Author: Payoshni Patil, Vasantrao Pawar Law College, Baramati, Pune
To The Point
The initiative ‘One Nation, One Election’ aims to align the election schedules for the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies across India. This initiative aims to streamline the electoral cycle, reduce election frequency, and improve governance by electing national and state representatives simultaneously, thereby minimizing disruptions and promoting political stability and efficiency. This initiative is motivated by the goals of decreasing electoral costs, lessening administrative responsibilities, and guaranteeing continuous governance. Nevertheless, beneath its apparently cohesive objective exists a complex legal and constitutional maze.
The Constitution of India presently allows for distinct electoral cycles for both the Centre and the States, as established in Article 83(2) for the Lok Sabha and Article 172(1) for State Assemblies, which stipulate a fixed five-year term commencing from the date of their initial sitting. To synchronize elections, either the tenure of some assemblies must be curtailed or extended—both actions requiring constitutional amendments, potentially violating the basic structure doctrine by affecting federalism and democratic representation.
Further, the use of Article 356, which allows for President’s Rule in states, could be misused to dissolve state legislatures prematurely to align with national elections. This would undermine state autonomy and go against the principles of cooperative federalism, a cornerstone of India’s political structure as upheld in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994).
Implementation would necessitate amendments to Articles 83, 85, 172, 174, and 356 of the Constitution, along with changes to the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Additionally, logistical hurdles, including the requirement of massive deployment of security personnel and EVMs, pose practical concerns.
While the Election Commission of India and Law Commission have shown theoretical support for the idea, it remains politically contentious, especially with regional parties wary of central dominance. The Supreme Court has not ruled on its constitutionality yet, but legal scholars argue that altering electoral cycles through statute may not withstand judicial scrutiny if it disturbs federal balance.
In conclusion, although One Nation, One Election promises efficiency and national coherence, it must navigate a complex web of legal, constitutional, and federal challenges. Any move toward implementation must be undertaken with bipartisan consensus and judicial oversight, ensuring the autonomy of states is preserved within the framework of national unity.
Use of Legal Jargon
The doctrine of “One Nation, One Election” contemplates the harmonisation of electoral cycles for the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies. While administratively efficient, it is ensnared in a constitutional conundrum involving federal autonomy, legislative competence, and the democratic mandate.
According to the Indian Constitution, Article 83(2) and Article 172(1) establish fixed five-year terms for the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, respectively. To operationalise synchronised elections, abridgement or elongation of legislative tenures would be essential—raising concerns of constitutional propriety and electoral disenfranchisement.
Furthermore, invocation of Article 356, which provides for President’s Rule in case of breakdown of constitutional machinery, could be misapplied to prematurely dissolve assemblies for alignment, violating the principles of cooperative federalism, as safeguarded in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994).
The proposal mandates extensive constitutional amendments—particularly to Articles 83, 85, 172, 174, and 356—and substantive reforms to the Representation of the People Act, 1951. This requires approval from at least fifty percent of the state legislatures as stipulated in Article 368(2), which illustrates the federal nature of the political system.
Though aimed at electoral consolidation and fiscal prudence, critics argue that it undermines the political heterogeneity of states and impairs the decentralised democratic ethos envisioned by the Constitution. The Law Commission, in its 255th Report, acknowledged the theoretical feasibility but cautioned against its practicability without broad political consensus.
In essence, “One Nation, One Election” straddles the fine line between national integration and state sovereignty, demanding judicial scrutiny and legislative restraint to ensure conformity with the basic structure doctrine.
The Proof
The proposal of One Nation, One Election must be examined through the lens of constitutional provisions, judicial precedents, and policy reports. In accordance with Article 83(2) of the Indian Constitution, the Lok Sabha, recognized as the lower house of Parliament, is required to operate for a duration of five years commencing from its inaugural session. In a similar vein, Article 172(1) outlines that State Legislative Assemblies are also required to adhere to the same five-year duration for their operational period. This provision ensures a consistent timeframe for both the national and state legislative bodies, allowing for regular elections and the opportunity for the electorate to exercise their democratic rights. These provisions establish independent electoral cycles for the Union and the States, which would have to be synchronized through significant constitutional intervention.
To legally implement simultaneous elections, multiple constitutional provisions—Articles 83, 85, 172, 174, and 356—would require amendment. According to Article 368(2), such changes would necessitate not only a parliamentary majority but also ratification by at least half of the state legislatures, reinforcing the federal nature of the Indian polity.Moreover, the possible abuse of Article 356, which allows for the imposition of President’s Rule in states, has the potential to undermine the democratic structure. In the matter of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court ruled that Article 356 must be applied with caution and cannot be used arbitrarily to dissolve state governments that have been legitimately elected. Using it for electoral alignment would violate this landmark judgment and erode cooperative federalism.
The Law Commission of India, in its 255th Report, acknowledged the conceptual advantages of synchronised elections but cautioned against their implementation without comprehensive constitutional amendments and political consensus. Similarly, a discussion paper by NITI Aayog (2018) supported the idea in principle but emphasized that its execution would require at least two constitutional amendments and substantial reform of election laws.
These authoritative sources collectively demonstrate that while the proposal may offer administrative benefits, it is legally intricate and must navigate serious constitutional and federal hurdles before realisation.
Abstract
This article explores the constitutional, legal, and federal implications of the One Nation, One Election proposal, which aims to synchronize elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies. While touted for promoting administrative efficiency, cost reduction, and uninterrupted governance, the proposal poses complex constitutional challenges. The synchronisation of electoral cycles would require amendments to core constitutional provisions such as Articles 83, 85, 172, 174, and 356, potentially infringing upon the democratic autonomy of states and disturbing the federal balance envisioned by the Constitution of India.
The use of Article 356 for aligning state elections with national one’s risks misuse, undermining the principles of cooperative federalism, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994). Legal experts and the Law Commission of India, in its 255th Report, have underlined the procedural and political hurdles, calling for national consensus and constitutional safeguards before any implementation. Additionally, the NITI Aayog’s 2018 Discussion Paper acknowledges that while simultaneous elections may seem desirable, they require at least two constitutional amendments and extensive legal restructuring.
Thus, this article argues that One Nation, One Election, though driven by ideals of unity and efficiency, traverses a complex legal terrain, raising legitimate concerns about democratic decentralisation and constitutional propriety.
The Case Laws
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)
This significant ruling strengthened the principle of cooperative federalism and established stringent criteria for the application of President’s Rule as outlined in Article 356.The Court determined that the authority granted by Article 356 cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner and is subject to judicial scrutiny.
This case is vital in relation to the concept of “One Nation, One Election” as it restricts the Central government from dissolving state assemblies at its discretion for the purpose of electoral synchronization.
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)
This case upheld the validity of the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law), affirming the importance of political stability and democratic integrity in legislative bodies. Its relevance lies in the necessity of uninterrupted legislative terms, which could be jeopardized by arbitrary changes to electoral cycles.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)
The Supreme Court determined that Parliament is not permitted to modify the “basic structure” of the Constitution, which encompasses federalism, democracy, and the separation of powers. Any amendment aimed at synchronizing elections that undermines state autonomy may be invalidated if it contravenes the basic structure doctrine.
State of Karnataka v. Union of India (1977)
This case affirmed that States are not mere appendages of the Centre and have an independent constitutional identity. It reinforces the idea that central imposition over state legislative terms may violate the federal equilibrium.
Conclusion
The concept of One Nation, One Election embodies an ambitious goal for electoral synchronization in India, with the intention of minimizing fiscal costs and improving governance stability. Nevertheless, its execution presents considerable constitutional, legal, and federal obstacles. The existing framework of the Indian Constitution, especially Articles 83(2) and 172, stipulates fixed yet autonomous terms for the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, which mirrors the federal essence of the country. Any effort to synchronize these electoral cycles would necessitate not only extensive amendments to various constitutional articles, including Articles 83, 85, 172, 174, and 356, but also the approval of at least half of the state legislatures as mandated by Article 368. The possible abuse of Article 356 for the premature dissolution of assemblies brings forth significant worries about the degradation of cooperative federalism, a principle firmly supported in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India. Furthermore, any legislative action that jeopardizes federal equilibrium and democratic representation may be invalidated under the basic structure doctrine, as determined in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.
While policy think tanks such as the Law Commission of India and NITI Aayog have acknowledged the administrative advantages of conducting simultaneous elections, they have also recognized the legal and political intricacies involved. In conclusion, the quest for electoral synchrony must not undermine constitutional integrity. Unity and efficiency, though desirable, must be achieved through democratic means that respect state autonomy and federal balance.
FAQS
Q1. What does the term “One Nation, One Election” signify?
“One Nation, One Election” denotes the initiative to hold concurrent elections for the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies, intending to minimize electoral expenses, prevent recurrent election cycles, and maintain administrative stability.
Q2. Is simultaneous election constitutionally permitted in India?
At present, the Constitution permits distinct election cycles. Articles 83(2) and 172(1) establish fixed five-year terms for the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, respectively. In order to facilitate simultaneous elections, these provisions and others related would necessitate amendments to the Constitution.
Q3. What are the major legal challenges associated with implementing this proposal?
The main legal hurdles include the need to amend multiple constitutional articles, ensure compliance with Article 368(2) (which requires ratification by at least half of the states), and avoid violation of the basic structure doctrine, particularly the principles of federalism and democratic representation.
Q4. Can Article 356 be used to align state elections with the national cycle?
Although it is technically feasible, the application of Article 356 (President’s Rule) for this purpose would raise constitutional concerns and is likely to contravene the Supreme Court’s directives established in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), which aimed to restrict the abuse of central authority over states.
Q5. Has any legal or policy body supported this idea?
Indeed, the Law Commission of India (255th Report, 2015) and NITI Aayog (2018 Discussion Paper) have recognized the advantages of conducting simultaneous elections. Nevertheless, both entities have warned that this is achievable solely with extensive political agreement and significant legal reforms.
