Author: Nehal Saxena, Christ University Delhi NCR
To the Point
The ongoing debate over whether practical legal training should be mandatory before entering the judiciary on balancing merit with experience. The proponents of the 3-year rule argue that courtroom exposure builds competence and enhances a candidate’s understanding of courtroom procedures, cultivates professional maturity, and better prepares them to dispense justice from the bench, but critics point out that it creates unnecessary barriers for academically capable, first-generation law graduates, many of whom come from underprivileged or rural backgrounds, and lack the financial stability or familial legal networks to sustain years of practice with little to no income. For them, the 3-year rule becomes a gatekeeper—not a gateway—excluding talented individuals who might otherwise bring fresh insight, academic rigor, and diverse perspectives to the judiciary. The rule’s inconsistent implementation across Indian states raises questions about constitutional equality (Article 14) and access to opportunity. Given the presence of robust judicial academies and training modules, practical experience should be encouraged—not enforced. What’s needed is a more inclusive and flexible system that recognizes both the strength of academic excellence and the value of experience, to build a judiciary that is competent, diverse, and truly representative. The goal should not be to restrict entry but to prepare and empower those who have the potential to serve justice with excellence.
Abstract
The Indian judiciary plays an important role in maintaining the rule of law and ensuring justice for everyone. The process of selecting judges especially at the entry level has come under increasing scrutiny. One of the most debated issues in recent years is the implementation of a rule in certain states mandating that judicial service aspirants must possess a minimum of three years of legal practice experience before they can even sit for the judicial service examination. Popularly referred to as the “3-year rule,” this regulation has ignited widespread discussions across legal and academic circles, student communities, and policymaking platforms.
This “3-year rule” has sparked a nationwide debate: Should courtroom experience be a prerequisite for serving as a judge, or should academically qualified graduates be allowed direct access to judicial service? This article explores the arguments on both sides, considers relevant constitutional and legal principles, reviews significant case law, and evaluates whether this rule acts as a bridge or a barrier to judicial entry.
Use of Legal Jargons
The judgement of the three-year rule for being eligible to become a Civil Judge passed on 20 May 2025 by a Three Judges Bench (B.R. Gavai J, A.G. Masih J, K.V. Chandran J) draws heavily upon foundational principles of legal theory, constitutional law, and administrative fairness, and is best understood through the lens of key legal terminologies that shape the discourse. At the core lies Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the law. This principle prohibits arbitrary classification, a situation where similarly placed individuals are treated unequally without a reasonable or intelligible differentia. Critics of the rule argue that mandating prior legal practice before appearing for judicial service examinations amounts to such a classification, particularly disadvantaging fresh law graduates without sufficient justification.
The concept of judicial discretion is also relevant while state governments and public service commissions enjoy discretion in framing eligibility criteria for judicial posts, this power must be exercised within constitutional bounds, ensuring that it does not result in unjust or exclusionary outcomes. Legal doctrines such as locus standi (the legal capacity to approach the court), ratio decidendi (the legal principle or reasoning forming the basis of a judicial decision), and due process of law (a guarantee of fair, transparent, and non-arbitrary legal procedures) are often invoked in legal challenges to such eligibility rules.
Furthermore, the notion of natural justice with principles of fairness and reasoned decision-making, becomes crucial when analysing whether a procedural barrier like the three-year rule aligns with constitutional power and the broader objectives of judicial reform. These legal jargons and principles not only define the contours of the ongoing debate but also guide the judiciary and policymakers in evaluating whether the rule fosters judicial competence or undermines equal access to public employment under Article 16.
Ultimately, understanding and applying these legal concepts is essential to assess whether the three-year rule serves as a tool of reform or merely reinforces systemic inequities within the judicial recruitment framework.
The Proof
The rationale behind the three-year rule is grounded in the belief that judicial officers should possess not only theoretical knowledge but also a practical understanding of court functioning, legal drafting, client interaction, and litigation ethics. Proponents argue that the courtroom is the real training ground where one develops the critical faculties required for adjudication—such as applying the law to facts, assessing credibility of witnesses, managing case flow, and interpreting procedural nuances.
However, empirical evidence and policy studies challenge the exclusivity of this view. For instance, several judicial officers who entered service directly after graduation—prior to the enforcement of the rule—have gone on to become respected members of the higher judiciary. This suggests that courtroom experience, while helpful, is not the only path to competence. In fact, judicial academies across India, such as the National Judicial Academy (Bhopal) and various state judicial academies, offer structured training programs that include mock trials, legal writing, judgment drafting, and mentoring, effectively bridging the gap between legal education and judicial responsibility. There is also no conclusive data to show that judges selected through the 3-year practice route perform significantly better than those selected directly after graduation.
Additionally, requiring litigation experience assumes that three years of practice equates to meaningful learning—but this is not always the case. Many young advocates struggle to find proper mentorship or paid work in the early years of practice, often relegated to clerical tasks without real exposure to courtroom advocacy. In contrast, some fresh graduates possess strong academic backgrounds, internships under judges or senior advocates, and research experience that better prepare them for judicial roles than poorly guided practice. In sum, while practical experience can be beneficial, the evidence does not support its imposition as a rigid rule. The real issue is not whether candidates have practiced for a fixed period, but whether they are adequately trained, assessed, and equipped to perform the role of a judge. The availability of judicial training infrastructure, combined with well-designed exams and interviews, can serve this purpose more effectively and inclusively than a blanket experience requirement.
Case Laws
All-India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (1992 AIR 165)
The All-India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (1992) case plays a crucial role in the ongoing debate around the three-year practice rule for judicial entry. In this landmark judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized the uniformity in recruitment standards, service conditions, and training of judicial officers across all states is needed. This directly relates to the issue of the three-year rule, which is implemented unevenly across India—creating unequal access to the judiciary depending on regional policies. The Court’s stress on standardization underlines the argument that judicial appointments should not be subject to arbitrary or inconsistent eligibility criteria. Moreover, the judgment supports the idea that professional competence can be ensured through structured judicial training, rather than enforcing mandatory courtroom experience as a prerequisite. This strengthens the view that merit and academic excellence should not be sidelined in favour of an inflexible experience requirement, particularly when such a rule may violate the equality principle under Article 14 of the Constitution.
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983 AIR 130)
The case of D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) is significant to the debate surrounding the three-year practice rule for judicial entry, as it reinforces the constitutional principle of equality under Article 14. In this landmark judgment, the Supreme Court held that any classification that is unreasonable or arbitrary, and not based on intelligible differentia, would be unconstitutional. Applying this reasoning to the three-year rule, the mandatory requirement of prior legal practice creates an arbitrary classification between fresh law graduates and those with litigation experience, despite both being academically qualified. This classification may unfairly disadvantage meritorious, first-generation law graduates by denying them equal opportunity in public employment. Thus, D.S. Nakara supports the argument that access to judicial services should be based on fair and inclusive criteria, rather than rigid prerequisites that violate the right to equality and create systemic barriers to entry.
Conclusion
The debate over whether practical legal training should be mandatory for judicial entry boils down to a fundamental tension between experience and opportunity. While real-world experience undeniably brings maturity and context-awareness, making it a prerequisite risk excluding countless deserving law graduates who could be excellent judges with proper training. The 3-year rule, although well-intentioned, lacks uniformity and may violate constitutional guarantees of equality. It fails to consider the evolving role of judicial academies, the academic excellence of many fresh graduates, and the socioeconomic barriers that impede access to litigation for many young lawyers. Moreover, the rule potentially contributes to structural elitism, favouring those who can afford to “wait it out” in litigation, often with family support.
A better approach would involve flexibility and choice. States could allow candidates to qualify either with three years of litigation experience or with exceptional academic records coupled with a commitment to undergo intensive judicial training. A more balanced solution would be to make legal practice preferable but not mandatory, allowing states to recognize varied forms of legal exposure—such as internships, moot courts, clerkships, or research assistantships—as valid indicators of readiness. Additionally, a centralized and uniform policy on judicial recruitment, framed by the judiciary or a national body, can prevent state-level inconsistencies and uphold fairness. Ultimately, the judiciary must reflect not only legal acumen but also social diversity, inclusivity, and openness to new talent—qualities that rigid rules should not be allowed to suppress. This dual-path model would respect diversity in backgrounds while ensuring that competence remains central to the recruitment process.
Ultimately, the goal should be to identify judges who are fair, knowledgeable, and capable of upholding justice — not just those who have spent a certain number of years in court corridors. The judiciary must remain accessible to all talented individuals, regardless of whether they take the path of experience or academic excellence.
FAQS
What is the “3-Year Rule” in judicial service exams?
The “3-Year Rule” refers to the eligibility condition imposed by some Indian states that requires candidates to have a minimum of three years of legal practice experience before they can appear for the judicial services examination. This rule aims to ensure that only individuals with courtroom exposure are considered for entry into the judiciary.
What role do judicial academies play in the training of new judges?
Judicial academies in India are responsible for providing structured, post-recruitment training to newly appointed judges. This training includes theoretical instruction, court craft, case management, and ethical guidance.
How does the concept of arbitrary classification apply to the 3-year rule?
Arbitrary classification refers to dividing individuals into groups without reasonable justification. If the 3-year rule distinguishes between fresh graduates and practicing lawyers without a clear nexus to judicial competence, it may be considered arbitrary under Article 14.
Is the 3-year legal practice rule uniformly applied across India?
Yes, the three-year legal practice rule is now uniformly applied across India for candidates aspiring to enter the judiciary. In a landmark decision on May 20, 2025, the Supreme Court of India reinstated the requirement that law graduates must have a minimum of three years of legal practice before they can appear for judicial services examinations.
How does the 3-Year Rule affect first-generation or underprivileged law graduates?
The rule can act as a significant barrier for first-generation lawyers or economically disadvantaged students who may not have the resources to sustain unpaid or underpaid legal practice for three years. It potentially discourages talented individuals from aspiring to join the judiciary.
