Author: Aishwarya Sinha, Amity Law School, Patna
Introduction
The relationship between the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is best illustrated in the Article 37. It provides that Directives are not enforceable in a court of law. But, they are fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply them in making laws. In view of such provision, there have arisen certain conflicts between the Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights. But, as of now Article 39(b) and 39(c) can take precedence over Fundamental Right enshrined under Article 14 and Article 19. During the initial period from 1950 to 1966 there was emphasis on sacrosanct character of Fundamental rights. The Supreme Court held the view that if two interpretations of a law are possible, the one avoiding conflict should be accepted. But in case of a single interpretation, leading to conflict fundamental right would prevail over directive principles. In this view, constitutionality of 1st Amendment Act was hailed as valid. In the historic Golan Math’s case, 1967, the Supreme Court emphasized on unamedability of the fundamental rights which have been given a ‘transcendental position.’ The Government passed the 24th and 25th Amendment Act. The 24th Constitution Amendment Act made it clear that the Parliament has power to amend any provision of the Constitution, including the fundamental Rights.
Fundamental Rights are superior to Directives :
The provisions of DPSPs, set out in Part IV of the Constitution, are not enforceable by the courts, but these principles are fundamental guidelines for governance and the State is expected to apply them in framing and passing laws.
The Fundamental Rights are not absolute and are subject to reasonable restrictions as necessary for the protection of public interest.
In the Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala case in 1973, the Supreme Court, overruling a previous decision of 1967, held that the Fundamental Rights could be amended, subject to judicial review in case such an amendment violated the basic structure of the Constitution.
The Fundamental Rights can be enhanced, removed or otherwise altered through a constitutional amendment, passed by a two-thirds majority of each House of Parliament.
Soon after the commencement of the Constitution the judiciary started laying down an undue emphasis on the unenforceability of Directive Principles without taking in consideration their priorities and the Constitutional duty imposed upon the state to implement them. It gave rise to a belief that the Directive Principles were merely pious aspirations of no legal force and had to conform to and run subsidiary to the chapters on Fundamental Rights.
The first important case after the commencement of the Constitution of India on this issue was that of State of Madras v. Champakam Dorrairajan. In this case the Court held as follows:
1) Directive Principles are non-justiciable and these cannot override Fundamental rights.
2) Directive Principles have to conform and run subsidiary to the Fundamental Rights.
3) Fundamental Rights envisaged in Part III of the Constitution is sacrosanct and cannot be abridged by the legislature or executive except to the extent provided in the appropriate articles in part III.
4) Any action of the state under Directive Principles is subject to the legislative and executive powers.
Thus, the court held that if there is any conflict between Fundamental Rights and directive Principles it is the Directive Principles which would be subordinate to the Fundamental Rights. The hang-over of this observation was that it stood in the way of many socio-economic reforms. It gave a set back to the implementation of Directive Principles.
Harmonious Construction between F.Rs and DPSPs:
The Directive Principles have been used to uphold the Constitutional validity of legislations in case of conflict with Fundamental Rights. Article 31C, added by the 25th Amendment in 1971, provided that any law made to give effect to the Directive Principles in Article 39(b)–(c) would not be invalid on the grounds that they derogated from the Fundamental Rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31. The application of this article was sought to be extended to all the Directive Principles by the 42nd Amendment in 1976, but the Supreme Court struck down the extension as void on the ground that it violated the basic structure of the Constitution.
The Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles have also been used together in forming the basis of legislation for social welfare. The Supreme Court, after the judgement in the Kesavananda Bharati case, has adopted the view of the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles being complementary to each other, each supplementing the other’s role in aiming at the same goal of establishing a welfare state by means of social revolution.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has used the Fundamental Duties to uphold the Constitutional validity of statutes which seeks to promote the objects laid out in the Fundamental Duties. These Duties have also been held to be obligatory for all citizens, subject to the State enforcing the same by means of a valid law. The Supreme Court has also issued directions to the State in this regard, with a view towards making the provisions effective and enabling a citizens to properly perform their duties.
Later on, the judiciary played a significant role in interpreting the social and other progressive legislations passed by States in its various landmark decisions. It came forward with Doctrine of “Harmonious Construction “ to maintain equilibrium between DPSPs and Fundamental Rights holding that Fundamental Rights and DPSPs both are meant for social welfare and progress of nation and they are complimentary to each other.
The power of Judicial Review is vested in SC of India and vital to the maintenance of rule of law. This power has been held as basic feature of the Constitution. Social Justice lies in Directive Principles of State Policy. Many legislations also have been enacted in order to protect social justice.
Right to Freedom and Directive Principles :
The freedom of speech is not only guarantee to India within national limits but in International field, too. UDHR provides in interference and to seek, receive and import information and ideas through any media.
In Maneka Gandhi v UOI , the important question decided was whether Right of free speech and expression has any geographical limitations. The question was given in affirmative i.e. without any limitation by the Supreme Court. Freedom of Movement has also been recognized. It provides that every citizen has Right to travel throughout India. Rt. to go abroad has also been recognized by S.C in Maneka Gandhi v UOI under this clause.
Art 48 provides the protection of animal husbandry on modern and scientific basis and prohibition of cow slaughtering. In Hanif Qureshi v State of Bihar. it was argued that Muslims have got right to slaughter animals including cows. But the court gave answer in the negative and held that no one has got the right in society to slaughter animals to carry business and trade.
Art. 20 has been incorporated as the protection of criminal prosecution. It provides that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for the violation of law in force at the time of commission of crime. S. 300 Cr.P.C. is ahead in this respect of Art. 20 (1) because S. 300 Cr. P.C. provides that a person convicted or acquitted cannot be tried for the same offence.
The fundamental nature of guarantee against Double Jeopardy is enshrined in Art. 20 (2) of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be prosecuted for same offence more than once. This principle was accepted in Preetam Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1956.
20 (3) provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself who is accused of an offence. In Nandini Satpathi v State of Orissa, 1978, it was held if any person is keeping silence then he cannot be forced to answer.
The important phrase of Life – Liberty and the procedure established by law under Art. 21 has been broadened by Supreme Court in Kharag Singh v State of UP. The court approved the definition of life. The concept of life has been broadly explained by P.N Bhagwati that this Right include the Right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it. Every act which offends against human dignity would constitute deprivation of this right to life.
Right to Speedy Trial has also been included in Art. 21 by Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar.
Thus, through various judicial pronouncements , the Indian Judiciary established that Art. 21 and 22 have a relationship with DPSP and this relationship between them should be regarded as Harmonious Construction. Art. 21 & 22 are the species of genus, while Art. 38 provides welfare of the people by securing and protecting social order in which Justice, socio-economic and political shall flourish.
Further, the court observed that there is no Art. in DPSPs which come in the way of the implementation of Arts. 21 and 22. But rather they are helpful and complimentary to each other. In fact, the S.C. has interpreted Art. 21 and 22 in such a way that all the principles of human rights and social justice can be secured through these Articles.
Likewise, the purpose of Art. 44 (Uniform Civil Code) is made for the upliftment of social status of citizens on uniform basic. Uniformity is the first basis of liberty to all. Art. 45, 46 provide about the removal of illiteracy and upliftment of schedule caste and tribe and other economically weaker sections. Life and Liberty without equality of status and mass education to all is worthless. Therefore, there is a distinct relationship between DPSPs and Fundamental Rights as both of them collectively aim at achieving Socio- economic goals such as, equality, liberty and social justice as enshrined in the Constitution.
Inter – Relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles :
The question of relationship between the Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights has caused some difficulty, and the judicial attitude has undergone transformation on this question over time. What if a law enacted to enforce a directive principle infringes a Fundamental Right?
On this question, the judicial view has revolved round from irreconcilability to integration between the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.
Initially, the courts adopted a strict and literal legal position in this respect. The Supreme Court adopting the literal interpretative approach to Article 37 ruled that a Directive Principle could not override a Fundamental Right, and, that in case of conflict between the two, the Fundamental Right would prevail over the Directive Principle.
This point was settled by the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, where a government order in conflict with Art. 29(2), a Fundamental Right was declared invalid, although the government did argue that it was made in pursuance of Art. 46, a Directive Principle.
The Supreme Court came to adopt the view that although Directive Principles, as such, were legally non-enforceable, nevertheless, while interpreting a statute, the courts could interpret a statute so as to implement Directive Principles instead of reducing them to mere theoretical ideas.
This is on the assumption that the law makers are not completely unmindful or obvious of the Directive Principles. Otherwise, the Directive Principles might be justiciable. As such, the courts began to implement the values underlying these principles.
principles to the extent possible. The Supreme Court began to assert that there is “no conflict on the whole” between the
Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles. “They are complementary and supplementary to each other.”The
Supreme Court said in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, that the Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights should be construed in harmony with each other and every attempt should be made by the Court to resolve any apparent inconsistency between them.
Journal of Advance Research in Social science and Humanties (ISSN: 2208-2387)
Vol. 2 No. 5 (2016)
In Pathumma v. State of Kerala, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the purpose of the Directive Principles is to fix certain socio-economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent social revolution. The Constitution aims at bringing about synthesis between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.
The biggest beneficiary of this approach has been Art. 21. By reading Art. 21 with the Directive Principles, the Supreme Court has derived therefrom a bundle of rights. One of these rights is the right to live with human dignity. The Supreme Court has stated in Bandhua Mukti Morcha that right to live with human dignity enshrined in Art. 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy.
Further, the Court observed that Right to life includes the right to enjoy pollution free water and air and environment . Right to health and social justice has been held to be a Fundamental Right of the workers. It is the obligation of the employers to protect the health and vigour of his employee workers. The Court has derived this right by reading Art. 21 with Arts. 39(e), 41, 43 and 48A.
Similarly, the Court held that Right to Shelter and Right to education implicit in Art. 21 is to be applied out in the light of the Directive Principle contained in Art. 41 and 45. In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017, the Supreme Court held that Right to Privacy implements the socio-economic policy envisaged in the Directive Principles, hence it must be regarded as one for public purpose.
Key Takeaways:
At the beginning, a strict literal interpretation was advocated by the Judiciary and the Fundamental Rights were given priority over the Directive Principles.
Later in course of time, a perceptible, and a welcome change came over the judicial attitude. The courts though subordinated the Directives to the Fundamental Rights, took the view that the mechanism of harmonious construction should be used to interpret the two Parts.
The next stage came with the case of Sajjan Singh, and Golak Nath, where the judiciary began expanding the Directive Principles and interpreted the two Parts as being co-equal, and without any conflict.
Kesavananda Bharti case was a turning point in the history of Directive Principles Jurisprudence, where for the first time the court held that the Directive principles should be given primacy over the Fundamental Rights. This was the third stage.
However, in Minerva Mills, the judiciary again went back to stating that there should be balance and harmony between Part III and Part IV, and that none should be given a primacy over the other. Since then this has been the view taken by the courts in the subsequent cases.
The recent trend in this regard, is that though the Directive Principles are unenforceable, and a State cannot be compelled to undertake a legislation to implement a Directive, the Supreme Court has been issuing directions to the State to implement the Principles. Hence various aspects of Part IV are being enforced by the courts indirectly.
abolish zamindari has been enacted for a ‘public purpose’ within the meaning of Art. 31.
Conclusion
Since both the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles were of common origin, it is clear that they both had the same objectives to ensure the goal of a welfare society as envisaged by the Preamble. If the Fundamental rights seek to achieve the goal of certain minimal rights guaranteed to the individual as against State action, the Directives enjoin the State to ensure the welfare of the people collectively. Whenever the State makes laws, they should be made consistently with these principles with a view to establish an egalitarian society. Today, the Directive Principles no longer remain merely a moral obligation of the Government.
