KARTAR SINGH VS STATE OF HARYANA AIR 1982 SC 1439

KARTAR SINGH VS STATE OF HARYANA AIR 1982 SC 1439

PETITIONERS – Kartar Singh and Others

RESPONDENT – State of Haryana through Inspector General of Prison

DATE OF JUDGMENT – 26 August 1982

EQUIVALENT CITATIONS – 1983 SCR (1) 445, 1982 SCC (3) 1

ADVOCATES – R.C. Kohli for the Petitioners

 K.G. Bhagat, R.N. Poddar for the Respondent

JUDGES – Justice VD Tulzapurkar

Justice R.B. Misra

Justice Baharul Islam

Chapter XXXII of Code of Criminal Procedure talks about the execution, suspension, remission and commutation of sentences. We know that sometimes the accused is kept in prison during the investigation of the case, and even during the trial. While this is a useful measure in order to prevent the suspect from tempering with the evidence and to prevent him from causing further nuisance. In certain cases, however, the accused is detained for a long period which is even longer that the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him after conviction. This makes the entire judicial proceeding unfair and unjust. To keep the process fair and just, section 428 was introduced in the code according to which the period of under trial detention undergone by the accused shall be set off against the total term of imprisonment that the accused is sentenced to after conviction. In 1982, however, a dispute arose as to whether the benefit if this section is also available to life convicts along with those sentenced to imprisoned for a term, that took the form of a legal case that was tried by the supreme court.

In the present article, I will be discussing the case Kartar Singh vs State of Haryana, 1982 with respect to its background, facts, issues raised before the court, arguments presented by both the sides, and finally, the judgement given by the court. 

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Kartar Singh, Baljit Singh and Mukhtiar Singh were convicted under section 302 of IPC. The respondent state had issued an order dated February 2, 1981, to all the jail superintendents of the state directing that for the purpose of considering cases of premature release, with regards to the judgement in Maru Ram vs Union of India 1978 and paragraph 516B of the Punjab/ Haryana Jail Manual, the benefit of setting off the under-trial period of detention is not available to those convicted to life imprisonment before December 18, 1978. The three petitioners, through their writ petition also sought their pre mature release on the basis of the periods of under trial imprisonment in their credit.  

The Supreme Court, had, however, dismissed their petition. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The three petitioners, Kartar Singh, Mukhtiar Singh and Baljit Singh were convicted for murder under section 302 of IPC and were sentenced to life imprisonment and in 1978, were undergoing their sentence in one or the other jails in Hissar. Kartar Singh and Mukhtiar Singh were convicted on February 20, 1973 while Baljit Singh was convicted on September 17, 1975. 

The petitioners sought pre mature release by relying on the judgement in Maru Ram vs UOI, 1978 and para 516B of Punjab Haryana Jail Manual. 

Section 433A  provides that “Notwithstanding anything contained in section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishment provided by laws or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment.”

Maru Ram vs UOI 1978 – The constitutional validity of section 433A of CrPC was challenged by the prisoners on the ground that it violated articles 14, 20(1), 72 and 161 of the Constitution. The court, thereby, had held that the section will have prospective effect, i.e., all those whose cases would be decided by the court after 18 December, 1978 (the date of delivery of judgement) will have to undergo a mandatory minimum of 14 years imprisonment while those whose cases were decided before 18 December, would not be subject to mandatory 14 years imprisonment and would be entitled to consideration by government for premature release. 

Since the three petitioners were convicted in 1973 and 1975, they contended that they’re not subject to the mandatory 14 years imprisonment. Further, they referred to paragraph 516B of Punjab Haryana Jail Manual, according to which all the life convicts above the age of 20 are to be considered for pre mature release if the period of their under-trial detention was added to their total period of imprisonment including remissions, the total detention would exceed 14 years and that in such a case, their continued detention would be illegal. 

In response to the petition, on February 2, 1981, the respondent state issued an order 1953/59/G1/G.3T-19(11) to all the jail superintendents of the state, issuing directions that for the purpose of considering cases of pre mature release, the benefit of the under-trial period is not to be given to life convicts. 

The petitioners, however, alleged that this order issued by the state ran contrary to section 428 of CrPC for it wrongfully denied the life convicts the benefit of set off contemplated under section 428 and sought a mandamus directing the respondent state to consider their cases of premature release under para 516B of the Jail Manual after giving them the benefit of the said set off against their sentences.

In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent state the legal position after the judgement in Maru Ram case was accepted, similarly, the effect of para 516B of Punjab/ Haryana Jail Manual has also been accepted. However, it was denied that the order issued by state was illegal for being contrary to section 428 CrPC.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

The main issue that emerged before the court in Kartar Singh vs State of Haryana, was not whether the three petitioners could be granted pre mature release.

The issue, rather, was whether the benefit to set off the under-trial period of detention under section 428 CrPC was also available to life convicts or not?

ARGUMENTS BY PETITIONER

Counsel for the petitioners contended that cases of life-convicts would fall within the terms of s. 428. Assigning reasons for the same, he pleaded:

• That the persons sentenced to imprisonment for life could be said to have been sentenced to their ‘life-term’ which under the provisions of the Penal Code and Jail Manual was regarded as equivalent to 20 years or 14 years
• when remissions are actually granted to life- convicts their sentences become imprisonments for a term, and in the instant case each one of the petitioners has been granted remissions.
• To support his contention, the counsel relied upon a judgement by the Gujarat High Court in Kalidas Vanmalibhai vs State of Gujarat, where it was held that when convicts other than life convicts were entitled to the benefit of the set off contemplated under the section, there was no reason why life-convicts should be denied that advantage.

ARGUMENTS BY THE STATE

It was contended that the benefit of setting off the under-trial period contemplated in section 428 is only available to those convicts who have been sentenced to imprisonment for term’ as opposed to imprisonment for life. And since the benefit is not available to the three petitioners, their cases could not be said to have become ripe for consideration for premature release.

And even on the inclusion of the under-trial detention period, neither of the convicts have not completed 14 years as required by para 516B of the Punjab Haryana jail manual. In the case of Kartar Singh, the net period of actual imprisonment is 6 years 9 months and 11 days, the remissions earned by him amount to 4 years 8 months and 24 days, to which even if the period of under-trial detention of 1 year 8 months and 4 days, is added the total comes to 12 years, 11 months and 9 days and not 14 years as required by Para 516-B of the Punjab/Haryana Jail Manual; in the case of Mukhtiar Singh the net period of actual imprisonment is 7 years, 0 month and 6, the remissions earned by him amount to 4 years, 7 months and 10 days, to which even if the period of under-trial detention of 1 year, 8 months and 4 days is added the total comes to 13 years, 3 months and 20 days and not 14 years as required by the said Para 516-B; in the case of Baljit Singh the net actual imprisonment under gone by him is 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, the remissions earned by him amount to 3 years, 8 months, 11 days, to which even if the period of under-trial detention of 2 years, 1 month and 13 days is added the total comes to 10 years, 7 months and 4 days and not 14 years as required by the said Para 516-B.

The state thereby contended that in any event the petitioners are not eligible to be considered for pre mature release, and therefore the petition is liable to be dismissed.

JUDGEMENT

The judgement of the court was delivered by Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar. 

The court held that on a plain reading of section 428 CrPC, the case of life convicts would not fall within the section as it applies only on such convicts who’ve been sentenced to imprisonment for term. Section 428 runs as follows:

“Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term , not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him.
Provided that in cases referred to in section 433A, such period of detention shall be set off against the period of fourteen years referred to in that section.

The court further held that both the IPC and the CrPC maintain a clear distinction between imprisonment for life and imprisonment for term, as they’ve been used in contradistinction to one another in one and the same section where imprisonment for term means imprisonment for a fixed or a definite period and imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life of the convict. For example, section 304 provides that punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years.

The court further held that section 57 IPC and the rules contained in the Jail Manual are irrelevant in this context.

• Section 57 provides that life imprisonment shall be equivalent to 20 years, but that is for a specific purpose, i.e., for the purpose for calculating the fractions of terms of punishment, and not for all purposes. The court relied on a judgement by privy council in Pandit Kishori Lal case and Gopal Godse case where it was settled that life sentence has to be regarded as a sentence for the remainder of the natural life of the convict.
• Secondly, in accordance with the hierarchy of laws, remission rules contained in jail manuals cannot override statutory provisions contained in the Penal Code.

The court further rejected the contention by the petitioners’ counsel that on remission, their sentence to life imprisonment becomes sentence of imprisonment for a term, as being without any substance. Because:

• An order passed by the state government cannot interfere with the sentence recorded by the court, which remains intact. 
• Secondly, as the words of section 428 state, the section will come to the fore when the imprisonment for term is awarded ‘on conviction’ and not after remission by the state government. 

Lastly, the court highlighted the objectives and reasons for introducing section 428 in the code, as set out by the Joint Committee in one of its reports, which is as follows:

“In many cases accused persons are kept in prison for a very long period as under-trial prisoners and in some cases the sentence of imprisonment ultimately awarded is a fraction of the period spent in jail as under- trial prisoner. Indeed, there may even be cases where such a person is acquitted. No doubt, sometimes courts do take into account the period of detention undergone as under-trial prisoner when passing sentence and occasionally the sentence of imprisonment is restricted to the period already undergone. But this is not always the case so that in many cases, the accused person is made to suffer jail life for a period out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence or even to the punishment provided in the statute. A large number of persons in the overcrowded jails of today are under-trial prisoners. The new clause seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs.”

The court therefore, dismissed the writ petition.

CONCLUSION

Thus, as was held in Gopal Vinayak Godse case, life imprisonment is life imprisonment and nothing else and therefore a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is obliged to spend the rest of his life in prison. But it has not been denied that such a sentence could be commuted or waived by the competent authority. 

Thus, while the life convicts are certainly entitled to enjoy the benefit of state granted remissions, they however, as was held in the instant case, are not entitled to enjoy the benefit of set off contemplated in section 428, which is only available to those sentenced to imprisonment for term.

Keeping in mind the language of the statute, the court has given the section a correct interpretation through its judgement in the instant case, but on moral grounds, I agree with the petitioners’ counsel that when convicts other than life convicts were entitled to the benefit of the set off contemplated under the section, there was no reason why life-convicts should be denied that advantage.

In 1985, however, in Bhagirath & Others vs Delhi Administration, the Supreme Court overruled its judgement in Kartar Singh vs State of Haryana by holding that ‘to deny the benefit of section 428 to life convicts is to withdraw the application of a benevolent provision from a large majority of cases in which such benefit would be needed and justified.’

Finally, by the virtue of section 34 of the Act 25 of 2005, a proviso was added to section 428, whereby it is stated that in cases referred to in section 433A (cases of life imprisonment), the period of detention shall be set off against the period of fourteen years, thereby, making the benefit under section 428 available to life convicts.

BY:

ARSHITA JINDAL

UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LEGAL STUDIES

PANJAB UNIVERSITY