WOMEN’S SAFETY IN PUBLIC SPACES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF LIFE WITH DIGNITY
Author: Mahi Sinha, Lloyd School of Law
Abstract
A constitution is measured less by the eloquence of its text than by the ease with which its promises are lived on an ordinary evening: at a bus stop, in a train compartment, along an unlit lane. This article examines the proposition that the safety of women in public places is not a matter of policing alone but an incident of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under article 21 of the constitution of India. It traces the judicial expansion of that article, consider a doctrinal base for the right to safety, evaluates the statutory and institutional response, situates India’s obligations within international law, and identifies the structural deficiencies that continue to separate constitutional promise from lived reality.
Introduction
The public sphere is the arena in which citizenship is performed. To work, to study, to travel, to assemble and dissent are all acts that presuppose a freedom to be present in shared space without fear. Where that freedom is unequally distributed, citizenship itself becomes unequal. For a considerable portion of Indian women, the street is not a neutral thoroughfare but a landscape of calculation: which route is lit, which hour is prudent, which companion is necessary. Such calculation is tax levied silently, and it is levied on one half of the population alone.
The law has not been indifferent to this predicament, yet it has too often treated safety as a question of crime and punishment, to be answered after the injury, rather than as a question of rights, to be secured before it. This article argues for latter conception. It advances the proposition that the state’s constitutional obligation transcends the mere penalisation of perpetrators and encompasses the affirmative duty to establish conditions in which women may exercise their right to access and occupy public spaces freely, safely and without fear. This obligation is intrinsically rooted in article 21 of the constitution, which guarantees not merely the preservation of life, but the realisation of life with dignity, autonomy, and substantive freedom.
Article 21 and the architecture of the dignity
Article 21 declares, in deceptively modest terms, that no person shall be deprived of life of personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. For nearly three decades after the commencement of the constitution, the provision was read narrowly. The turning point came with Maneka gandhi v. Union of india (1978), in which the supreme court held that the procedure contemplated by the article must fair, just and reasonable, and the articles 14, 19 and 21 are not isolated compartments but interlocking guarantees.
From that foundation grew a jurisprudence of remarkable generosity. In Francis coral muslin v. Administrator, union territory of Delhi (1981), the court observed that the right to life embraces the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it. Life, in other words, is not mere animal existence; it is existence worthy of a person. The court’s later decision in K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of india (2017) deepened the point by recognising privacy, autonomy and dignity as constituent elements of personal liberty, thereby affirming that the individual is the bearer of an inviolable inner sphere that neither state nor society may lightly trespass.
It was only a short step from this reasoning to the recognition that sexual violence is affront to the core article 21. In bodhisattva Gautam v. Subra chakraborty (1996), the court characterised rape as a crime against basic human rights and a violation of the victim’s most cherished fundamental right. The same understanding animates state of Punjab v. Gurmit singh (1996), where the court insisted that the trial courts approach such cases with sensitivity to the dignity of the complainant, and Delhi domestic working women’s forum v. Union of india (1995), which called for legal assistance and compensation for victims.
The reach of the guranatee was further clarified in chairman railway board v. Chandrika was (2000). A foreign national had been assaulted by employees of a public undertaking within railway premises. The court held that article 21 protect “persons” and not merely citizens, and that the state could be held liable in public law to compensate the victim. The case is instructive for present purposes because it locates responsibility squarely upon the institutions that administer public premises.
These provisions do not stand alone. Article 14 guarantees equality before law: article 15(1) forbids discrimination on grounds of sex; article 15(3) empowers the state to make special provision for women; article 19(1)(d) secures the freedom to move freely throughout the territory of india; and article 51A(e) enjoins every citizen to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women. Read together, they compose a constitutional picture in which a woman’s presence in public life is not a concession but an entitlement.
The public sphere and the geography of fear
Hannah Arendt described public realm as a space of appearance, the arena in which persons disclose who they are through speech and action in the company of their fellows. To be excluded from that space, or to enter it only on sufferance, is to be denied a mode of existence which Arendt regarded as distinctively political. Seen in this light, the woman who is deterred from the street by fear is not merely inconvenienced; she is expelled, quietly and without judgement from the political community.
The expulsion has a lineage. Liberal political theory, from its earliest articulations, partitioned human existence into a public realm of reason, commerce and governance and a private realm of the household, assigning the former to men and the latter, by implication or by decree, to women. Carole Pateman’s penetrating critique contends that the partition was never innocent: it was constitutive of a social order in which women’s presence in public life was conditional, tolerated rather than assured.
The modern residue of that order is what is called the geography of fear. Gill valentine observed that women map the city through apprehension, identifying and avoiding places and hours of danger, and thereby curtailing their own movement without the aid of any formal prohibition. Susan brownmiller’s celebrated thesis, that keeps the other in a condition of apprehension, may be contested in it generality, but its central intuition is difficult to refute: the fear of violence works all upon women and upon all women, whether or not it is ever visited upon them.
Iris marion young identified systematic violence as on of the faces of oppression, and her analysis repays attention. What render such violence oppressive is not its brutality alone but its social context: the knowledge, shared by every member of the targeted group, that she is liable to attack merely by virtue of the group to which she belongs, and that society regards such attacks as unremarkable. The injury in other words, is both individual and collectiv, and a legal order that perceives only the former will always under-protect.
Catharine macKinnon’s argument that sexual harassment is a species of sex discrimination, and not merely a personal wrong, proceeds from kindred premise: conduct that is individually perpetrated may be collectively subordinating. It follows that formal equality is an adequate remedy. A rule that treats men and women identically while leaving the actual conditions of the street untouched merely ratifies an inequality of experience. Only a conception of substantive equality attentive to the lived circumstances of the group, is equal to the harm.
The Duty of the State
If safety forms part of Article 21, the next question is what the State must do about it. I would say that its obligation is one of due diligence. The State is not an insurer against every crime, but it is answerable for failing to take reasonable preventive measures, for investigating without vigour, and for denying remedy. The standard has the merit of being measurable. One can ask whether the street was lit, whether the complaint was registered, whether the trial was concluded, and the answers are matters of fact rather than sentiment.
The decision in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) shows what such a duty can look like in practice. Faced with a legislative void on sexual harassment at work, the Supreme Court did not wait. It laid down binding guidelines, drawing upon Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 and upon India’s international commitments through Article 51(c). I regard the decision as a model of constitutional responsibility, because it treated the absence of a statute as a reason to act and not as an excuse for inaction.
Protection Without Confinement
I wish to add a caution, because discussions of safety are prone to a quiet error: the temptation to secure it by restraining the very persons it is meant to protect. Curfews, dress codes and exclusionary rules are habitually defended in the language of care. Yet protection that proceeds by confinement merely relocates the injury from the assailant’s hand to the legislator’s pen.
The Supreme Court recognised as much in Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008), where it struck down a prohibition on the employment of women in establishments serving liquor and warned that paternalism founded on stereotype is itself a form of discrimination. I would state the principle more generally. A measure designed to protect women is legitimate only if it enlarges, and does not diminish, their effective freedom. The test is not the benevolence of the motive but the consequence for the woman’s liberty. A safe public space is one in which women may remain; it is not one from which they have been courteously excluded.
The Statutory and Treaty Framework
The public anguish that followed the Delhi gang rape of December 2012 led to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, which widened the definition of sexual offences and created distinct offences for conduct that commonly occurs in public: sexual harassment, disrobing, voyeurism and stalking. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, these provisions now appear in Sections 74 to 78, while insult to modesty by word or gesture is found in Section 79. The substance of protection endures, though the new numbering must be cited with care.
The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 gives statutory form to the Vishaka guidelines, and victim compensation continues under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Initiatives such as the Nirbhaya Fund, the unified emergency response system, One Stop Centres and the Safe City projects show an official recognition that safety needs infrastructure no less than legislation. India is also bound by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, ratified in 1993, which requires the State to prevent, investigate and redress gender-based violence with due diligence. In my view, such instruments are not foreign impositions but useful aids to interpretation wherever domestic law is silent.
Where the System Fails: An Indictment
It would be pleasant to end the analysis here and congratulate the legal order upon its architecture. I cannot. Statutes, schemes and slogans abound; safety, by the testimony of countless women, does not. The distance between law on paper and law in practice has seldom been so cruelly illustrated, and what follows is an indictment, meant as one.
Legislation by outrage. Parliament has a habit of legislating in paroxysms of public anger, lengthening sentences and enlarging definitions whenever a fresh atrocity commands the headlines, and then lapsing into somnolence once the cameras depart. I would call this theatre. Deterrence depends far more upon the certainty of detection and conviction than upon the severity of the sentence, and a legislature that raises the penalty while leaving that certainty untouched has purchased applause, not safety.
The police: first and most culpable point of failure. The police station is the threshold of justice, and for countless women it is the place where justice is refused. Complaints are discouraged, dismissed as private quarrels, shuttled between jurisdictions, or met with an interrogation that places the complainant, rather than the accused, on trial. An institution that treats the woman’s account with suspicion and the offender’s convenience with courtesy has forfeited any claim to be the guardian of her liberty. That the courts have had to issue repeated directions on the mandatory registration of complaints is itself an indictment of the service.
The courts: delay as denial. I do not exempt the judiciary from censure. Trials for sexual offences drag across years and sometimes decades; witnesses tire, are pressured or vanish; and complainants are compelled to relive their ordeal in proceedings whose length is a punishment in itself. Reasoning that leans upon stereotypes of womanhood in place of evidence and law has, on occasion, drawn rebuke from the Supreme Court itself. Justice so tardy and so careless is a counterfeit of the genuine article.
Planning negligence and municipal indifference. Safety is engineered into or out of a place long before any offence occurs. Yet no authority is called to account for the unlit underpass; no engineer is censured for the bus stop sited in darkness; no official forfeits office because the public convenience was never built or, once built, was never maintained. Preventable danger is tolerated as though it were a natural feature of the landscape.
Tokenism and the graveyard of funds. Schemes are announced with fanfare and implemented with languor. The Nirbhaya Fund, conceived as a solemn commitment, has been repeatedly criticised in parliamentary scrutiny for the underutilisation of its allocations, and the Internal and Local Committees contemplated by the 2013 workplace legislation remain, in many establishments and districts, either unconstituted or inert. A law that exists only on paper is a species of false advertisement, and the public that relies upon it pays the price.
Intersectional abandonment. Disadvantages do not merely add up; they compound, a point captured in the concept of intersectionality introduced by Kimberlé Crenshaw. Women who are Dalit, Adivasi, migrant, disabled, transgender or economically precarious face aggravated risk and enjoy the least access to redress, for they must petition the very institutions that regard them with the greatest disdain. A framework blind to this reality secures protection chiefly for those who need it least.
The digital abdication. Public space is no longer solely physical. Online harassment, doxxing and the non-consensual circulation of images drive women from public discourse as effectively as menace on the street. The law remains oriented largely toward the physical encounter, and enforcement agencies remain ill-equipped for the digital one.
The culture of blame and the complicity of the powerful. Most corrosive of all is the habit, nurtured by officials and public figures alike, of interrogating the victim’s attire, itinerary and hour in place of asking what the State failed to do. Insofar as persons holding high office have from time to time lent their voices to such sentiments, the State has not merely failed to dispel the culture of blame; it has underwritten it, and has transferred, with a shrug, to the woman a burden that belongs to the community.
Each failure compounds the next. The woman who anticipates a hostile police station does not report; the unreported offence is never counted; the uncounted offence attracts no budget; and the unbudgeted street remains dark. This is not a series of misfortunes but a system, and its product, fear, is precisely what that system, through indifference if not through design, has been shaped to deliver.
What I Believe Must Change
A credible response must pass from retribution to prevention, and from the rhetoric of concern to the discipline of accountability. I would begin with seven measures.
1. Statutory safety audits. Municipal and transport authorities should bear an enforceable duty to conduct periodic, public audits of lighting, transit stops, markets and public conveniences, and to answer for any failure to remedy the hazards disclosed.
2. Accountable policing. Sensitisation must be wedded to consequence: officers who decline to register complaints or who obstruct complainants should face real disciplinary and legal liability, and station-level data on complaints should be published.
3. Continuing judicial oversight. Where executive inertia is demonstrated, the constitutional courts should supervise implementation, as they did when Vishaka filled the legislative void.
4. Expeditious and trauma-informed adjudication. Dedicated courts, time-bound trials and judicial training against stereotyping are indispensable, for delay is itself a form of denial.
5. Compensation as of right. Where State negligence in securing public premises contributes to harm, public-law compensation on the Chandrima Das model ought to be the norm and not the exception.
6. Participatory and intersectional design. Marginalised women should be consulted in framing the measures intended for their protection, and public dashboards should track the disbursement and use of dedicated funds.
7. Cultural reform. Education and public discourse must shift responsibility from the victim to the perpetrator and to the institutions that condone his conduct.
Conclusion
The guarantee of life under Article 21 was never meant as a bare assurance against execution. It is a promise of existence marked by dignity, security and the freedom to move through the world without dread. Where a woman cannot walk home without calculation, that promise stands unredeemed, however many statutes adorn the book.
My conclusion is a simple one. Safety is not the gift of a benevolent State but the due of a free citizen, and the Constitution, read as it deserves to be read, already says so. What remains is for the executive, the legislature and the judiciary alike to match the vision of the law with the discipline of conduct. The street belongs equally to all who walk upon it, and a republic that cannot assure as much to its women has yet to complete the work of its founding.
FAQ’s
1. Does the Constitution expressly guarantee a right to safety?
No. The right is derived rather than enumerated. It flows from Article 21 as expanded in Maneka Gandhi, read with Articles 14, 15 and 19(1)(d), and it rests on the proposition that a life without dignity or security is not the life the Constitution promises.
2. Can Article 21 be invoked when the aggressor is a private person and not the State?
Fundamental rights are primarily enforced against the State, but the State’s duty to protect operates even where the harm is inflicted by a private individual. The liability lies in the State’s failure to prevent, investigate or remedy, as Vishakaillustrates.
3. Can a woman claim compensation from the State if she is attacked in a public place?
Not automatically. Public-law compensation, as in Chandrima Das, depends on the facts, particularly on State negligence or the involvement of its functionaries. Separately, statutory victim-compensation schemes exist, now under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
4. Which provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 deal with offences against women in public places?
Sections 74 to 78 cover assault or criminal force to outrage modesty, sexual harassment, disrobing, voyeurism and stalking, and Section 79 covers insult to modesty by word or gesture. The earlier numbering under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was different, so the two should not be confused.
5. Where is the line between protecting women and restricting them?
A measure protects when it removes the threat and leaves the woman’s freedom intact or enlarged. It restricts when it removes the woman from the threatened space. Anuj Garg is the leading illustration: the Court struck down a protective rule that, in effect, shut women out of a livelihood.
