Author: Chhavi Das, ILS Law College
To the Point
India’s federal form, while constitutionally symmetric, tends to experience strain in terms of overlapping powers and political variation. The Centre maintains primacy with provisions such as Article 254 (federal dominance in Concurrent List clashes), Article 248 (residuary powers), and Article 356 (President’s Rule), the latter routinely abused till checked by the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai (1994). Though subject to the counsel of state Cabinets (Article 163), governors have slowed state legislation attacked by courts, such as in the 2025 case of Tamil Nadu. States have increasingly turned to Article 131 of the Constitution to legally challenge the Centre in the Supreme Court, as seen in West Bengal’s 2024 case against alleged overreach by the CBI and ED.
Bommai, State of Rajasthan, and Nabam Rebia cases supported judicial restraints on central power and upheld state independence. However, disputes over NEET, central agencies, and language policies derive from the fact that federalism in India is as much about political bargaining as constitutional precept. Cooperative federalism is still the aspiration, but the practice oscillates between confrontation and judicial correction.
Use of Legal Jargon
Indian federalism, though constitutionally guaranteed, tends to work through a maze of intricate legal principles. Central to this is the doctrine of federal superiority, primarily manifest in Article 254, which ensures that on the Concurrent List, in event of conflict, Union legislation will supersede State law. Article 248 also transfers residuary powers to the Centre to legislate in new areas such as cyber law and environmental law.
Tensions heighten for Article 356, which allows the President to Rule a state on the report of a governor’s breakdown of constitutional order. Even though it was supposed to be a last resort, its abuse compelled the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India to declare such declarations judicially reviewable, strengthening the basic structure doctrine.
In this power game, concepts such as the mala-fide exercise of power and the colourable legislation doctrine emerge where ostensibly legal action conceals political intention. This has created controversy over coercive federalism, a politically motivated but extra-constitutional term invoked when the Centre is alleged to be overbearing states through financial or institutional coercion.
The constitutional morality doctrine also acquires significance, especially in the form of Governors withholding their assent from state bills or stalling decisions. However, Article 163 requires them to act on advice given by ministers.
Additionally, Article 131 grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction concerning Centre-State conflicts, a provision recently used by states such as West Bengal against unilateral CBI actions. These legal doctrines reflect the ongoing constitutional balancing act between federal cooperation and central-state conflict in India.
The Proof
Though India is constitutionally a “Union of States,” its federal setup leans towards centralization, making it quasi-federal in nature. The Seventh Schedule allocates subjects: the Centre has exclusive powers (Union List), states have their domain (State List), and many areas (like education, public health, forests, etc.) are Concurrent (both can legislate). Crucially, if a state law on Concurrent subject conflicts with an earlier Union law, it is void unless it was reserved for the President and assented. This repugnancy rule means states cannot easily override central schemes. For example, education was moved to the Concurrent List by the 42nd Amendment; Tamil Nadu’s 2021 Act to scrap the NEET exam was a state law on education. That law was reserved for the President (since it conflicted with the Union’s NEET law) and ultimately withheld (no assent was given), so the central NEET scheme continues.
The Centre’s rejection of Tamil Nadu’s request for NEET exemption was strongly condemned by the state’s Chief minister, who framed it as a severe setback to the spirit of federalism. This clash exemplifies tensions in concurrent-list fields like education: a state enactment can override central law only if reserved and assented to. Here, the President (on Union advice) refused assent, so the central NEET law prevailed. Such instances highlight the fine line between state autonomy and national uniformity. (Other disputes, e.g., national education policy, language impositions, etc., similarly pit state priorities against the Centre’s mandate.)
The Centre also exerts power through institutions. Article 356 (President’s Rule) allows the dismissal of state governments. In theory, it’s for “failure of constitutional machinery”, but it was often invoked for party politics. The Supreme Court’s S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) severely curbed this. Bommai held that proclamations under Article 356 are not immune from judicial review; the President’s satisfaction must have some material basis, and bad faith can be probed. The Court stressed that secularism is a constitutional basic feature so that a state government could be dismissed only for genuine non-secular acts or constitutional breakdown. Subsequently, the President’s Rule is now rarely used; the Court’s 1994 bench of nine judges “put crucial limits on the Union government’s discretionary power, strengthening … federalism”.
State legislatures and governors have also become battlegrounds. Article 163 requires Governors to act on the state Cabinet’s advice in almost all matters, with few discretionary exceptions. Yet governors can reserve bills for the President’s assent (Article 200) or send them back for reconsideration. Opposition states often accuse governors (who are Union nominees) of deliberately delaying or blocking legislation. The Tamil Nadu Governor’s failure to act on several state bills for a long period has generated controversy regarding the constitutional function and responsibility of governors under India’s federal setup. The Supreme Court’s April 2025 judgment condemned this conduct: it called the decision to reserve 10 Tamil bills for presidential approval “illegal and arbitrary.” The Court issued new rules: if a Governor withholds or reserves a bill on advice, he must act within one month; if done against the government’s advice, within three months; and once a bill is re-passed, assent must come within a month. Failure to meet these deadlines is now reviewable. (A satirical cartoon on Tamil politics portrayed the Governor as a slow-moving turtle, underscoring the Court’s rebuke about ‘not sitting on’ state business.)
Finally, states use Article 131 of the Constitution to litigate grievances against the Union. Article 131 grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over disputes “between the Government of India and one or more States” or between States. In State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977), Congress-ruled states challenged the Janata Centre’s threats to dissolve assemblies. The Court (7-2) ultimately upheld the Centre’s position on those facts, emphasizing that Article 356 is “subjective” but could be reviewed for mala fides. Importantly, it confirmed that Article 131 does cover Centre-State disputes, laying the groundwork for later cases. More recently, West Bengal (TMC-led) sued the Union under Art 131, alleging misuse of the CBI and ED. The Supreme Court in July 2024 held the suit maintainable, noting that states can challenge central executive actions when federalism is at stake. West Bengal argued that since it had withdrawn general consent for CBI probes, any intrusion without permission violated the DSPE Act and that ED raids routinely follow CBI searches, amplifying the harm. A 2023 parliamentary reply revealed that ten states had withdrawn general consent for CBI investigations.
Abstract
India’s federal polity entrenches a separation of powers between the Union and states (Seventh Schedule) and visualizes cooperative federalism, where “strong states make a strong nation.” However, in recent times, repeated conflicts have ensued, from battles over central examinations (NEET) to governors delaying state legislation and opposition states crying about the “misuse” of federal institutions (CBI/ED). This piece charts the constitutional setup (Articles 356, 131, Seventh Schedule, etc.) and developing practice. We examine how Centre-State conflicts are resolved politically and jurally, identify key cases (e.g., S.R. Bommai, Nabam Rebia, State of Rajasthan v. UoI), and determine whether tensions represent a constitutional crisis or a political tug-of-war.
Case Laws
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): A 9-judge bench limited Article 356 abuse. It ruled that presidential proclamations are justiciable; courts may examine if there was any material justifying dismissal. Secularism was declared a “basic feature” of the Constitution, so governments can only fall for genuine non-secular conduct. In effect, Bommai struck down many arbitrary President’s Rule orders and “strengthened … federalism” by curbing the Centre’s power.
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977): States invoked Article 131 to challenge a Home Ministry directive threatening the dissolution of Congress governments. The SC (majority) upheld the Centre’s stance but clarified limits: judicial review of Article 356 is extremely narrow, with presidential satisfaction essentially final unless mala fide. The Court explained that Article 131 “covers disputes between the Centre and the State Government.” This case cemented that a state may sue the Union on constitutional matters, setting the stage for future federal litigation.
Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh (2016): During a political crisis in Arunachal Pradesh, the Governor advanced the Assembly session without ministerial advice, and the Speaker preemptively disqualified dissenting MLAs. A 5-judge bench held that the Governor does not have unfettered discretion: powers under Art.174 (summoning/dissolving the House) must be exercised in consultation with the Council of Ministers.
Significantly, the Court nullified the subsequent imposition of the President’s Rule (the first-ever judicial reversal of an Article 356 proclamation) and restored the democratically elected government. This reinforced that even Governors (and presidential proclamations) are subject to constitutional constraints.
(Other notable cases: The Delhi-Governance judgments (2018) limit the Centre’s control over NCT legislation; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) and ED Gujarat vs. Loyola (Aadhaar, 2018) touch on agency overreach, etc.)
Conclusion
India’s Centre-state relations swing between legal frameworks and political contests. The Founders considered a federal arrangement with space for national integration but also ensured state autonomy through judicial review and cooperative forums. However, clashes erupt when different parties run the state and central governments. Recent developments like NEET wars, Governor’s gatekeeping, and ED/CBI skirmishes show the weaknesses as well as stresses of the system. The Supreme Court has repeatedly intervened to impose legal restraints (as in Bommai, Rebia, etc.), reaffirming that federal equilibrium is not a blank cheque. In the future, genuine “cooperative federalism” would mean consultation and deference to constitutional limits. Until such time, India’s democracy will continue to see spirited tugs-of-war, with the courts playing umpire to this game of the Constitution.
FAQS
1. What is President’s Rule (Article 356)? Can it be challenged?
Yes. Under Article 356, the Centre can impose President’s Rule if a state fails to function as per constitutional norms.
2. What is Article 131? How do states apply it?
It allows states to directly bring the Centre to the Supreme Court in a dispute (such as abuse of power or allocation of resources). For instance, West Bengal employed it in 2024 against CBI/ED meddling, and the SC sanctioned it.
3. How are CBI/ED disputes made federal issues?
The CBI requires state permission to investigate. Several opposition states revoked permission, alleging the Centre employs agencies for political targeting. This has federalism implications, and courts are now adjudicating such cases.
4. What is the role of Governors?
The Centre chooses governors but must act on state advice (Art.163). Recently, some state bills have been delayed or even blocked (e.g., TN’s NEET bill). The SC admonished that this is unconstitutional; they can’t delay state work without reason.
5. Can a state override a central law?
No, unless the state legislation has Presidential assent. Even that can be set aside if it conflicts with central legislation on the same subject (e.g., TN’s NEET law was rejected).