permanently searchable public information, disproportionately affecting individuals who have been acquitted, discharged, or whose proceedings have concluded in their favour. Drawing on the constitutional recognition of informational privacy and the Delhi High Court’s 2026 ruling establishing a de-indexing and masking framework, the article argues that a calibrated, case-by-case proportionality approach, rather than either blanket erasure or absolute permanence, offers the most workable reconciliation between an individual’s dignity interest and the institutional need for transparent, verifiable criminal justice records.
Case Laws
1. R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994)
This early privacy case held that an individual’s right to be let alone extends to matters concerning family, marriage, and personal life, subject to exceptions where information enters the public record through court proceedings. It laid the groundwork for treating court records as a category where the ordinary privacy shield weakens once a matter becomes part of public litigation.
2. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)
The nine-judge bench unanimously recognised privacy, including informational privacy, as intrinsic to Article 21. It introduced the proportionality standard that has since become the analytical tool for weighing an individual’s data privacy interest against competing public and institutional interests, including access to court records.
3. Dharamraj Bhanushankar Dave v. State of Gujarat (2017)
One of the earliest Indian RTBF claims, where the Gujarat High Court declined to direct removal of a judgment from an online database, holding that once a matter is decided in open court, the judgment forms part of the public record and cannot be selectively erased merely because the petitioner was acquitted.
4. Jorawer Singh Mundy v. Union of India (2021)
The Delhi High Court granted interim relief directing a legal database to remove a judgment naming a foreign national who had been acquitted of narcotics charges, noting the disproportionate impact on his career and reputation abroad. This marked a shift toward individualised relief rather than an absolute bar on RTBF claims.
5. Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India & Connected Matters (2026)
In this landmark ruling delivered on 29 May 2026, the Delhi High Court consolidated over thirty petitions from acquitted persons and parties to settled disputes, holding that RTBF is a facet of informational privacy under Article 21. Rather than ordering deletion of judgments, the Court devised a framework of de-indexing and masking of personal identifiers from search results, while preserving the underlying judicial record for institutional and public-interest access, and directed the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology to ensure compliance by intermediaries.
6. Subhranshu Rout v. State of Odisha (2021)
The Orissa High Court, while declining bail in a case involving morphed and objectionable images of the complainant uploaded on social media, extensively discussed RTBF as an emerging facet of privacy and observed that victims of such offences should eventually be able to seek removal of content once the criminal process concludes, situating RTBF within substantive criminal law and not merely procedural record-keeping.
7. Indian Kanoon’s Pending Appeal (2026)
Indian Kanoon has challenged the Laksh Vir Singh Yadav framework before a division bench, contending that undefined standards such as “no longer relevant” or absence of “legitimate public purpose” will convert every masking request into fresh litigation and undermine the free public legal database it maintains. This ongoing appeal illustrates that the contours of RTBF in criminal records remain unsettled and are actively being shaped by the higher judiciary.
Conclusion
The right to be forgotten cannot be transplanted into criminal procedure as an absolute right of erasure, nor can it be dismissed outright in deference to open justice. Criminal records serve institutional functions: they inform future proceedings, support law-enforcement functions, enable academic and journalistic scrutiny, and preserve accountability. At the same time, an acquitted person carries no criminal liability in the eyes of the law, and a search-engine-driven, permanent digital association with a closed case imposes a punishment that no court ever handed down.
The workable path, as the 2026 Delhi High Court ruling suggests, lies in graduated remedies rather than binary outcomes. De-indexing and masking allow the substantive record to remain intact for institutional, evidentiary, and research purposes while limiting casual, name-based discoverability that causes disproportionate harm without corresponding public benefit. What remains necessary is a clearer statutory or procedural framework, ideally through amendment or clarification within the BNSS or the DPDPA rules, so that courts are not left to develop ad hoc standards for every individual petition. Until then, the judiciary’s proportionality-based, case-specific approach remains the most defensible middle ground between dignity and transparency.
FAQ
Q1. Does the right to be forgotten mean a criminal record is permanently deleted?
No. Courts have generally ordered de-indexing or masking of personal identifiers rather than deletion of the underlying judgment, which remains accessible through official court repositories.
Q2. Who can claim this right in the criminal law context?
Relief has largely been granted to individuals who were acquitted, discharged, or whose proceedings concluded in their favour, where continued name-based visibility causes disproportionate reputational harm without any remaining public interest.
Q3. Does an ongoing criminal case qualify for such relief?
No. Matters that are sub judice or involve continuing public interest, such as offences against public officials or matters of financial fraud, are treated as falling outside the scope of RTBF relief.
Q4. Is there a dedicated statute in India recognising this right?
Not yet in operative form. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 contains erasure-related provisions, but its implementing rules are still pending, so courts currently anchor RTBF directly in Article 21.
Q5. How does this affect legal databases such as Indian Kanoon?
Such platforms may be directed to restrict name-based search functionality for specific individuals, but courts have been cautious not to compromise the broader public-interest function these databases serve for legal research and transparency.
Q6. Can a victim, rather than an accused, invoke this right?
Yes. Courts have recognised that victims of certain offences, particularly those involving non-consensual sharing of images or information, may also seek removal of related content once the criminal process concludes and their protective interest outweighs any remaining public purpose.
Q7. What is the difference between de-indexing and expungement?
De-indexing restricts a record from appearing in name-based search results while the record itself remains on the original database. Expungement goes further by formally erasing or sealing the record from official circulation altogether; Indian courts have so far granted only the former in the RTBF context.
