Author: Snehasree Parida, School of Law, Centurion University
Abstract
The object of this paper is to find out whether, in the working of modern constitutional democracy, the differences between the exercise of judicial review and political decision-making are being completely effaced with particular reference to the Indian jurisprudence. Although some recent decisions of the constitutional courts in politically sensitive areas like the Vote of Confidence, the Appointment of constitutional authorities, etc., are overtly political in character, the doctrine of separation of powers has been practically challenged. In this paper, we will evaluate whether such judgments are devices to guarantee the democratic State or external interventions that infringe upon popular sovereignty. Upon examining the detailed analyses of major decisions, constitutional rules, political interpretations, trends, and other phenomena, it can be noticed that not wrong to assign the judicial prerogatives to the judiciary as the last resort of the constitutional system and the same is to be dealt with deference.
To the Point
What remains to be argued, the second debate about courts and political conflicts, takes place at this institutional paradox: those who oppose to political processes desire control to thwart a completely unchecked majority; those who are rallying for a system, in a word, are against unelected courts that could pose as threat, that their legitimacy in the political process can be reduced as courts overrule political acts. The core debate had focused on power: what is the domain of courts that entails solely constitutional, as opposed to ideological, decisions on policy choices? From the judicial election, constituency definition, and to test legislative floor, to challenge partisanship in speech sponsored by a party, to reorganize administrative agency for elections, the court intervenes as an emergency referee. However, entry into the political thicket reduces electoral accountability, silences political dialogue into judicial theatre, and results in accusations of partnership against the judiciary. The present article argues that the excess of the field of the court corrects the excess of the field of politics. By increasing the excess in the dignity of judicial review as an anti-institutional checkpoint, it guarantees its legitimacy only when courts use the paradigm of judicial conservatism to reinforce procedural constitutional morality; excess includes substituting a judgment and consensus of the Court.
Use of Legal Jargon
In order to fully comprehend the nature of the structural friction between the judiciary and the political branches of government, a proper reading of the constitutional language and principles is required:
1) Justiciability: The jurisdiction of the court to entertain the case before it. A claim is non-justiciable if it is one of the following: In the Constitution, the task can be identified to some other branch of government, or the resolution of the task is beyond judicially manageable criteria.
2) Political Question Doctrine: This, like American judicial function, is also derivative of American vision, and would prohibit constitutional courts from interfering with:
(a) Wholly political questions.
(b) Questions for which there are no standards of resolution and
(c) Those solely within the Congressional and executive branches.
3) Separation of Powers: Division of powers given to three wings of government- legislature, executive, and judiciary. In a parliamentary system such as India, doctrine is not strictly followed, but one of the features of the inalienable basic concept is that no one else’s domain should intervene in other wings’ larval working.
4) Constitutional Morality- Which was given by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and revived in present-day courts emphasis the significance of Constitutional values like Institutions, plurality, and freedom instead of the interpretation of the rule or the opinion of the majority.
5) Judicial Activism and Judicial Overreach: Judicial activism seems to be a proactive stance taken in protecting the constitutional basic rights and organizational inertia of the executive from usurpation of power, but judicial overreach becomes dangerous since the judiciary shakes the government, and the people will elect the representatives by straying into policy and legislative matters.
6) Ultra vires: Denoting an act beyond the bounds of proper authority. Courts are frequently asked to adjudicate when a TV oversteps the executive order or law in situations of political controversy.
The Proof
The last thirty years have witnessed the judiciary’s increasing involvement in public law, characterized by the courts adopting a jurisprudence aligned with summary politics and legislative activities, which has historically positioned constitutional courts at the center of significant policy issues. The breakdown of stable single-party systems and the rise of unstable coalition politics in the new regime have resulted in substantial institutional gridlock, necessitating the judiciary to intervene and address these challenges.
The change can be seen through three key elements regarding the Tenth Schedule and the Anti-Defection Law’s role in parliament tests while ensuring procedural integrity. Article 212 states that courts cannot go beyond the legislative assembly’s proceedings to invalidate them based on procedural irregularities. Nevertheless, courts have mandated live broadcasts of floor tests, imposed time limits on disqualification petitions submitted to the speaker, and have nullified arbitrary suspensions of seated members.
Secondly, the modification of constitutional entities is compelling, particularly when the legislative organization was seen as representing a structural conflict of interest. This necessitated reorganization through the judiciary. A notable example is the reform of the Election Commission of India’s process for appointing Commissioners. The court established a committee, including the Chief Justice, deliberately shifting the balance of executive power within the institution to uphold electoral fairness.
Finally, the extension of Indian courts’ authority to review presidential decisions, specifically under “President’s Rule” as articulated in Article 356, serves as compelling evidence of the transformation of the Indian judiciary following the constitution’s enactment. Until the 1970s, actions to impose President’s Rule were largely deemed subjective political decisions shielded from thorough judicial examination. However, the courts’ later readiness to evaluate the factual basis underpinning presidential proclamations, allow access to high-level cabinet documents, and restore dissolved state governments illustrates that such political actions are now subject to stringent constitutional review.
Case Laws
1) S. R. Bommai v. Union of India ( AIR 1994 SC 1918)
Context & Ruling: This historic judgment by a nine-judge bench, altered the understanding of Article 356. The Court held that the President’s action of dissolving a state assembly was not an absolute and non – justiciable political act. The Court added that, continued existence of the Assembly was governed by the constitutional doctrine of consensus and the Court urged the president to use his discretion judiciously.
Significance: This case demonstrates an important constitutional bar on undue encroachment of federalism by the centre’s majoritarianism besides laying down a judicially manageable framework to deal with political questions that until this case, were non justiciable.
2) Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India ( 2006 2 SCC 1)
Context & Ruling: Following the split verdicts in the Bihar Assembly Elections, the governor recommended proroguing the Assembly, citing unscrupulous coalition-building. However, the Supreme Court ruled this dissolution unconstitutional, affirming that the governor cannot obstruct government formation based on personal moral grounds regarding party positions.
Significance: This ruling established a clear boundary, indicating that the judiciary will intervene to invalidate gubernatorial actions that undermine the democratic mandate as long as the legislature remains unassembled.
3) Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker ( 2016 8 SCC 1)
Context & Ruling: A constitutional crisis in Arunachal Pradesh emerged when the Governor convened a legislative session without consulting the Chief Minister, while the Speaker faced a removal notice. The Supreme Court ruled that the Governor does not have the constitutional authority to independently schedule legislative sessions without the Cabinet’s involvement. Furthermore, it stated that a Speaker cannot decide on disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule while a removal resolution is pending.
Significance: This ruling significantly extends judicial authority into legislative matters, demonstrating the court’s commitment to upholding constitutional principles over traditional legislative immunity.
4) Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharastra (2023 SCC OnLine SC 607)
Context & Ruling: Emerging from the political tumult within the Shiv Sena party in 2022, the Supreme Court reviewed the Governor’s decision to conduct a floor test and the Speaker’s recognition of party whips. The court concluded that the Governor erred in calling for a floor test based solely on internal party disagreements, citing a lack of objective evidence that the government had lost assembly confidence. However, since the Chief Minister had voluntarily resigned before the floor test, the court noted it could not restore the previous government. Significance: This case highlights the constraints of judicial intervention, as the court criticized the political actions of both the Governor and the Speaker but was ultimately limited by the existing political situation, pointing to the challenges of using judicial mechanisms to resolve dynamic political crises.
5) Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023 6 SCC 1)
Context & Ruling: In 2022, during political turmoil within the Shiv Sena party, the Supreme Court assessed the Governor’s decision to call for a floor test and the Speaker’s recognition of party whips. The court concluded that the Governor erred by initiating the floor test based only on internal party disputes, lacking objective evidence that the government had lost assembly confidence. However, since the Chief Minister had resigned voluntarily before the test, the court stated it could not reinstate the previous government.
Significance: This case highlights the constraints of judicial intervention, as the court criticized both the Governor and Speaker’s political actions but recognized its limitations amid the ongoing political crisis.
Conclusion
The legal principles governing judicial involvement in political conflicts reveal a tension between structural necessity and institutional integrity. Constitutional courts play a vital role in upholding democratic values, particularly when political systems fail to observe constitutional ethics. Judicial inaction in such situations would violate constitutional responsibilities, thus highlighting the judiciary’s role as a protector of democracy against majority tyranny.
However, there is a significant concern regarding the judiciary’s transition from safeguarding constitutional processes to imposing policy directives. The authority of the judiciary depends on its perceived impartiality and commitment to the rule of law. Frequent judicial intervention in political disputes risks undermining this credibility. Courts must distinguish between maintaining procedural constitutional integrity and making substantive political judgments, thereby acting as institutional arbiters without overstepping into political decision-making.
FAQs
Q1. How does the Judiciary justify intervening in legislative matters despite the explicit bar under Article 212 of the Constitution?
Ans. Article 212 protects legislative proceedings from being challenged on the grounds of an “alleged irregularity of procedure.” However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that this immunity does not extend to gross illegalities, unconstitutionality, or violations of natural justice. When a proceeding violates the constitutional framework, the court retains the authority of judicial review to preserve the integrity of the Constitution.
Q2. Can the legislature reverse the effects of a judicial judgment that alters political or executive processes?
Ans. Yes. Parliament can pass a validating or remedial statute that addresses the legal basis of the court’s judgment, provided the new legislation does not violate the Basic Structure of the Constitution. A clear example is the legislative response to the *Anoop Baranwal* decision, where Parliament enacted a new statutory framework governing the appointment of Election Commissioners.
Q3. What distinguishes legitimate judicial activism from unconstitutional judicial overreach in political disputes?
Ans. The distinction lies in the nature of the remedy applied. Judicial activism involves enforcing established constitutional rights and procedures when the executive or legislature fails to act. Judicial overreach occurs when the court crosses structural boundaries to create new policy, perform executive functions, or intervene in matters that lack judicially manageable standards for resolution.
