Author: Harmanpreet Kaur
College: Panjab University, Chandigarh
LinkedIn Link: www.linkedin.com/in/preetharman47
TO THE POINT
Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita criminalizes sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means where the act does not amount to rape. The provision applies where consent is induced through:
• False promise of marriage;
• False promise of employment;
• False promise of promotion;
• Concealment of identity; or
• Other specified fraudulent means under the statute.
The key issue is not merely whether the promise was broken, but whether it was dishonest from the very beginning. The controversy arises because romantic relationships often fail for genuine reasons. If every unsuccessful relationship were treated as a criminal offence, the criminal justice system would be drawn deeply into private emotional disputes.
USE OF LEGAL JARGON
The interpretation of Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is deeply rooted in established principles of criminal jurisprudence. A proper understanding of the provision requires an examination of legal concepts such as mens rea, actus reus, free and informed consent, fraudulent misrepresentation, and the burden of proof. In criminal law, mens rea is a fundamental ingredient of most offences, requiring the prosecution to establish that the accused possessed a dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the alleged promise was made. Similarly, actus reusunder Section 69 consists of obtaining sexual intercourse through specified forms of deception.Central to this is the doctrine of “vitiation of consent,” which establishes that if intimacy is based on a fundamental lie, the consent given is legally void because it was never truly “informed.” The doctrine of fraudulent misrepresentationalso assumes considerable importance. It refers to a knowingly false representation made with the intention of inducing another person to act to their detriment. Section 69 is a penal provision affecting personal liberty, courts are also expected to apply the principle of strict construction of criminal statutes, ensuring that the provision is interpreted narrowly and in accordance with constitutional safeguards under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
THE PROOF
Under the old IPC framework, there was no specific section for relationship fraud. Prosecutors had to squeeze these cases into rape charges. According to a prominent 2013 study of rape trials in Delhi’s district courts, roughly one in four (25%) rape cases stemmed from allegations of a broken promise to marry. The strongest argument in favor of Section 69 is that it acknowledges a social reality. Many women enter relationships believing representations that are later revealed to be deliberately false. In such cases, the emotional and sexual exploitation may be substantial even if the technical ingredients of rape are absent. The most difficult issue is proving dishonest intention at the inception of the relationship. A person may sincerely intend to marry but later change his mind because of family opposition, financial difficulties, incompatibility, or other circumstances. If courts infer guilt merely from the fact that marriage did not occur, the distinction between fraud and disappointment disappears. Critics argue that Section 69 may encourage parties to convert relationship disputes into criminal proceedings. Arrest, investigation, and social stigma can themselves become forms of punishment even before guilt is established. Therefore, the provision must not become a substitute for resolving personal grievances. Section 69 potentially engages Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects personal liberty and privacy. At the same time, Article 14 requires equal protection of the laws, and the state is entitled to protect individuals from exploitation. The constitutional challenge is to balance autonomy with protection.
ABSTRACT
For over two decades, Indian courts had grappled with cases where sexual intercourse was obtained on a false promise of marriage, treating such consent as “vitiated” under Section 90 IPC and prosecuting the conduct as rape under Section 375 IPC. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860, introduced several significant reforms in Indian criminal law. It introduced Section 69, punishing sexual intercourse obtained by “deceitful means” — a false promise of marriage, a fake job or promotion offer, or marriage after concealing one’s identity — where the act falls short of rape. The enactment of this provision reflects the legislature’s intent to protect women from emotional, psychological, and sexual exploitation. This article critically examines Section 69 by analyzing its legislative purpose, legal framework, judicial precedents, constitutional implications, and comparative perspectives.
CASE LAWS
1. Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003): The Supreme Court held that every breach of promise to marry does not amount to rape. Criminal liability arises only where the promise was false from the very beginning and intended solely to obtain consent.
2. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019): The court ruled that to establish a criminal offense, the promise of marriage must be false from its very inception and must have had a direct, immediate connection on a woman’s decision to consent.A subsequent breakdown of a relationship due to family resistance or compatibility issues does not equal a crime.
3. Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court, 2025): Proceedings were quashed where the parties had been in a consensual relationship for roughly fifteen years before it broke down, the Court holding that such a prolonged, voluntary relationship could not retroactively be recast as an offence under Section 69.
4. Kuldeep Verma v. State of UP and Another (2026): In a recent landmark ruling directly addressing Section 69 of the BNS, the Allahabad High Court refused to quash criminal proceedings against a man who engaged in an 11-year relationship with a woman by deliberately concealing the fact that he was already married with children. The Court held that hiding a preexisting marriage perfectly satisfies the legal definition of obtaining consent via “deceitful means” under Section 69.
CONCLUSION
Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita is a classic double-edged sword because it is both progressive and problematic. It is progressive as it recognises that deception can undermine genuine consent and that women may suffer serious exploitation outside the traditional framework of rape. It is problematic because its broad language may invite criminal prosecution in situations involving ordinary relationship breakdowns. The success of Section 69 will therefore depend less upon its wording than upon careful judicial interpretation that distinguishes deliberate fraud from ordinary relationship breakdowns. Future jurisprudence should develop objective standards for determining fraudulent intent, ensure strict compliance with the burden of proof, and safeguard both victims’ rights and the constitutional protections available to accused persons. Only through balanced interpretation can Section 69 fulfill its intended purpose without compromising fundamental principles of criminal justice.
FACTUAL ASKED QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
Q.1 How is Section 69 different from rape under Section 63 BNS?
Rape under Section 63 involves the absence of valid consent altogether, including consent vitiated by fear, coercion, or certain kinds of misconception of fact, and carries a minimum sentence of ten years extending to life imprisonment. Section 69 is expressly confined to cases “not amounting to the offence of rape” and caps punishment at ten years with no prescribed minimum, though the two provisions overlap considerably in the fact patterns they can cover.
Q.2 Is Section 69 gender-neutral?
Only partially. The offender is described in gender-neutral terms (“whoever”), so it can, in principle, be invoked against a woman as well as a man. The protected victim, however, is expressly limited to “a woman” — a man who is deceived into sexual intercourse has no equivalent protection under this provision.
Q.3 If a couple breaks up due to family disapproval, can the man be jailed under Section 69?
No. Courts have repeatedly clarified that a “breach of promise” (where a person genuinely intended to marry but couldn’t due to circumstances like family opposition) is not the same as a “false promise”.Criminal liability only kicks in if the promise was a conscious lie from the very first day it was made.
Q.4 Why has Section 69 become controversial?
Because it seeks to protect women from exploitation while also raising concerns regarding evidentiary difficulties, misuse, and the expansion of criminal liability into private relationships.
