Author: Mansi R. Jadhav, Shahaji Law College, Kolhapur
CITATION: 2024 INSC 161
CASE NUMBER: Criminal Appeal no. 451/2019
STRENGTH OF JUDGES: Constitutional Bench
BENCH: Y. V. Chandrachud (Cj), A. S. Bopanna, M. M. Sundresh, P. S. Narasimha, J. B. Pardiwala, P. V. Sanjay Kumar, Manoj Misra
PETITION: Special Leave Petition
PARTIES: Appellant: Sita Soren; Respondent: Union of India
NATURE OF THE CASE: Criminal Case
JUDGEMENT: 4th March, 2024
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Sita Soren v. Union of India is crucial in defining the boundaries of parliamentary privilege under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of the Indian Constitution, especially in relation to criminal accountability. The question before the Supreme Court was whether a legislator accused of accepting a bribe for voting within the House could claim immunity from criminal prosecution under the protection granted by parliamentary privilege.
This issue gained prominence due to the precedent set in PV Narasimha Rao v. State (1998), where a majority of the bench held that legislators could not be prosecuted for bribery if the act was linked to a speech or vote in the House. This interpretation drew strong criticism for enabling corruption under the guise of privilege. In Sita Soren v. Union of India, the Court revisited its prior stance on legislative immunity, seizing the opportunity to update its interpretation in light of modern democratic principles, accountability, and the rule of law.
Recognizing the serious constitutional implications, a seven-judge Bench in its unanimous verdict overruled Narasimha Rao, holding that legislative privilege cannot shield criminal acts, although connected to legislative functions. The judgment affirmed that parliamentary privilege exists to uphold democratic governance, not corrupt acts. The judgment affirmed the constitutional position that no legislator enjoys exemption from legal scrutiny, thereby upholding the supremacy of rule of law.
Facts
The present criminal appeal arises from the judgment dated 17th February 2014 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand, dismissing a petition filed by the appellant.
The appellant was a Member of the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly from the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM).
An election to fill two Rajya Sabha seats from Jharkhand was conducted on 30th March 2012.
During this election, the appellant was accused of accepting a bribe to vote for an independent candidate.
However, since there is an open balloting system in Rajya Sabha, it was found that the appellant had voted Sabha, member of her party.
On the same day, Rs.2.15 crores in cash were seized by Income Tax authorities from a vehicle allegedly linked to the independent candidate, raising suspicions of electoral malpractice.
The Election Commission recommended cancelation of the electoral process, which was accepted by the President of India.
A re-election was held on 3rd May 2012, and the appellant again voted for her party’s candidate.
On 5th April 2012, the High Court directed the matter to be handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
The CBI revived the case and filed a charge sheet against the appellant under the provisions:
Sections 120B and 171E of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and
Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The Special Judge, CBI took notice of the offense after the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly approved the request for prosecution.
The appellant challenged the proceedings, claiming immunity under Article 194(2) of the Constitution, stating that her vote in the legislature was protected under that provision.
The High Court, drawing upon the precedent established in PV Narasimha Rao v. State (1998), declined to grant her the relief sought and permitted the continuation of criminal proceedings against her.
A five-judge bench expressed doubts about the majority view in PV Narasimha Rao (1998) and placed the issue before a larger bench for reconsideration.
Constitution Bench comprising seven judges was formed to re-examine the ruling in PV Narasimha Rao v. State (1998) and to clarify the constitutional limits of the protections given to legislators under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution.
ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY THE PARTIES:
Petitioner’s Submissions:
Counsel for the appellant defended the majority view in PV Narasimha Rao, arguing that it was based on sound constitutional principles and should not be reconsidered. He submitted that constitutional immunity for legislators is meant to protect free and fearless functioning within the legislature and not to exempt lawmakers from the rule of law but to protect the legislature from external influence.
He emphasized that overturning settled law without compelling reasons goes against the principles laid down in cases like Keshav Mills (1965), Krishena Kumar (1990), and Shanker Raju (2011).
He opposed the minority’s interpretation of ‘in respect of’ as ‘arising out of’, calling it constitutionally inaccurate. He contended that although bribery is a complete offense upon receipt, once a speech or vote is given, Article 194(2) immunity is triggered. Elections to the Rajya Sabha, despite not taking place on the floor, bear the essential character of legislative proceedings and should fall within the scope of privilege.
Respondents’ Submissions:
The Attorney General for India, Mr. Venkataramani, submitted that PV Narasimha Rao’s decision is inapplicable, as voting in a Rajya Sabha election is not a legislative function and thus not protected under Article 194(2).
Mr. Tushar Mehta, the Solicitor General of India, submitted that the crime of bribery under the Prevention of Corruption Act is consummated upon the acceptance of illegal gratification, irrespective of any subsequent legislative action. Since the offense occurs outside the House, privilege cannot shield it.
Submissions by Amicus Curiae:
Mr. P. S. Patwalia submitted that the majority judgment wrongly extended privilege to criminal acts unrelated to legislative functions. He relied on Raja Ram Pal, Lokayukta v. State of M.P. (2007), and State of Kerala v. K. Ajith (2021), stressing that constitutional protection does not extend to criminal acts committed outside the House.
He emphasized that immunity should not protect bribery, as it violates the rule of law. He also cited international practice, especially in the UK, US, and Australia, where privilege does not shield corruption.
Intervenor Submissions:
Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayan, Sr. Advocate, argued for narrow reading of ‘any’ and ‘in respect of’, limiting privilege to core legislative act. He stressed strict interpretation in corruption cases to uphold public accountability.
Mr. Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Advocate, submitted that privilege must be interpreted keeping in mind the increasing criminalization of politics. He called for a balanced approach-one that upholds parliamentary dignity but does not compromise constitutional morality or public trust.
ISSUES:
Whether the constitutional immunity granted under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) extends to legislators accused of accepting bribes in exchange for their votes or participation in legislative proceedings?
Whether a legislator can invoke the protection of parliamentary privilege to shield themselves from criminal prosecution for acts of bribery linked to their official legislative conduct?
JUDGEMENT:
Sita Soren v. Union of India was a landmark judgment delivered on 4th March 2024, by a seven-judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, headed by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, stands as a pivotal ruling wherein the Supreme Court held that lawmakers, whether from Parliament or State Legislatures cannot claim constitutional immunity under Articles 105(2) or 194(2) when accused of accepting bribes. This judgment overruled the earlier 3:2 decision in PV Narasimha Rao v. State (1998), which had extended such immunity to legislators accepting bribes for voting in a particular manner, provided they fulfilled the promise.
The Bench clarified that parliamentary privileges are not personal entitlements of legislators but are functional tools to ensure the effective operation of the House. The purpose of immunity conferred by Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution of India is to safeguard he freedom of speech and action in the legislature, not to protect criminal acts such as bribery, which undermine the democratic values and erode public confidence in governance.
In clarifying the scope of such privilege the Court laid down a two-fold test: (i) the act must have a direct nexus with the collective functioning of the legislature; and (ii) it must be essential to the discharge of a legislator’s duties. The Court unequivocally held that bribery has no nexus with the core legislative functions and thus cannot be falls under Article 105(2) immunity. It asserted that corrupt conduct, even if occurring in a legislative context, lies outside the constitutional protection intended for genuine deliberative acts. Critiquing the Narasimha Rao precedent, the Court found its distinction between a legislator who acted on a bribe and one who did not to be logically unsustainable and contrary to the foundational principles of constitutional ethics.
Rejecting the flawed reasoning in Narasimha Rao, the Court noted that the distinction between granting immunity to a legislator who accepted a bribe and voted accordingly, but denying it to one who accepted a bribe but did not vote was paradoxical and fundamentally inconsistent with constitutional morality. The Court emphasized that under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the offence of bribery is complete the moment a legislator accepts an illegal gratification, irrespective of whether the promised vote or action is carried out.
The earlier decision in Narasimha Rao was criticized for creating an illogical distinction: where a legislator who accepted a bribe but did not vote could be prosecuted, but one who accepted a bribe and voted accordingly could not. The Court found such reasoning contrary to both constitutional principles and the public interest.
The Bench agreed with the interpretation of Mr. Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General of India and held that once the illegal benefit is received with the intention to influence legislative conduct, criminal liability is attracted, regardless of any subsequent action by the legislator.
The Supreme Court clarified that its constitutional jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal liability functions autonomously and cannot be curtailed by the internal disciplinary mechanisms of Parliament or State Assemblies.
The interpretation of privileges under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) is not immune from judicial review and must conform to the broader constitutional vision of accountability, transparency, and rule of law.
The argument based on stare decisis, that the precedent in PV Narasimha Rao should not be disturbed was rejected, as the Court held that the doctrine is not an inflexible rule, but must yield where previous rulings are found to be unworkable or contrary to public good and for development of law. The Court cited global practices from the UK and Canada which allow reconsideration in exceptional cases. The Court also rejected the argument that bribery allegations against legislators fall within the ambit of legislative privilege, holding that such acts attract judicial scrutiny as they affect the very foundation of democratic integrity and the sanctity of constitutional governance.
The judgment thus marks a decisive constitutional reaffirmation that no holder of public power, including members of the legislature, is immune from the rule of law. By narrowing the ambit of legislative immunity and overruling PV Narasimha Rao, the Court reaffirmed that privileges are instruments of legislative efficiency, not shields for corruption.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sita Soren v. Union of India marks a significant shift in the interpretation of legislative privilege, reaffirming the core constitutional principle that no authority is exempt from the rule of law. By overruling PV Narasimha Rao, the Court clarified that Articles 105(2) and 194(2) are intended to protect the autonomy of parliamentary functioning and not to shield legislators from criminal accountability in cases of bribery. The judgment reinforces that privileges are to facilitate effective lawmaking, not personal exemptions from legal scrutiny. The adoption of a clear two-stage framework ensures that claims of privilege are tested against the functional relevance to legislative duties and the broader integrity of the democratic process. Notably, the Court reaffirmed that judicial scrutiny is essential to upholding constitutional norms, and that past rulings which enable unethical conduct in public office cannot be maintained solely for the sake of precedent. By taking this position, the Court reinforced a more grounded and principled approach to interpreting the Constitution, while sending a clear message that democratic accountability must prevail over institutional convenience.
FAQS
1. Does constitutional immunity under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) extend to legislators accused of accepting bribes for voting in the House?
No. The Supreme Court in Sita Soren v. Union of India held that the constitutional privileges under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) are intended to safeguard the sanctity of legislative functioning and do not extend to acts of bribery. Acceptance of bribes, even if connected with voting or speech in the House, constitutes a criminal offence and falls outside the scope of legislative privilege. The judgment decisively affirms that parliamentary immunity cannot be invoked to shield criminal misconduct.
2. What criteria did the Court apply to determine whether an act falls within the ambit of legislative privilege?
The Court introduced a two-fold test to assess whether an act qualifies for legislative privilege: (i) The act must have a direct connection with the collective legislative functioning; and (ii) It must be essential for the discharge of a legislator’s duties. Bribery fails both criteria. The Court made it clear that criminal acts like accepting illegal gratification have no legitimate role in the legislative process and therefore fall outside the protective scope of privilege.
3. On what grounds did the Supreme Court overrule the precedent laid down in PV Narasimha Rao v. State (1998)?
The Supreme Court found the majority ruling in PV Narasimha Rao to be logically flawed and constitutionally unsound. The earlier judgment had created an arbitrary distinction by protecting legislators who accepted bribes and voted, while allowing prosecution for those who accepted bribes but did not vote. Such a position was held to be fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional ethos, as it permitted the erosion of accountability under the guise of privilege. The Court emphasized that the moment illegal gratification is accepted, the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 stands complete, rendering any subsequent legislative act irrelevant for the purpose of immunity.
4. Does the judgment alter the relationship between legislative privilege and judicial scrutiny?
The decision reaffirms that while legislative privilege protects internal deliberative processes from external interference, it cannot be construed as a bar on judicial scrutiny where criminality is alleged. The Court reiterated that privileges are conferred not as personal rights but as institutional safeguards for the effective functioning of the legislature. Any attempt to use these privileges as a cover for illegality compromises constitutional morality and democratic accountability, and must yield to the overarching principle of the rule of law.
