Author : Supriya Pathak , Delhi Metropolitan Education
Introduction :
Facts Of The Case.
The petitioner in this case wed Sanjay Kumar Saini. Respondent No. 2 was born on April 16, 2000, in accordance with Hindu customs. and Gaya’s rites. The appellant claims that at the her father gave her all of the kitchenware when she got married. A double bed, dining table, refrigerator, TV, and an almirah cash payment of Rs. 2,50,000. Furthermore to the same, Her father lavished a great deal of money on the marriage ceremony. and for presents to her husband’s other family members. However, despite similar reason, she was held accountable as soon as the marriage for providing a smaller dowry than her in-laws, and they began hurting and harassing her. Her spouse was also accustomed to help his family members torment her. It is her going forward. complaint about her husband’s need for more money Receiving Rs. 4 lakhs from her parents for home improvement at Rancher. She was seized against her will when she was pregnant and her married residence in Ranchi and brought her to her parents at Gaya, at home.
Following the delivery of a girl child, the things got worse and worse, and everyone began to accusing her of having placed an extra load on 3 of them. A while later, her spouse revealed a new compel her father to give him his Gaya house unless She will not return to Ranchi, her marital residence. Being tormented nonstop and experiencing the intolerable treatment she endured for many years from her husband and in-laws, With nothing else to do, The petitioner filed a First Information Report No. 66 of 2007 (abbreviated “FIR”) under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is read alongside Sections 498A and 406 Code (also known as the “IPC”) and Dowry Sections 3 and 4 Act of Prohibition, 1961 (also known as the “D.P. Act”) at Magadh Medical Gaya, College Police Station. Following review of the charge by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, sheet, discovered that the accused had a prima facie case, Consequently, acknowledged the offences that were subject to Read in conjunction with Section 34 IPC and Sections 498A and 406 against each of them and transferred the D.P. Act’s sections 3 and 4. appeal to the Gaya sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate’s court in order to test. Although a complaint was made claiming that the The learned Magistrate, the court in Gaya has no authority, following careful evaluation of all pertinent information, including the the complaint’s accusations, rejecting the aforementioned argument. Angry about the aforementioned order, the defendants Criminal Miscellaneous No. 42478 of 2009 was favoured prior to the Supreme Judicial Court in Patna. By dated order
On March 19, 2010, the High Court determined that the actions at Gaya are quashed and cannot be maintained due to a lack of jurisdiction. the whole Magadh Medical College Police procedures Station Case No. 66 of 2007 where the appellant is free to file the same in the relevant court, as stated below. After the spouse (respondent No. 2 in this instance) and quashed the criminal charges brought against him stated directive, the High Court permitted Criminal
ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE CASE
Territorial jurisdiction about the criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant-wife.
Respondent and petitioner’s advocate
Heard appellant Mr. Vivek Singh, the knowledgeable attorney
and Mr. S.B. Sanyal, the respondent’s knowledgeable senior counsel
Mr. Gopal Singh, the respondent’s knowledgeable lawyer, and No. 2
State is number one.
Argument on part of petitioner
Given that the problem is limited to territorial jurisdiction over the criminal cases that were started by the The appellant-wife does not required to provide any additional factual information. elements. Given that the SDJM has determined that the Gaya Court has the authority to try the defendants for offences punished by Section 34 in conjunction with Sections 498A and 406 IPC, D.P. Act Sections 3 and 4, and the High Court overturned the aforementioned ruling and discovered that the activities at Gaya cannot be maintained due to a lack of jurisdiction. would be appropriate to refer to the pertinent clauses and the contents of FIR.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XIII (in the criminal courts’ jurisdiction in short, “Code” investigations and testing. Particularly pertinent sections are 177–179. like this:
177. Common location for investigation and trial -. Generally, the court whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed will investigate and try any offence.
178. Trial or inquiry location. (a) When it’s unclear where an offence was committed among multiple localities, or
(b) in cases where an infraction is partially perpetrated in one locality and partially in another;
(c) in the case of an ongoing offence that is being committed in multiple localities, or
(d) in cases when it comprises multiple acts carried out in various localities,
It could be investigated or tried by a court that has jurisdiction over any of these localities.
179. An offence that can be tried based on the act committed or the result of the action. If an act becomes illegal due to something that was done and a result that happened, the crime can be investigated or tried by a court that has local jurisdiction over the place where the act was done and the result that happened.
The aforementioned clauses make it evident that the customary practice is that the crime will typically be investigated and tried by a court that it was committed in within its local jurisdiction.
Considering the aforementioned clauses, let’s look at theclaims stated in the formal complaint. On October 17, 2007, Sunita The appellant in this case, Kumari Kashyap, filed a complaint with the Magadh Medical College Police Inspector in Charge Gaya Station. Following a narrative in the complaint, the appellant her union with respondent No. 2 Sanjay Kumar Saini as of April 16, 2000, indicated that what had transpired soon after her marriage, at her husband’s request, and the abuse, torture, and ultimately death of his family members expressed dissatisfaction on being removed from the married residence at Ranchi and conveyed to her parents’ house in Gaya under duress that unless she receives her father’s home under her name marriage, she will always have to reside at her parents’ home. In the Moreover, she claimed in her complaint that her husband put pressure on her to transfer her father’s home into his name and 8 when she refuted her husband’s claims that she had been beaten. It was additionally claimed that following the retention of all of her jewellery and belongings, on On December 24, 2006, her spouse arrived in Gaya and departed from her. Until his requests are fulfilled, she must remain at Gaya, and should she attempt to return without encountering those requests the death of the woman. Moreover, it was mentioned that from that her in-laws never asked from the date of the complaint to the date of the inquiry regarding her. She phoned them even then, but they never returned her call. she. Examining the complete complaint, which was filed as An FIR unequivocally demonstrates that there was cruelty and maltreatment. at the hands of her spouse and his relatives during the married residence in Ranchi, and as a result of their deeds and fear that she might be compelled to return to her parents’ house in Gaya where she started the criminal investigation against them because offences that fall under the IPC’s Sections 498A and 406/34 D.P. Act Sections 3 and 4.
“In the case of Suresh Kaushal and Others v. State of M.P., (2003) 11 SCC 126, once more in a comparable situation, evaluating the terms of Section 179 in light of the the complaint on the violations of Section 498A reads Section 34 IPC, this Court rendered the following ruling:
The two courts mentioned in the foregoing Section are contemplated as having jurisdiction, and either of those two courts may host the trial. The court whose local jurisdiction the conduct was committed is one; the court whose local jurisdiction the result occurred is the other. In cases when it is claimed that the miscarriage occurred at Jabalpur It cannot be argued that the Jabalpur court was not able to get jurisdiction .
Argument on part of Respondent
The knowledgeable senior attorney Mr. S.B. Sanyal is representing the
Fairly speaking, respondents said there is no disagreement over the the authority of the Court in Gaya with respect to the husband, yet, in regard to the husband’s other relations The aforementioned Court has no jurisdiction in the absence of any act at Gaya. authority and, if any, the wife must seek redress exclusively in Ranchi. He cited as evidence for his claim a ruling in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith and Others vs. Police Inspector, Chennai and Others, 2004 8 SCC 100 notably, paragraph 12 of the aforementioned ruling, which says beneath:
Whether any portion of the cause of action originated within the court’s jurisdiction is the key question. It is the location of the offence as defined by Section 177 of the Code. Essentially, it serves as the basis for starting legal action against the accused. True, Section 177 of the Code makes reference to the local authority in which the crime is perpetrated. Even so, the Criminals are familiar with the phrase “cause of action.” situations, in light of the Code’s Sections 178 and 179 and in the in view of the particular allegation in the appellant’s complaint .
We believethat the aforementioned decision is not relevant to the current situation. Mr. Sanyal additionally cited this Court’s ruling in State of Rajasthan and Others v. Bhura Ram and Others, (2008) 11 SCC 103, wherein in light of the ruling in Y. As stated above in Abraham Ajith and Others, this Court determined that “cause of action” having emerged under the purview of the The offence could not be tried by the court where it was committed by the court in which no offence was committed in part. Regarding the similar explanations as those in the preceding paragraph, while Since there is no disagreement over the proposition, The crime in question was a persistent one, and the incident in Gaya was only a result of the ongoing offence of mistreatment and harassment inflicted upon the Complainant, you are now subject to Section 178 clause (c). Considering the aforementioned rationale, neither of the rulings applies to the the circumstances of this case, and we cannot support the position adopted by Sanyal, Mr.
Decision of the Court
Considering the debate and conclusion above, the contested High Court ruling declaring that the Gaya’s proceedings cannot continue because there is not It is not possible to maintain jurisdiction. The contested ruling of the High Court decision in Criminal Misc. No. 42478 of March 19, 2010 2009 and a further Criminal Misc. decree dated April 29, 2010. 2009 Case No. 45153 is set aside. Considering the same, the SDJM, Gaya is allowed to continue with the criminal the actions taken in trial Nos. 1224 of 2009 and 1551 of 2008 and determine the same in line with the law. It is stated unequivocally that We have not discussed the merits or assertions of both parties, and the conclusion we reached above is limited to the territorial jurisdiction .hence both appeal are allowed.
Conclusion
The case involves the petitioner, Sunita Kumari Kashyap, who alleged that she was harassed and tortured by her husband, Sanjay Kumar Saini, and his family for not bringing sufficient dowry. After being forced to return to her parents’ home in Gaya, she filed a First Information Report (FIR) at Magadh Medical College Police Station in Gaya. The Chief Judicial Magistrate found a prima facie case against the accused and transferred the case to the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate (SDJM) in Gaya.
The main issue in the case was the territorial jurisdiction of the criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant-wife. The High Court initially quashed the proceedings at Gaya, stating a lack of jurisdiction, and directed the appellant to file the case in the appropriate court. The appellant argued that the SDJM in Gaya had jurisdiction over the case as per Sections 177, 178, and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. These sections allow for the investigation and trial of an offense by a court within whose local jurisdiction any part of the offense occurred.
The Supreme Court ruled that the ongoing offense of harassment and mistreatment, which started at the marital residence and continued to affect the appellant in Gaya, gives the Gaya court jurisdiction under Section 178(c) of the Code. Therefore, the High Court’s decision was set aside, and the SDJM, Gaya, was allowed to continue with the criminal proceedings.
FAQs
1. Why did the appellant-wife file the FIR in Gaya?
The appellant-wife filed the FIR in Gaya because she was forced to return to her parents’ home in Gaya due to harassment and torture by her husband and in-laws.
2. What sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Dowry Prohibition Act were involved in this case?
The sections involved were Sections 34, 498A, and 406 of the IPC, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
3. What did the High Court initially decide regarding the case?
The High Court initially quashed the proceedings at Gaya, stating a lack of jurisdiction, and directed the appellant to file the case in the appropriate court.
4. What was the Supreme Court’s ruling on the jurisdiction issue?
The Supreme Court ruled that the Gaya court had jurisdiction under Section 178(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as the ongoing offense of harassment and mistreatment affected the appellant in Gaya.
