Author: Asmita Sarkar, Heritage Law College
To the Point
The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, aims to deal with the question of individuals occupying high constitutional or executive positions even if they are facing serious criminal charges. It provides a mechanism for the automatic disqualification of the Prime Minister, Union Ministers, Chief Ministers, and State Ministers if arrested and detained for a consecutive period of thirty days or more on charges that consist of a punishment of five years or more, even before conviction. Under this system, such persons would be considered to have relinquished their office from the date of the 31st day of detention, subject to the exception of a recommendation to the contrary by the relevant constitutional authority, like the President or Governor, on sound advice. The Bill seeks to enforce accountability, integrity, and public confidence in governance, as well as to bar the abuse of extended detention to freeze democratic institutions. But it has raised controversy on the balance between presumption of innocence and the requirement for ethical governance, as removal is precipitated even in the absence of a judicial determination of guilt, and concerns arise about possible political abuse of arrest or detention.
Use of Legal Jargon
The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, envisions a substantive change to the constitutional provision regulating ministerial term by the introduction of a disqualification ipso facto mechanism. It requires that the Prime Minister, Union Ministers, Chief Ministers, and State Ministers will ipso jure vacate office if they are undergoing imprisonment for a connected duration in excess of thirty days on account of charges involving a minimum penal consequence of five years of rigorous imprisonment or more, despite the lack of a conviction. The termination of office shall be suo motu from the thirty-first day of detention, subject to the President’s or the Governor’s constitutional discretion, as the case may be, in accordance with Articles 74 and 163, on the advice and aid of the Council of Ministers. This suggested amendment seeks to strengthen the doctrine of constitutional morality and preserve the sanctity of public office, while at the same time raising jurisprudential issues about the presumption of innocence, due process under Article 21, and the risk of abuse of preventive disqualification as an instrument of politics.
The Proof
The evidence of the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, is in its textual provision and legislative intention, as presented to the Lok Sabha on 19 August 2025. The Bill clearly states that the Prime Minister, Union and State Ministers will automatically vacate their office on the thirty-first day of consecutive detention if they are charged with an offence punishable with five years or more of imprisonment, even in the absence of a formal conviction. This mechanism has been ratified by the government as a device to protect constitutional morality, preserve the dignity of public office, and avoid the criminalization of politics in view of the growing number of legislators who are confronted with serious criminal charges. The Bill takes its legitimacy from the concept that being an executive office holder is a privilege rather than an indefeasible right and thus can be regulated through constitutional disqualifications under Articles 75 and 164. The legislative insertion attempts to establish a deterrent regime against persons with serious outstanding criminal charges continuing to hold executive authority, thus validating people’s faith in administration.
Abstract
The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, brings in a new constitutional mechanism to stem criminalization of politics by making the automatic disqualification of office of the Prime Minister, Union Ministers, Chief Ministers, and State Ministers on continuous detention for more than thirty days in respect of offences punishable with five years’ or more imprisonment, regardless of conviction. The amendment aims to improve probity in public life, accountability in government, and protection of constitutional morality by preventing individuals accused of serious criminal charges from continuing to hold executive power. Though it is anticipated as a reformist step to uphold the integrity of high constitutional posts, the Bill also evokes serious questions with regard to the presumption of innocence, right to due process under Article 21, and possible abuse of arrest or detention as a tool of political revenge. This abstract, therefore, places the amendment at the crossroads of constitutional rule, criminal jurisprudence, and democratic accountability, underscoring both its promise of reform and its jurisprudential challenge.
Case Laws
Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1
The Supreme Court stressed that criminals must not be made ministers since it erodes constitutional morality and good governance. Although the Court avoided issuing binding orders, it stressed that Parliament must pass laws to decriminalize politics. This case has strong jurisprudential backing for the amendment.
Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 224
The Court concluded that persons accused of serious offenses ought not to be permitted to sully the election process, even though disqualification was feasible only upon conviction under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The judgment is a testament to judicial restraints and demonstrates why a constitutional amendment such as the 130th would be called for.
Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 653
The Court invalidated Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, on the basis that legislators convicted of crimes incurring a punishment of two years or more would be disqualified forthwith without immunity. This milestone judgment is applicable because it established the precedent for zero tolerance against criminalization of public office.
Conclusion
In summary, the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, is a parliamentary endeavour to institutionalize probity in governance by disqualifying high constitutional authorities on prolonged detention for serious offences even in the event of non-conviction. Though it harmonizes with the Supreme Court’s continued concern regarding criminalizing politics and calls for greater ethical standards of life in public office, the amendment also throws up deep constitutional challenges concerning the presumption of innocence, due process under Article 21, and state power abusing potential for undermine political rivals. Its success will hence rest not just on the strength of procedural protections incorporated in its framework but on its judicial interpretation in consonance with constitutional morality and democratic values. If applied cautiously and equitably, the amendment can prove to be a revolutionary move towards purifying Indian politics; otherwise, without necessary protections, it can turn into a double-edged sword.
FAQS
Q1. What is the principal target of the 130th Amendment Bill, 2025?
The Bill seeks to prevent the criminalization of politics by making high constitutional officials like the Prime Minister, Union Ministers, Chief Ministers, and State Ministers lose their office forthwith if they are detained for over 30 days on trial in grave offences punishable with five years’ imprisonment or more, even in the absence of conviction.
Q2. Is the Bill infringe the presumption of innocence principle?
The critics contend that it does, as removal is necessitated before conviction. But the government defends it on the basis that to hold an executive office is a constitutional privilege and not an indefeasible right, and so higher disqualification tests can be applied.
Q3. On whom lies the authority of determining whether the disqualification is to be applied?
The suspension of office operation ipso facto on the 31st day of detention, although the President (in case of Union ministers) or Governor (in the case of State ministers) can act on advice under Articles 74 and 163.
Q4. How is this Bill connected with current disqualification legislation?
At present, under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, disqualification is only on conviction. The 130th Amendment takes it one step ahead by bringing about pre-conviction disqualification of ministers, breaching the classical approach.
Q5. What are the possible dangers of this amendment?
The principal dangers are the abuse of arrest or extended detention as a political tool, infringement of due process rights under Article 21, and potential destabilization of governments through arbitrary disqualifications.
Q6. How would this Bill enhance democracy?
With proper checks on abuse, it could increase public confidence, maintain the dignity of executive offices, and act as a deterrent against holders of high office who have serious criminal charges against them.
