Author: Durvankur Manjrekar, School of Law and Public Policy, Avantika University
Abstract
The “One Nation, One Election” proposal represents a major reform aimed at aligning national and state election cycles in India. The proposal weighs the touted advantages, such as reduced election expenses and enhanced administrative efficiency, against the substantial constitutional and legal complexities it entails. It. It explores the necessary constitutional amendments, the effects on federalism and state independence, the possible influence on parliamentary accountability, and potential conflicts with the basic structure doctrine, especially regarding free and fair elections and democratic principles. The article suggests that although the goals are commendable, the far-reaching changes of ONOE require a thorough analysis of its democratic impact and broad consensus, beyond just a legislative majority.
To the Point
The proposal for “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE) in India, advocating for simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, is touted as a panacea for electoral fatigue and high costs. However, its implementation poses profound constitutional, legal, and political challenges, particularly concerning the foundational principles of federalism, parliamentary accountability, and the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. The concept, if fully realised, would fundamentally alter India’s electoral landscape and reshape its democratic functioning, demanding careful consideration of its long-term ramifications.
Use of Legal Jargon
The adoption of a “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE) framework would necessitate substantial alterations to pivotal constitutional provisions of the Constitution of India. These include modifications to Article 83, which dictates the lifespan of the Houses of Parliament, and Article 172, governing the tenure of State Legislatures. Additionally, revisions to Article 85, concerning parliamentary sessions, prorogation, and dissolution, and Article 174, addressing similar aspects for State Legislatures, would be indispensable. To address the complexities arising from potential hung assemblies (where no single party or pre-election coalition secures a majority) or successful no-confidence motions (votes expressing a lack of trust in the government), current proposals often contemplate mechanisms like a “constructive vote of no-confidence.” This innovative concept dictates that a government can only be ousted if a viable successor can simultaneously garner majority support. Alternatively, fresh elections for the unexpired portion of the original five-year term are considered, both requiring the enactment of further specific legislative provisions.
Such far-reaching constitutional amendments are not trivial; they mandate passage by a special majority in Parliament. This means they must be approved by two-thirds of the members present and voting in each House, provided this also constitutes a majority of the total membership of that House. Any amendment that significantly affects the federal framework of the country—like modifying the fixed term of state legislatures—must also be ratified by at least half of the state legislatures, by Article 368(2) of the Constitution. The ONOE proposal also ignites fundamental constitutional debates, particularly in relation to the basic structure doctrine. This doctrine, upheld by the Supreme Court as inviolable, encompasses core tenets of the Constitution, including parliamentary democracy, federalism, and the principle of free and fair elections.
Furthermore, concerns abound regarding the potential impact on voter behaviour. Critics fear a dilution of regional issues, where national narratives might overshadow local concerns during simultaneous polls. The implications of mid-term government collapses on the synchronised ONOE cycle also present a significant challenge to maintaining the envisioned electoral rhythm. Moreover, the implementation would necessitate an expansion of the logistical and administrative powers of the Election Commission of India (ECI), whose constitutional mandate under Article 324 already encompasses the superintendence, direction, and control of elections. Finally, the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the foundational statute governing electoral conduct, would equally demand comprehensive amendments to accommodate the sweeping changes brought about by ONOE.
The Proof
Simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies were, in fact, a feature of India’s electoral history during its initial four general elections (1951-52, 1957, 1962, 1967). This cycle, however, was disrupted primarily due to the premature dissolution of some State Assemblies in 1968-69 and subsequently the Fourth Lok Sabha in 1970, leading to a staggered election cycle that has persisted ever since. The proposal of the ONOE by the union government now aims to restore the alignment of the elections across the nation.
Implementing ONOE is far from a simple administrative tweak; it demands significant legal, constitutional, and logistical overhauls. A High-Level Committee (HLC), chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, and earlier, the Law Commission of India, have thoroughly examined the feasibility, acknowledging the need for extensive constitutional amendments. The HLC, for instance, in its report, proposed a phased approach, with the first phase synchronising Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections, and a second phase aligning local body elections. They also suggested amending Articles 83, 172, 85, 174, and potentially Article 356 (President’s Rule), along with significant changes to the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The June 2025 ONOE proposal remains a key policy priority. The government is reportedly aiming for 2034 to conduct the first nationwide synchronised elections, contingent upon the passage of a comprehensive constitutional amendment—namely, the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024. which is under examination by a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) chaired by P.P. Chaudhary, the bill is undergoing an inclusive consultative process.
The Joint Parliamentary Committee is conducting widespread consultations with states and Union Territories to collect feedback and build a broad-based consensus. A key clause in the proposed legislation states that state assemblies formed after 2029 will have truncated terms to synchronise with the 2034 general elections. In the event of mid-term elections, the newly elected legislature would serve only the remainder of the original five-year term.
Let me know if you’d like it to sound more academic, journalistic, or simplified—I can tailor it for any tone or format.
A primary hurdle facing ONOE lies in the dynamic nature of India’s parliamentary system. Governments at both the central and state levels may collapse due to no-confidence votes, shifting alliances, or early dissolutions. To uphold electoral synchronisation, ONOE would require robust mechanisms to accommodate such disruptions. Suggestions like fixed legislative terms or limited-term re-elections attempt to preserve synchronicity but may compromise established democratic norms of legislative accountability. Forcing alignment by shortening or prolonging assembly terms raises critical questions about the legitimacy of existing mandates and challenges the federal principle, which grants states autonomous power independent of the Union.
Opposition to ONOE emphasises the risk of “nationalising” state elections. Critics argue that merging state and national polls might skew voter focus toward central issues and personalities, thereby sidelining regional concerns and marginalising local parties. This could weaken India’s multiparty democracy, in which regional voices play a crucial role in representing diverse grassroots interests. Furthermore, the logistical strain on the Election Commission of India would be immense.
Conducting simultaneous elections would demand a significant expansion in Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs), and trained electoral staff. The extended deployment of security forces also raises concerns about their availability for routine duties.
Case Laws
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973): This landmark case introduced the Basic Structure Doctrine, establishing that Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is not unlimited and cannot violate foundational constitutional principles. Any attempt to modify legislative tenures or the federal framework under ONOE could face scrutiny under this doctrine, especially where it affects parliamentary democracy or legislative accountability.
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): Though centred around the misuse of Article 356, this ruling reinforced federalism and state sovereignty. The Court emphasised that President’s Rule should be invoked sparingly. ONOE-related proposals to standardise assembly terms might be challenged if seen as encroaching upon the constitutional independence of states.
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975): This case highlighted the significance of free and fair elections as an essential feature of parliamentary democracy, integral to the Constitution’s basic structure. Critics caution that ONOE might compromise electoral fairness by diluting regional narratives, creating combined mandates that influence voter behaviour, and reducing the frequency of public scrutiny through elections.
Conclusion
The “One Nation, One Election” proposal, though appealing in its promise of efficiency and reduced expenditure, presents a profound constitutional conundrum for India’s federal democracy. Its implementation would necessitate far-reaching and complex amendments to the Constitution, potentially challenging the delicate balance of powers, the essence of federalism, and the very spirit of parliamentary accountability. While the administrative and financial benefits are often highlighted by proponents, the potential erosion of the vibrancy of regional politics, the possible weakening of the representative link between citizens and their state governments, and the intricate legal challenges posed to the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be understated. The debate transcends mere logistics and delves into the fundamental principles of India’s democratic framework. A decision of this magnitude requires not just a legislative majority but a broad national consensus, based on thorough deliberation of all legal, political, and socio-economic ramifications. It is imperative to ensure that the pursuit of efficiency does not inadvertently dilute the fundamental democratic principles that underpin the Indian Republic, thereby maintaining the robust and representative nature of its electoral system.
FAQS
What does “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE) propose?
ONOE proposes conducting simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha (national parliament) and all State Legislative Assemblies across India, either on the same day or within a very short, synchronised timeframe. It aims to create a single electoral cycle for both national and state polls.
What are the primary arguments in favour of ONOE?
Proponents argue that ONOE would significantly reduce the massive expenditure incurred on frequent elections, minimise the disruption to governance caused by the repeated enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct, alleviate voter fatigue, and allow governments to focus more on long-term policy implementation and development rather than being in a perpetual election mode.
What are the main constitutional articles that would need to be amended for ONOE?
Key articles include Article 83 (duration of Lok Sabha), Article 172 (duration of State Assemblies), Article 85 (dissolution of Lok Sabha), and Article 174 (dissolution of State Assemblies). Amendments to these, particularly those affecting the federal structure, would require ratification by at least half of the state legislatures.
How could ONOE potentially impact India’s federal structure?
Critics argue that ONOE could undermine federalism by potentially curtailing the independent terms of state assemblies (either by premature dissolution or extension), forcing state elections to align with national issues rather than local ones, and thereby centralising political power at the expense of regional parties and concerns. This might reduce the distinct voice and autonomy of states within the Union.
What logistical challenges does ONOE present?
Logistical challenges include the massive requirement for additional Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPATs) units, the deployment of an unprecedented number of security forces, the mobilization of a huge pool of election personnel, and managing a single, large-scale electoral exercise across the vast and diverse geography of India.
What is the current status of the ONOE proposal in India (as of June 2025)?
As of June 2025, the Union Government is targeting 2034 for the first nationwide simultaneous polls. The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024, is currently under review by a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), which is conducting consultations with various stakeholders across states to gather feedback before finalising its recommendations.
