Author: Gauri Aggarwal, a student at Symbiosis Law School, Pune.
Abstract
The Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024 proposes to institutionalise simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha and all State/Union Territory Legislative Assemblies through the insertion of Article 82A. While the government cites electoral economy, administrative efficiency, and governance stability as rationales, the proposal raises serious constitutional concerns. This article argues that the Bill undermines federalism, electoral fairness, and the basic structure doctrine, introducing risks of partisan manipulation, centralization of power, and distortion of local representation in India’s diverse federal democracy.
To the Point
Bill Overview: Article 82A mandates simultaneous elections and fixed terms for the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies. In case of premature dissolution, mid-term elections will only be for the remainder of the original five-year term.
Election Commission’s Discretion: Under Article 82A(5), the Election Commission of India (ECI) may recommend deferring elections to a State Assembly if simultaneous elections are not feasible, and the President may approve such deferral via Executive Order.
Problematic Centralization: The ECI is appointed by a predominantly executive-led committee. This opens space for partisan bias and undermines democratic neutrality.
Structural Violation: The proposal compromises the basic structure of the Constitution, particularly federalism, free and fair elections, and the representative character of the legislature.
Use of Legal Jargon
The proposal to institutionalize simultaneous elections through the insertion of Article 82A has profound constitutional implications, particularly concerning the basic structure doctrine, federalism, and electoral integrity.
Basic Structure Doctrine:
The Indian Constitution allows Parliament to amend its provisions under Article 368, but not in a way that alters or destroys its basic structure. This unwritten but judicially enforced doctrine protects core constitutional values like federalism, separation of powers, and free and fair elections.
Introducing fixed, uniform election cycles for both the Union and States interferes with these essential features. It imposes an artificial electoral symmetry that does not reflect the organic, separate existence of State governments under the Constitution. By doing so, it centralizes the electoral calendar and restricts the States’ constitutional right to complete their full tenure independently.
Violation of Federalism:
Federalism under the Indian Constitution is not just an administrative arrangement—it is a constitutional guarantee. The proposed amendment disregards the unique political timelines and mandates that each State independently carries from its electorate. By forcing States into a uniform election schedule, it indirectly allows the Union government to influence or even disrupt the tenure of State Assemblies, which violates the principle of autonomy of States.
Electoral Discretion and ECI’s Role:
Article 324 of the Constitution entrusts the Election Commission of India (ECI) with the authority to oversee, guide, and regulate the conduct of elections. However, the proposed Article 82A(5) grants the ECI the power to advise postponement of elections to a State Assembly, following which the President may issue an order based on that recommendation.
However, the provision lacks objective standards or transparent procedures for such deferrals. Given that the ECI’s appointment is currently controlled by a central executive-dominated committee, the absence of clear statutory limits raises concerns about partisan manipulation and executive overreach. This violates the independence of constitutional bodies, a key facet of the separation of powers doctrine.
Impact on Free and Fair Elections:
The principle of free and fair elections is part of the basic structure because it ensures democratic legitimacy. When voters are asked to cast ballots for both national and state governments at the same time, studies show that national issues dominate public discourse, often leading to “coattail voting”—where people vote for the same party at both levels, ignoring local issues. This undermines electoral representation, as regional concerns and local governance are sidelined.
Moreover, the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), which is enforced by the ECI during elections, restricts government actions to ensure fairness. If all elections are held simultaneously, the Union government—armed with disproportionate resources—will campaign nationwide, effectively drowning out smaller, regional voices. This tilts the electoral field and violates the constitutional principle of equality before the law under Article 14.
Case Laws
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225
In this landmark judgment, a 13-judge Bench of the Supreme Court ruled that while Parliament has wide powers to amend the Constitution under Article 368, it cannot alter or destroy its “basic structure.” The Court identified key features—such as federalism, separation of powers, and free and fair elections—as integral to the constitutional identity. Any amendment that disturbs this core is unconstitutional, even if passed by the required majority.
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1
This decision reaffirmed that federalism is not just a political principle but a constitutional mandate in India. The Court observed that the Union cannot arbitrarily override or dismiss democratically elected State governments. Importantly, it held that federalism forms part of the Constitution’s basic structure, and any attempt to weaken State autonomy violates this doctrine.
T.N. Seshan v. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 611
In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional status and institutional independence of the Election Commission of India (ECI) under Article 324. The Court stressed that the ECI must function free from executive interference, ensuring the integrity and impartiality of the electoral process.
Legal Challenges
Ambiguity under Article 82A(5):
The provision gives unfettered discretion to the ECI and President to defer elections without statutory safeguards. Absence of defined triggers (like natural disaster, armed conflict, or constitutional breakdown) violates procedural due process.
Appointment of ECI:
The members of the Election Commission of India are currently selected by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, one Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. Scholar Tarunabh Khaitan’s theory of “constitutional cuts” highlights how such structurally biased appointments allow indirect executive control over institutions, risking democratic backsliding.
Violation of Electoral Equity:
The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) prohibits misuse of government resources in campaigns. ONOE advantages national ruling parties by leveraging state apparatus across the country during a single electoral event.
Misalignment with Voter Autonomy:
Empirical studies show that simultaneous elections reduce issue-based voting. Voters are more likely to vote along party lines rather than on regional or policy issues, diluting the representative function of state elections.
Unequal Campaigning Ground:
Larger parties, especially the ruling national party, enjoy economies of scale, greater media access, and a stronger campaign machinery. This creates an uneven playing field, contrary to the democratic principle of electoral fairness.
Conclusion
Simultaneous elections may promise administrative efficiency and reduced expenditure, but the constitutional cost is prohibitive. ONOE infringes on the basic structure by centralizing power, disrupting electoral equity, and diminishing State autonomy. In India’s pluralist democracy, electoral diversity reflects socio-political diversity. Synchronization distorts this fabric, weakens regional representation, and risks undermining constitutional morality.
For a comparative context, if Germany were to hold Bundestag and Landtag elections simultaneously, it would likely shift political discourse from state-specific issues to national themes. Similarly, India’s adoption of ONOE would erode the federal checks that preserve local autonomy and pluralism. Centralization under the guise of reform is a constitutional regression, not progress.
FAQS
Q1. Does the Constitution currently allow simultaneous elections?
No. The Constitution permits independent terms for each legislative body. Synchronization requires major amendments under Article 368(2) with State ratification.
Q2. Can Parliament unilaterally pass this amendment?
No. Since it affects federal structure and State autonomy, it must be ratified by at least half of the State Legislatures under Article 368(2), proviso.
Q3. Does ONOE violate the basic structure doctrine?
Yes. It compromises free and fair elections, federalism, and democratic representation, all of which are part of the basic structure.
Q4. How could ONOE impact smaller or regional parties?
It may marginalize regional voices by skewing campaigns toward national issues and consolidating electoral advantage with larger, centrally positioned parties.
Q5. Is the Election Commission neutral under ONOE?
The proposed discretionary powers under Article 82A(5), combined with executive influence over ECI appointments, threaten its independence and neutrality.
Q6. How will the government enforce ONOE when different States have elections at different times and fixed tenures?
To enforce ONOE, the government would need to either:
(a) Curtail the terms of some State Assemblies (ending them before five years); or
(b) Extend the tenure of others beyond the constitutional limit.
Both options violate the democratic mandate of the people and require a constitutional amendment, as the current framework does not permit altering fixed five-year terms arbitrarily. Moreover, frequent dissolutions or extensions to enforce alignment would compromise the spirit of representative democracy.
