Author: Manpreet Rathor, Army Law College, Pune
Abstract
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, empowering the President to impose President’s Rule in states, represents one of the most contentious provisions in Indian constitutional law. This emergency power, designed as a safeguard against constitutional breakdown, has been frequently criticized as a tool for political manipulation that undermines India’s federal structure. This article examines the constitutional framework of Article 356, analyzes its judicial interpretation through landmark cases, and evaluates its impact on Indian federalism. Through examination of recent developments and comparative analysis, this study argues that while Article 356 serves legitimate constitutional purposes, its frequent misuse necessitates stricter judicial oversight and constitutional reforms to preserve India’s federal democracy.
I. Introduction
The relationship between the Union and States in India has been shaped significantly by Article 356 of the Constitution, which provides for the imposition of President’s Rule when a state government cannot function according to constitutional provisions. This provision, borrowed from the Government of India Act 1935, was intended as an exceptional remedy for extraordinary circumstances. However, its frequent invocation, particularly during periods of political instability, has sparked intense debate about its compatibility with federal principles and democratic governance.
The controversy surrounding Article 356 reflects deeper tensions in Indian constitutionalism between the need for national unity and respect for state autonomy. Critics argue that successive Union governments have weaponized this provision to dismiss democratically elected state governments for partisan political purposes, thereby undermining the federal structure envisioned by the Constitution’s framers. Supporters contend that Article 356 serves as a necessary constitutional safety valve that prevents the breakdown of constitutional governance at the state level.
This tension has been particularly acute in recent decades, as India’s political landscape has become increasingly fragmented and regional parties have gained prominence. The intersection of Article 356 with coalition politics, hung assemblies, and inter-party conflicts has created new challenges for constitutional interpretation and federal governance.
II. Constitutional Framework and Historical Context
A. Drafting History and Intent
During the Constituent Assembly debates, Article 356 (then Draft Article 278) generated significant controversy. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, as Chairman of the Drafting Committee, acknowledged the provision’s potential for misuse but argued that it was necessary to address situations where state governments failed to function according to constitutional requirements. The framers were influenced by their experience under British colonial rule and the Government of India Act 1935, which contained similar emergency provisions.
The inclusion of Article 356 reflected the framers’ concern about maintaining constitutional governance across a diverse and newly independent nation. They recognized that federal systems required mechanisms to address breakdowns in state-level governance while balancing this need against principles of democratic self-governance and federal autonomy.
B. Constitutional Requirements and Procedures
Article 356 establishes a multi-step process for imposing President’s Rule. The President may issue a proclamation if satisfied that a situation has arisen where the government of a state cannot be carried on in accordance with constitutional provisions. This satisfaction may arise from a report by the Governor or otherwise. The proclamation must be laid before Parliament and ceases to operate after two months unless approved by both Houses.
The Constitution also provides safeguards through Articles 355 and 356(4), which require the Union to protect states against external aggression and internal disturbance while ensuring that state governance conforms to constitutional provisions. These provisions create a framework that theoretically balances Union oversight with state autonomy.
III. Judicial Evolution and Landmark Cases
A. The S.R. Bommai Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s decision in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) fundamentally transformed the jurisprudence surrounding Article 356. The nine-judge bench established crucial limitations on the exercise of this power, declaring that the President’s satisfaction is not immune from judicial review. The Court held that the proclamation could be challenged on grounds of mala fides, irrelevant considerations, or lack of material facts.
The Bommai judgment established several important principles. First, secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution, and state governments cannot be dismissed merely for pursuing secular policies. Second, the dissolution of the state legislative assembly is not automatic upon imposition of President’s Rule. Third, the Court emphasized that Article 356 should be used sparingly and only when constitutional governance has genuinely broken down.
B. Post-Bommai Developments
Following Bommai, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have continued to refine the boundaries of Article 356. In Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006), the Court reiterated that floor tests should be conducted to determine majority support rather than dismissing governments without such verification. The judgment emphasized the importance of allowing democratic processes to function before resorting to constitutional emergency powers.
More recently, the Court has grappled with questions about the timing of Governor’s reports, the role of political considerations in Article 356 decisions, and the relationship between hung assemblies and constitutional breakdown. These developments reflect ongoing judicial efforts to balance constitutional text with democratic principles and federal values.
IV. Political Misuse and Federal Tensions
A. Pattern of Partisan Application
Statistical analysis reveals concerning patterns in the application of Article 356. Between 1950 and 2019, President’s Rule was imposed over 125 times, with significant variations based on which party controlled the Union government. During periods of Congress dominance, non-Congress state governments faced disproportionate dismissals, while BJP-led Union governments have similarly targeted opposition-ruled states.
The most egregious examples of political misuse occurred during the Emergency period (1975-1977) and its aftermath, when numerous state governments were dismissed for political reasons. The dismissal of nine non-Congress state governments in 1977 following the Congress party’s return to power exemplified how Article 356 could be weaponized for partisan purposes.
B. Impact on Federal Structure
The frequent misuse of Article 356 has had profound implications for India’s federal structure. State governments, particularly those led by opposition parties, have been forced to operate under the constant threat of dismissal, affecting their ability to pursue independent policy agendas. This has created a culture of political uncertainty that undermines the autonomous functioning of state governments.
Furthermore, the threat of Article 356 has influenced inter-governmental relations, with state governments often forced to moderate their positions vis-à-vis the Union to avoid dismissal. This dynamic has arguably weakened the collaborative federalism envisioned by the Constitution and created a more hierarchical relationship between Union and state governments.
V. Contemporary Challenges and Developments
A. Coalition Era Complexities
The emergence of coalition politics at both Union and state levels has created new complexities for Article 356 application. Hung assemblies, post-poll alliances, and defections have made it more difficult to determine when genuine constitutional breakdown has occurred versus normal political processes. The increasing frequency of horse-trading and political maneuvering has blurred the line between legitimate political competition and constitutional crisis.
Recent controversies involving Governor’s roles in government formation, particularly in states like Karnataka, Goa, and Manipur, have highlighted these challenges. Questions about the appropriate timeframe for government formation, the role of post-poll alliances, and the Governor’s discretion in inviting parties to form government have created new dimensions to Article 356 jurisprudence.
B. Anti-Defection Law Interactions
The intersection of Article 356 with the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law) has created additional complications. When state governments lose majority support due to defections, determining whether this constitutes grounds for President’s Rule or merely triggers anti-defection proceedings has proven challenging. Courts have struggled to balance the need for stable government with democratic principles and constitutional requirements.
VI. Comparative Federal Analysis
A. International Perspectives
Comparative analysis reveals that most federal systems include provisions for central intervention in constituent units, but the scope and frequency of such interventions vary significantly. Countries like Canada, Australia, and Germany have more limited central intervention powers, while others like Pakistan have faced similar challenges with constitutional emergency provisions.
The German model, with its emphasis on constitutional courts and federal cooperation, offers potential lessons for India. The German system’s focus on cooperative federalism and constitutional adjudication provides a framework that might reduce reliance on emergency powers while maintaining constitutional governance standards.
B. Alternative Models and Reforms
Several alternative approaches could address the problems associated with Article 356 while preserving legitimate constitutional safeguards. These include strengthening the role of constitutional courts in reviewing state-level governance issues, creating independent commissions to assess constitutional breakdown, and establishing clearer criteria for determining when emergency intervention is justified.
Some scholars have proposed replacing Article 356 with a more structured system of graduated interventions, allowing for lesser forms of Union oversight before resorting to complete dismissal of state governments. Such reforms could maintain constitutional safeguards while reducing the potential for political misuse.
VII. Sarkaria Commission and Reform Proposals
A. Sarkaria Commission Recommendations
The Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988) provided comprehensive recommendations for reforming Article 356. The Commission proposed that President’s Rule should be used very sparingly and only as a last resort when all available alternatives have been exhausted. It recommended that the Governor’s report should be a speaking document with specific materials supporting the conclusion that constitutional governance has broken down.
The Commission also suggested that where a ministry enjoys majority support in the assembly, Article 356 should not be invoked merely because of allegations of maladministration or corruption. These recommendations, if implemented, could significantly reduce the scope for political misuse while preserving legitimate constitutional functions.
B. Subsequent Reform Efforts
Various subsequent commissions and committees, including the Venkatachaliah Commission and the Punchhi Commission, have made similar recommendations for restricting the use of Article 356. However, political resistance to constitutional amendments has prevented meaningful reform, leaving the provision largely unchanged despite widespread recognition of its problems.
The lack of reform reflects deeper challenges in India’s constitutional amendment process and the political incentives that make parties reluctant to constrain their future ability to use Article 356 when in power. This political dynamic has perpetuated a system that most observers agree requires significant modification.
VIII. Recent Trends and Future Implications
A. Declining Frequency and Judicial Oversight
Recent decades have seen a gradual decline in the frequency of Article 356 applications, partly due to increased judicial oversight following Bommai and partly due to the emergence of coalition politics that has made single-party dominance less common. However, this trend may reflect political calculations rather than genuine constitutional restraint.
The Supreme Court’s increasingly active role in reviewing Article 356 decisions has created additional checks on executive power. Recent cases involving government formation processes have shown the Court’s willingness to intervene when constitutional processes are subverted for political purposes.
B. Digital Age Challenges
The digital age has created new challenges for Article 356 application, as social media and instant communication have accelerated political processes and increased transparency around government formation. Real-time coverage of political developments has made it more difficult for parties to manipulate the process without public scrutiny.
However, digital communication has also enabled new forms of political coordination that can rapidly change government arithmetic, making it more challenging to determine when stable governance exists and when constitutional intervention might be justified.
IX. Recommendations for Constitutional Reform
A. Procedural Safeguards
Several procedural reforms could address the problems associated with Article 356 without requiring constitutional amendment. These include requiring the Governor to provide detailed justification for reports recommending President’s Rule, establishing mandatory cooling-off periods before dissolution of assemblies, and creating independent monitoring mechanisms for government formation processes.
Additionally, Parliament could adopt clearer guidelines for approving President’s Rule proclamations, including requirements for detailed debate and supermajority approval for extensions beyond the initial two-month period.
B. Structural Reforms
More fundamental reform might require constitutional amendment to restructure Article 356 entirely. Possible approaches include creating an independent constitutional commission to assess breakdown situations, establishing graduated intervention mechanisms, and providing for automatic judicial review of all President’s Rule proclamations.
Such reforms would need to balance the legitimate need for constitutional safeguards against the risk of political manipulation while preserving India’s federal structure and democratic values.
X. Conclusion
Article 356 represents one of the most challenging aspects of Indian constitutionalism, embodying tensions between unity and diversity, central authority and federal autonomy, and constitutional safeguards and democratic governance. While the provision serves legitimate purposes in extreme circumstances, its frequent misuse has undermined India’s federal structure and democratic values.
The Supreme Court’s intervention in Bommai and subsequent cases has provided important safeguards, but judicial oversight alone cannot solve the fundamental problems with Article 356. Meaningful reform requires both constitutional amendment and political restraint, supported by a broader commitment to federal principles and democratic governance.
The path forward requires recognizing that federal democracy cannot function effectively when constituent units operate under constant threat of dismissal for political reasons. At the same time, constitutional safeguards remain necessary to address genuine breakdowns in governance that threaten the constitutional order.
Success in reforming Article 356 will require political leadership that prioritizes constitutional values over partisan advantage, judicial vigilance in protecting federal principles, and civil society engagement in promoting democratic accountability. The future of Indian federalism may well depend on our ability to transform this controversial provision from a tool of political manipulation into a genuine constitutional safeguard that serves democratic values while preserving national unity.
Only through such comprehensive reform can Article 356 fulfill its intended constitutional purpose while supporting rather than undermining India’s federal democratic system. The stakes of achieving this balance are high, as they involve fundamental questions about the nature of Indian democracy and the relationship between unity and diversity in the world’s largest democracy.
References
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918.
Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1.
Sarkaria, Ranjit Singh. Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations. Government of India, 1988.
Austin, Granville. Working a Democratic Constitution: A History of the Indian Experience. Oxford University Press, 1999.
Rao, B. Shiva. The Framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents. N.M. Tripathi, 1967.
Arora, Balveer, and Douglas V. Verney, eds. Multiple Identities in a Single State: Indian Federalism in Comparative Perspective. Konark Publishers, 1995.
Khanna, Hans Raj. Making of India’s Constitution. Eastern Book Company, 1981.
FAQS
1. What is Article 356 of the Indian Constitution and when can it be invoked?
Article 356, known as “President’s Rule,” empowers the President to suspend state government and impose central administration when a state cannot function according to constitutional provisions. It can be invoked based on Governor’s report or President’s own satisfaction that constitutional machinery has broken down due to political instability, hung assemblies, or inability to form government. The proclamation requires Parliamentary approval within two months and can be extended for maximum three years with periodic Parliamentary consent.
2. How did the S.R. Bommai case change the application of Article 356?
The landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) judgment transformed Article 356 by making the President’s “satisfaction” subject to judicial review, establishing that proclamations could be challenged on grounds of mala fides or irrelevant considerations. The Court declared that dissolution of state assembly is not automatic, emphasized that secularism is a basic constitutional feature, and mandated that Article 356 should be used sparingly only when constitutional governance has genuinely broken down.
3. Why is Article 356 considered a threat to Indian federalism?
Article 356 threatens federalism by creating constant dismissal threats for opposition-ruled states, forcing them to moderate policies to avoid central displeasure, and disrupting the constitutional balance between Union and state powers. With over 125 instances of President’s Rule between 1950-2019, many for partisan reasons, it has created hierarchical rather than cooperative federal relations, bypassed electoral mandates, and concentrated power at the center contrary to constitutional federal design.
4. What were the main recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission regarding Article 356?
The Sarkaria Commission (1988) recommended that Article 356 should be used very sparingly as last resort, Governor’s reports must be “speaking documents” with specific evidence, and President’s Rule should not be imposed for maladministration if ministry enjoys majority support. It suggested warnings before imposition, keeping assemblies in suspended animation rather than dissolution, and rigorous Parliamentary oversight, though most recommendations remain unimplemented due to political resistance.
5. How has coalition politics affected the application of Article 356?
Coalition politics has complicated
