Author: Prince Singh, a student at CHRIST (Deemed to be University) Pune, Lavasa campus.
Abstract
India’s foreign policy has never been stuck in one position; instead, it has managed to cope as per the changing currents of international politics. India was caught in the whirlpool of the Cold War between America and the Soviet Union at the time it became independent. Being poor, insecure, and economically exposed, India under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru practiced non-alignment—a policy designed to avert ideological competition without sacrificing national interests. Later, nevertheless, the fallacy of neutrality was evident, most strikingly in the 1962 Sino-Indian War when India’s policy of non-alignment alienated it. The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, however, together with the Soviet Union reflected the necessity for strategic alignments.
In the globalization and post-Cold War period, India gradually gravitated towards multi-alignment policy. This school of thought recommends cooperating with several powers simultaneously and being practical, instead of ideological. India today proactively engages with the likes of BRICS, SCO, QUAD, I2U2, and the G20, and even enhances bilateral ties globally. This is India’s emergence as a confident, assertive global player. The shift from non-alignment to multi-alignment is one such example of how India transitioned from survival policy to strategic leadership in a multi-polar world.
Introduction
India in a Divided World
When India attained independence in 1947, the global environment was already segregated into two hostile camps. The capitalist camp had America at its helm and the communist camp had the Soviet Union at its helm. They did not engage each other’s conflict in the classical sense of warfare but by ideology, diplomacy, and influence. The Cold War compelled countries to ally themselves with the West or the Communists, and neutrality was not an option. Post-colonial India, impoverished from colonial plunder and ravaged by famine, poverty, and corruption, could never afford to ally itself and invite probable disaster.
Nehru’s reaction to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Steer clear of joining either of the blocs formally, India tried to receive development assistance from both, refrain from being recruited into foreign wars, and maintain its sovereignty internationally. Nehru himself outlined this vision when he said that India’s policy was not to be bound by either power bloc but remain committed to its values and interest.
The Rise of Non-Alignment
Non-alignment was not neutrality; it was an attempt to forge solidarity between post-independence Asian, African, and Latin American states. The 1955 Bandung conference and the 1961 Belgrade NAM Summit were born. India was an ethical power, propagating peace, disarmament, and decolonization. Panchsheel maxims of peaceful coexistence were the principles of Indian foreign policy, bereft of aspirations that the Third World could embark on an autonomous trajectory.
For some time, NAM provided India with prestige and elbow room. It allowed New Delhi to have access to the economic and technological assistance of both East and West and be the representative voice of the Global South. But as things turned out, the inadequacies of this policy were revealed.
The Limits of Neutrality
The very first serious blow to NAM came in 1962, when there was the Sino-Indian War. Contrary to Indian nonalignment policy and Asian solidarity posturing, China attacked India in force along the whole Himalayan front. Neither superpower intervened firmly on India’s behalf. The United States provided some military equipment but did so in such small quantities that it did not count. The Soviet Union, preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis, remained aloof. Neutrality was no defense for India.
Nine years later, the contrast was dramatic. India had participated in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War to liberate East Pakistan. It was not alone in so doing. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation provided Moscow’s support, which made the combined pressure of the United States, Pakistan, and China no longer sufficient to overwhelm India. The outcome—a defeat that was crushing for the West Pakistanis and the birth of Bangladesh—had demonstrated that great combinations could be the determining factor.
Both these events exemplified the dual character of NAM. While it was giving India moral leeway, it was leaving it exposed during times of need. As the Cold War heightened and superpower politics sharpened, Indian foreign policy was stuck in the same doctrine that it had long been dependent upon.
Shift towards Multi-Alignment
The fall of the Cold War in 1991 brought dramatic change. The breakup of the Soviet Union deprived India of a consistent supporter, while globalization made global involvement more indispensable than ever before. Meanwhile, economic liberalization in India generated demand for greater trade, investment, and technology exchange. The strict straitjacket of non-alignment could no longer retain the balance of the new world order.
India began gradually to modify its policy. Instead of remaining isolated from international blocs, it attempted to involve all the great powers in various capacities. This multi-alignment strategy enabled India to deepen defense relations with the United States without abruptly halting oil imports from Russia, align with China in platforms such as BRICS and balance out with it in the Indo-Pacific, and yet remain close to Europe, Japan, and the Middle East as well. It was, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar subsequently explained, a new non-alignment befitting a multipolar world.
Multi-Alignment in Practice
India’s multi-alignment is its ability to tread on rival and at times even contradictory platforms. In BRICS, India aligns with Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa collectively to reshape world economic institutions and advance multipolarity. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, India reaches out to Central Asia but on a shared platform even with rivals like China and Pakistan. In the QUAD with Japan, Australia, and the US, respectively, India responds to Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.
India has also emerged as a key West Asian power by forming I2U2 with the US, Israel, and the UAE to become a pursuer of connectivity and technological cooperation. India has emerged as a bridge between the developed and developing world as a G20 lead, the voice of the Global South. Even within South Asia, where Pakistani obstructionism has frozen SAARC, India has turned to BIMSTEC, engaging deeply with Southeast Asian nations.
This multi-level interaction allows India to make the most of its options. It need not keep all its eggs in the same basket but can interact at the same time with multiple partners on multiple issues.
Strategic Resilience in Contemporary Terms
India’s multi-alignment has been strong in the last few years. When America hit Indian exports with tariffs and tried to browbeat India on Russian oil imports, India did not blink. Instead, it
diversified alliances, bought cheap crude from Moscow, raised trade with Brazil, strengthened ties with Africa and Southeast Asia.
Secondly, although India is facing the military aggression of China along the Himalayan border, India remains engaging Beijing both economically and diplomatically by participating in SCO and BRICS. Through such a balancing act, India is shunning isolation as well as excessive dependence on a single partner. In the Middle East, India has also consolidated ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE—a milestone which speaks volumes of pragmatism of diplomacy rather than ideological preference.
This freedom is a great deviation from the inflexibility of non-alignment. India of today’s times is more keen to stay equidistant from its competitors than to care to stay loyal to its national interests regardless of global competitions.
Challenges of Multi-Alignment
Despite the advantage of multi-alignment, the process is not without challenges. It is a difficult task to reconcile conflicting alliances. India’s ongoing reliance on Russian military equipment, for instance, will likely annoy Washington, as much as its alignment with the US under QUAD worries Beijing. And then, naturally, there is the question of capability—whether India can use diplomacy to deliver implications in trade, technology, and security. And then, of course, there is the specter of over-extendibility in this new world order. However, unlike the inflexibility and weaknesses of rigid neutrality, multi-alignment is far more flexible and long-lasting.
Conclusion
Survival to Leadership
India’s foreign policy has changed enormously post-independence. Non-alignment had been a conditioned reflex—a realism of a weak state caught between the Cold War rivalries. It accorded some freedom but revealed its limitations during crises. With the decline of the Cold War and the arrival of globalization, India developed a new multi-alignment principle—one under which it can deal with all powers, counterbalance oppositions, and project independence.
This transition is a reflection of India’s own transformation from a post-colonial vulnerability to becoming an assertive rising power. India today is not merely responding to what happens in the world but influencing it—in either its G20 presidency, voice of the Global South, or as a balancer in the Indo-Pacific. Whereas non-alignment was India’s armor in its youth, multi-alignment is its sword for the twenty-first century, enabling it to protect and project its interest.
FAQS
Q1. Why is non-alignment considered an incomplete or flawed foreign policy approach?
While non-alignment helped India stay away from Cold War entanglements, it also exposed the limitations of neutrality. In times of crisis, such as the 1962 war with China, India found itself diplomatically isolated. Neutrality meant that India could not fully rely on external support during emergencies, which highlighted the weakness of a strictly non-aligned posture.
Q2. Is India abandoning non-alignment completely?
Not entirely. India has not rejected the core principle of strategic autonomy, which was central to NAM. Instead, it has evolved from passive neutrality to active multi-alignment. This means India continues to avoid rigid alliances but now engages flexibly with multiple powers, ensuring national interest remains the guiding principle.
Q3. What does “multi-alignment” mean in India’s current foreign policy?
Multi-alignment refers to India’s pragmatic approach of engaging with multiple global powers and groupings simultaneously, rather than aligning exclusively with one bloc. Unlike the old policy of staying neutral, multi-alignment allows India to balance its relations with the US, Russia, Europe, and Asian powers, while also participating in multilateral forums like BRICS, QUAD, SCO, and G20. This approach ensures strategic autonomy without isolation.
Q4. How has India benefited from multi-alignment in recent years?
Through multi-alignment, India has been able to diversify partnerships for economic growth, defense cooperation, and global influence. For instance, India works with the US in QUAD for Indo-Pacific security, collaborates with Russia and China in BRICS for economic reforms, and engages with neighbors through SAARC. This strategy has given India leverage against unilateral pressures, such as US tariffs, since it has alternative allies like Russia, Brazil, and the Global South.
Q5. How does India’s shift to multi-alignment affect its global standing?
India’s multi-alignment enhances its credibility as a responsible global player. By balancing relations with the US, Russia, Europe, and Asia simultaneously, India projects itself as a bridge between developed and developing nations. This has allowed it to play a key role in global issues such as climate change, trade negotiations, and security in the Indo-Pacific.
