Author: Muskan Mishra, Sinhgad Law College, SPPU
To the Point
The power of the Governor to grant assent to Bills passed by a State Legislature under Article 200 of the Constitution has recently emerged as a major constitutional and political flashpoint. Several opposition-ruled States have accused Governors of indefinitely delaying assent to duly enacted legislation, thereby obstructing the democratic will of elected governments. The Supreme Court of India has intervened to clarify that while the Governor does possess constitutional discretion, such discretion cannot be exercised in a manner that frustrates legislative functioning. The Court has held that inaction and unreasonable delay are constitutionally impermissible and subject to judicial scrutiny, though courts must respect the separation of powers and refrain from rewriting constitutional procedures.
Use of Legal Jargon
Article 200 refers to the constitutional provision governing the Governor’s power to assent to, withhold, return, or reserve Bills passed by the State Legislature.
Aid and advice means the binding advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 163, except in limited discretionary areas.
Federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution involving the division of powers between the Union and the States.
Discretionary power refers to constitutional authority exercised independently of ministerial advice.
Judicial review denotes the power of constitutional courts to examine executive action for legality and constitutional compliance.
Pocket veto refers to indirect refusal by inaction without formally rejecting a Bill.
The Proof
Multiple States including Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, and Kerala approached the Supreme Court alleging prolonged delays by Governors in granting assent to Bills. In State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2023), the Supreme Court categorically held that the Governor cannot indefinitely delay assent and must act within a reasonable time. The Court observed that Article 200 does not contemplate a situation where a Bill can be kept pending without decision.
In State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2024), the Supreme Court reiterated that constitutional silence on timelines does not mean unlimited discretion. The Court emphasized that the Governor is a constitutional head and not a parallel legislative authority. Withholding assent without returning the Bill or reserving it for the President was held to be inconsistent with constitutional governance.
The Court further clarified that while courts cannot dictate how the Governor should decide, they can intervene when inaction becomes arbitrary, mala fide, or destructive of democratic functioning.
Abstract
The constitutional design of India places the Governor as the formal head of the State, entrusted with limited discretionary powers to ensure constitutional compliance. Article 200 grants the Governor four options when a Bill is presented: assent, withholding assent, returning the Bill for reconsideration, or reserving it for the President. However, the Constitution does not expressly prescribe a timeline for exercising these options, leading to political misuse through prolonged inaction.
Recent judicial developments reveal growing concern that Governors are increasingly acting as political agents rather than neutral constitutional authorities. This has resulted in legislative paralysis and erosion of federal balance. The Supreme Court has stepped in to reaffirm that constitutional discretion must be exercised reasonably and in good faith. This article analyses the evolving jurisprudence on gubernatorial assent, judicial limits on executive inaction, and the constitutional necessity of preserving democratic accountability within India’s federal structure.
Case Laws
State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab, (2023)
Facts: The Punjab government challenged the Governor’s refusal to summon the Assembly and delay in acting on Bills.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the Governor is bound by constitutional discipline and cannot act arbitrarily. It ruled that indefinite delay in exercising powers under Article 200 is unconstitutional.
Significance: This case firmly established that inaction can amount to constitutional violation.
State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, (2024)
Facts: The Tamil Nadu government challenged prolonged non-assent to multiple Bills passed by the State Legislature.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the Governor cannot adopt a pocket veto by neither assenting nor returning the Bill. The Court clarified that all constitutional options under Article 200 must be exercised within a reasonable time.
Significance: The judgment reinforced judicial scrutiny over gubernatorial inaction while respecting separation of powers.
Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh, (2016)
Held: The Governor cannot act independently of the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except where expressly permitted.
Relevance: This case remains foundational in limiting discretionary misuse by Governors.
B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010)
Held: Although Governors hold office at the pleasure of the President, their actions are subject to constitutional morality and judicial review.
Relevance: Reinforces accountability of Governors as constitutional functionaries.
Conclusion
The recent jurisprudence on the Governor’s assent to Bills reflects a judicial attempt to restore constitutional balance without encroaching upon executive discretion. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Governor is neither a rival power centre nor a political veto authority. While the Constitution does not prescribe rigid timelines, it equally does not permit paralysis of legislative processes through silence.
Judicial intervention in such cases is not an assertion of supremacy but a protection of democratic functioning. The evolving doctrine establishes that constitutional discretion must be exercised responsibly, reasonably, and in furtherance of representative governance. The Governor’s role is to facilitate constitutional processes, not to obstruct them. This jurisprudence strengthens federalism and reinforces the supremacy of elected legislatures within their constitutional domain.
FAQ
What options does a Governor have under Article 200
The Governor may grant assent, withhold assent, return the Bill for reconsideration if it is not a Money Bill, or reserve it for the President.
Can a Governor indefinitely delay assent to a Bill
No. The Supreme Court has held that indefinite delay is unconstitutional and subject to judicial review.
Can courts force a Governor to give assent
Courts cannot direct the outcome of the decision but can compel the Governor to exercise one of the constitutional options.
Is the Governor bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers
Yes, except in limited constitutionally specified discretionary situations.
Does this jurisprudence violate separation of powers
No. Judicial review is exercised only to prevent constitutional breakdown, not to substitute executive decision-making.
References:
Constitution of India – Article 200 (Governor’s Assent to Bills)
[https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1521](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1521)
State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2023)
Supreme Court judgment and reporting
[https://www.scobserver.in/court-case/state-of-punjab-v-principal-secretary-to-the-governor-of-punjab/](https://www.scobserver.in/court-case/state-of-punjab-v-principal-secretary-to-the-governor-of-punjab/)
Supreme Court on Governor’s delay in assent (Punjab case coverage)
[https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/supreme-court-governor-cannot-delay-assent-bills-passed-legislature-article-200-constitutional-morality-226432](https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/supreme-court-governor-cannot-delay-assent-bills-passed-legislature-article-200-constitutional-morality-226432)
State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2024)
Supreme Court proceedings and legal analysis
[https://www.scobserver.in/court-case/tamil-nadu-government-v-governor-of-tamil-nadu/](https://www.scobserver.in/court-case/tamil-nadu-government-v-governor-of-tamil-nadu/)
Supreme Court criticising ‘pocket veto’ by Governors
[https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/governor-cannot-sit-over-bills-indefinitely-supreme-court-article-200-247211](https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/governor-cannot-sit-over-bills-indefinitely-supreme-court-article-200-247211)
Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh (2016) 8 SCC 1
Official judgment text
[https://main.sci.gov.in/judgments](https://main.sci.gov.in/judgments)
(Search: Nabam Rebia v Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh)
B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 331
Supreme Court ruling on Governor’s office and constitutional morality
[https://main.sci.gov.in/judgments](https://main.sci.gov.in/judgments)
(Search: BP Singhal v Union of India)
Federalism and Governor’s role explained by Supreme Court jurisprudence
[https://www.scobserver.in/journal/governors-role-federalism-supreme-court/](https://www.scobserver.in/journal/governors-role-federalism-supreme-court/)
Law Commission of India – Report on Governor’s Role
[https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/Reports/Report214.pdf](https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/Reports/Report214.pdf)
Constitutional morality and limits on executive discretion
[https://www.livelaw.in/columns/constitutional-morality-governor-supreme-court-article-200-232456](https://www.livelaw.in/columns/constitutional-morality-governor-supreme-court-article-200-232456)
