Author: Mahi Sinha, Lloyd School of Law
INTRODUCTION:
Every constitutional democracy must reconcile two goods that, left unchecked, tend to pull in opposite directions. The first is the citizen’s entitlement to scrutinise the exercise of power conducted in her name. The second is the individual’s entitlement to repose beyond the gaze of the State and of her fellow citizens. For nearly two decades, Indian law mediated between these claims through a carefully calibrated provision of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”): Section 8(1)(j). Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (“DPDP Act”) has now recast that provision in a single, laconic sentence. The amendment is modest in length but potentially seismic in consequence.
This article inquires whether the amendment merely harmonises two statutes or quietly dismantles a hard-won equilibrium. It contends that the provision, as drafted, tilts the scales decisively towards opacity. It further contends that the resulting injury may be mitigated, though not wholly undone, through purposive interpretation, and that legislative correction remains the cleaner remedy.
TWO RIGHTS, ONE CONSTITUTIONAL HOME:
Neither privacy nor transparency finds express mention in Part III of the Constitution. Both are creatures of judicial exegesis, drawing their vitality from Articles 19(1)(a) and 21.
The right to know enjoys an old and distinguished lineage. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain(1975), the Supreme Court observed that a democratic government can have no secrets from those it governs, a theme developed with greater force in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1982). The doctrine acquired electoral content in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) and PUCL v. Union of India (2003), where voters were held entitled to know the antecedents of those who solicit their mandate. The RTI Act translated this jurisprudence into an enforceable statutory mechanism, its preamble invoking an informed citizenry and transparency as a bulwark against corruption.
Privacy attained express constitutional recognition in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017), in which a nine-judge Bench declared it intrinsic to life and personal liberty. Yet Puttaswamy did not enthrone privacy as an absolute. It subjected every infringement to a threefold scrutiny of legality, legitimate aim and proportionality. This is a point of considerable moment, for proportionality is precisely the analytical instrument that the original Section 8(1)(j) embodied, and precisely the one that the amended text relinquishes.
The two rights are therefore not adversaries by nature. They are siblings of a common constitutional parentage, and the question is how a statute ought to adjudicate between them.
THE ORIGINAL EQUILIBRIUM:
The RTI Act proceeds from a presumption of disclosure; the exemptions in Section 8 are exceptions to be construed strictly. Section 8(1)(j), in its original form, shielded personal information in two circumstances: where it bore no relationship to any public activity or interest, or where its disclosure would occasion an unwarranted invasion of the individual’s privacy. Even then, the exemption yielded where the Public Information Officer (“PIO”) or appellate authority was satisfied that a larger public interest justified disclosure. A proviso added a rule of parity: information that could not be denied to Parliament or a State Legislature could not be denied to the citizen.
The design possessed three cardinal virtues.
It was relational. The exemption turned upon the nexus between the information and public activity. A bureaucrat’s medical history was sheltered, but her sanctioned expenditure or the disciplinary outcome of her public office enjoyed no presumptive immunity.
It was adjudicative. The qualifier “unwarranted” conceded that some invasions of privacy are warranted, and the public interest override demanded a genuine exercise in weighing rather than a reflexive refusal.
It was anchored in legislative parity. The proviso denied the executive any claim to a secrecy that it could not assert before the people’s elected representatives.
The judiciary applied the provision with a sensibility neither cavalier nor timorous. In Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner (2013) and R.K. Jain v. Union of India (2013), the Court treated certain service-related particulars, such as appraisal records and the contents of confidential reports, as personal and ordinarily protected unless a larger public interest was demonstrated. In Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020), the Constitution Bench emphasised that privacy and transparency stand in no hierarchy, that the competing interests must be reconciled through proportionality, and that the public interest inquiry is irreducibly contextual. The lesson of that decision is that the method of balancing, rather than any categorical rule, is the proper idiom of adjudication.
By 2023, then, a settled body of doctrine existed. It guarded the genuinely private while preserving the citizen’s capacity to examine the conduct of public functionaries.
THE AMENDMENT AND ITS STRUCTURE:
Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act substitutes the original clause with a strikingly compressed formulation: it exempts information that “relates to personal information.” The qualifying phrases concerning public activity, unwarranted invasion and larger public interest have vanished. So too has the parity proviso.
The DPDP Act furnishes the surrounding machinery. “Personal data” denotes any data about an individual who is identifiable by or in relation to such data, a definition of formidable breadth. The Act also provides that, in the event of conflict, its own provisions shall prevail over other laws. Section 22 of the RTI Act had earlier asserted the supremacy of the RTI regime over inconsistent enactments, but a later and specific amendment to the RTI Act itself naturally prevails over that earlier assertion. The DPDP Rules, 2025 supply the operational framework, and the amendment to Section 8(1)(j) is understood to have taken effect upon their notification, while the more onerous compliance obligations are being phased in over a longer horizon. Constitutional challenges to the amendment have been brought before the Supreme Court, and the reader is cautioned to verify the present status of those proceedings.
Three structural features merit attention.
First, the exemption is now categorical. Where information relates to a person, the shield appears to descend without any inquiry into harm, relevance to public duty, or competing public interest.
Second, the phrase “relates to” is notoriously elastic. Almost any official record concerning a human being, whether a muster roll, a beneficiary register, a transfer order or a file noting an officer’s conduct, may be said to relate to someone.
Third, the institutional message is unmistakable. A PIO who reads the new clause is no longer invited to weigh anything. She is invited to refuse.
THE AMENDMENT INTERROGATED:
A. The Eclipse of Proportionality
Puttaswamy requires that any restriction upon a fundamental right pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary and proportionate to it. An exemption that operates irrespective of the weight of the competing public interest sits uneasily with that requirement when ranged against the right to information, itself an emanation of Article 19(1)(a). A restriction that cannot, by its own terms, yield even to an overwhelming public interest invites the objection that it is not narrowly tailored. The original Section 8(1)(j) satisfied the proportionality principle from within. The amended provision does not.
B. Public Servants and the Public Purse
The RTI movement was born of rural struggle. The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan in Rajasthan demanded copies of muster rolls and bills precisely because public works payments were being siphoned off in the names of fictitious or unpaid labourers. The mechanism of exposure lay in confronting official records with the lived testimony of identifiable individuals. Beneficiary lists for rations, pensions and employment guarantee wages are, in their essence, compilations of personal information. If they are categorically exempt, social audit forfeits its evidentiary foundation.
The same logic extends upwards. Whether a public official’s educational credentials are genuine, whether a licence was granted to a relative of the decision-maker, or how a particular appointment was procured are all questions concerning information that relates to identifiable persons. Under the former text, the public interest test allowed such inquiries to proceed. Under the latter, the burden shifts in practice to the citizen, who must scale a wall that the statute itself has raised.
C. The Asymmetry of Incentives
The institutional psychology of the amendment may weigh more heavily than its text. A PIO who wrongly refuses information is exposed to penalty under Section 20 of the RTI Act, yet such penalties are imposed sparingly. An officer who wrongly discloses personal data, by contrast, now operates in an environment in which the DPDP Act prescribes substantial monetary penalties for data fiduciaries who fail to safeguard personal data. The peril of refusal is small and diffuse; the peril of disclosure feels large and personal. A rationally self-protective bureaucracy will gravitate towards over-withholding, and the chilling effect will extend well beyond the cases the exemption strictly covers.
D. The Vanishing Proviso
The deleted proviso was a quiet guarantor of democratic symmetry. It forbade the executive from treating the citizen as less entitled than the legislator. Its removal means that information freely available to a Member of Parliament, through a question or a committee, may be refused to a citizen merely because it concerns a person. Whatever reservations one may entertain about the proviso’s drafting, its excision without any substitute principle is difficult to defend.
E. The Question of Residual Safeguards
Defenders of the amendment may invoke Section 8(2) of the RTI Act, which permits disclosure notwithstanding the exemptions in Section 8(1) where the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interest. That provision survives. A court committed to harmonious construction might hold that Section 8(2) continues to supply the missing balancing step.
The reading is plausible and ought to be pressed in litigation. But it is an interpretive rescue, not a legislative design. Section 8(2) is framed as an exceptional override, and its operation has historically been narrower and less routine than the integrated public interest test that once resided within the original clause. To rely upon it is to convert what was an organic component of the exemption into a separate, discretionary plea which the citizen must raise and the authority must be willing to entertain.
THE CASE FOR THE AMENDMENT
Intellectual honesty requires a fair hearing for the opposing view. Three arguments deserve respect.
The argument from coherence. A modern data protection statute cannot function if every public authority may be compelled, by a request under a different enactment, to release the very data it is bound to safeguard. Unless the two regimes are aligned, the RTI Act may become a back door through which personal data escapes into the hands of private actors, including those with commercial or malign motives.
The argument from abuse. Anyone acquainted with RTI practice knows that the Act has occasionally been deployed as an instrument of harassment: to settle personal scores, to coerce officials, or to extract the private particulars of ordinary people. A robust shield for personal information protects the powerless no less than the powerful.
The argument from administrability. The former public interest test imposed upon PIOs the unenviable duty of resolving delicate constitutional questions within short statutory timelines. A bright-line rule, its proponents say, promotes consistency.
The Union government has defended the change broadly on these lines, describing it as a harmonisation of two statutes and stressing that essential information about public functions remains accessible through proactive disclosure and other avenues.
These arguments are not frivolous, but they prove less than they promise. The legitimate apprehension of misuse could be met by a narrower exemption, confined to sensitive categories such as health, financial and intimate data, rather than by the sweeping exclusion of everything that relates to a person. The concern for administrability would justify guidance and training, not the abolition of the balancing test. And the argument from coherence overlooks that the original clause already protected privacy robustly. The DPDP Act added nothing to the protection of privacy that Section 8(1)(j) had not already supplied. What the amendment added was merely the removal of the counterweight.
A COMPARATIVE GLANCE
Other democracies have confronted the same collision and chosen differently. In the United Kingdom, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 exempts the personal data of third parties where disclosure would contravene data protection principles, but the analysis incorporates a legitimate-interests assessment, so that the interest in transparency is weighed rather than ignored. The decision in South Lanarkshire Council v. Scottish Information Commissioner (2013) illustrates the structured inquiry into necessity and balance. Within the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation, through its provision on public access to official documents, expressly contemplates that member states may reconcile access with data protection rather than subordinate one to the other. South Africa’s access-to-information legislation likewise protects the privacy of third parties but contains a public interest override.
The comparative lesson is consistent. Mature legal systems do not choose between privacy and transparency; they construct a mechanism for weighing them. India’s amendment is anomalous in dismantling the mechanism while retaining the exemption.
THE WAY FORWARD
Remedies are available at three levels.
Judicial. Courts and Information Commissions may read the amended clause alongside Section 8(2), treat the public interest override as continuing to operate, and insist upon proportionality as a constitutional imperative under Puttaswamy. They may also construe “personal information” purposively, so that information relating to the discharge of a public function, such as an official’s name, designation, emoluments, qualifications and official acts, is not regarded as private in the relevant sense. Precedent supports the proposition that a public role contracts the zone of reasonable privacy expectation. Should the constitutional challenges before the Supreme Court succeed, the Court may read down or strike the provision, thereby restoring the earlier equilibrium.
Legislative. The cleanest cure is to restore the public interest override and the parity proviso, and to confine the exemption to information that is genuinely private or sensitive. A statutory definition distinguishing information about public activity from information about private life would diminish both over-disclosure and over-withholding.
Administrative. Rules and guidelines should clarify that the routine disclosure of information concerning public functions does not offend data protection obligations. Training for PIOs, together with clear standards on severability and redaction, would permit records to be released with identifying particulars masked where the public interest can be served without exposing individuals. Information Commissions must also be adequately staffed and promptly constituted, for a debilitated appellate structure magnifies every defect in the substantive law.
CONCLUSION:
The amendment to Section 8(1)(j) is a case study in how a seemingly technical drafting choice can reorder constitutional priorities. Privacy merits vigorous protection, and Puttaswamy made that unmistakable. But the same Constitution that safeguards privacy also safeguards the citizen’s capacity to interrogate power, and the genius of the original Section 8(1)(j) lay in its refusal to treat these commitments as mutually exclusive.
By collapsing a nuanced, balancing provision into a categorical exemption, the DPDP Act risks converting a statute of transparency into a statute of presumptive secrecy wherever human beings appear in the record, which is to say nearly everywhere. The better view is that the amendment is vulnerable on proportionality grounds, mitigated at best by the continued existence of Section 8(2), and in urgent need of legislative repair. Until that repair arrives, the burden rests upon courts, Information Commissions and an alert citizenry to ensure that the right to be left alone does not curdle into a licence to remain unaccountable.
FAQ’s:
. What exactly did Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act change in the RTI Act?
It substituted the original Section 8(1)(j) with a compressed clause exempting information that “relates to personal information.” The earlier qualifiers, namely the absence of any relationship to public activity or interest, the requirement of an “unwarranted” invasion of privacy, the public interest override and the parity proviso concerning Parliament and State Legislatures, were all removed.
2. Does the RTI Act still contain any public interest override?
Section 8(2) survives, permitting disclosure notwithstanding the exemptions in Section 8(1) where the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interest. However, it is framed as an exceptional provision and has historically been invoked less routinely than the balancing test that once resided within the original Section 8(1)(j). Whether Section 8(2) can fully fill the gap is a question courts are yet to settle definitively.
3. Can a citizen still obtain information about a public official?
Much will depend on interpretation. A purposive reading would treat information relating to the discharge of public functions, such as name, designation, emoluments, qualifications and official acts, as falling outside genuinely “personal” information. But because the statutory text no longer expressly says so, Public Information Officers may adopt a cautious approach and refuse, leaving the applicant to pursue first appeal and the Information Commission.
4. Is personal information now absolutely exempt from disclosure?
On the face of the amended text, the exemption is categorical. In practice, its absoluteness is contestable. Courts may read it down in light of Article 19(1)(a), the proportionality standard in Puttaswamy, and the continuing operation of Section 8(2).
