Author: Sukriti Chaudhary, National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi
TO THE POINT
This article takes a closer look at whether the Supreme Court’s requirement for judges in lower courts to have three years of legal practice actually leads to a more skilled judiciary. While the intention behind this rule is to ensure that judges are both mature and experienced, we’re diving into whether it might be doing more harm than good like causing lengthy recruitment delays, reducing diversity, and making it tougher for talented young law graduates to step into judicial roles. The big question we’re exploring is whether real-world experience truly translates to better judgment.
LEGAL JARGON
Subordinate Judiciary These are the judges in trial courts, such as civil judges and magistrates, who operate under the High Courts.
Judicial Independence – This principle ensures that judges can make decisions on cases without any outside pressure from the government or other entities.
Article 233 – A section of the Constitution that outlines how judges at the district level are appointed.
Judicial Activism – This occurs when courts intervene to make decisions typically reserved for the government or legislature, often to safeguard rights or address policy gaps.
Eligibility Criteria – The specific requirements candidates must fulfill to apply for judicial exams.
Writ Petition (Civil) – A legal request submitted to the Supreme Court or High Court, asking them to protect or enforce a legal right.
THE PROOF
Right now, there are over 5,000 vacant positions in the lower judiciary, and many of these roles remain unfilled simply because experienced lawyers aren’t stepping up to apply. According to the 2018 Law Commission Report, a staggering 4 crore cases are pending in Indian courts, with the majority stuck in trial courts. The National Judicial Data Grid highlights that the backlog in lower courts is largely due to these vacancies and the slow pace of recruitment. In states like Bihar and Jharkhand, judicial exams have been postponed or even cancelled because very few practicing lawyers showed up to take them.
ABSTRACT
This article takes a closer look at the Supreme Court’s ruling in All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India, which mandated that candidates for judgeships in lower courts must have at least three years of legal practice. While the Court aimed to enhance the quality of judges by ensuring they have real-world experience, this requirement has inadvertently made it tougher to fill judicial vacancies and has discouraged many talented young graduates from applying. By examining the Constitution, relevant data, and practices in other countries, we seek to answer the question: is this rule genuinely improving our system, or is it hindering our progress toward a more inclusive and efficient judiciary?
INTRODUCTION
Judicial competence is absolutely essential for a thriving democracy. A judge’s ability to apply the law fairly, interpret it wisely, and deliver well-thought-out decisions promptly is vital for maintaining the rule of law. In India, with over 4 crore cases pending most stuck at the trial court level the discussion around judicial capacity is far from theoretical; it has a real impact on people’s access to justice. With the growing pressure of backlogged cases and ongoing judicial vacancies, the spotlight is on who gets to be a judge and how ready they are when they start their careers. An important moment in this context was the Apex Court’s pivotal ruling in All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 1022 of 1989, which was decided in 1993 by a bench that included Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy. This case was brought as a public interest litigation aimed at pushing for comprehensive reforms in the working conditions, pay scales, hours, and qualifications of the subordinate judiciary those judges who are the backbone of India’s trial courts.
COURT’S KEY OBSERVATION
In the case of All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 1022 of 1989), the Supreme Court made several important recommendations aimed at bolstering the subordinate judiciary in India. Among the most notable were suggestions for a uniform retirement age of 60 years, timely promotions, and updated pay scales to ensure that judicial officers receive fair compensation and opportunities for career advancement. However, the most contentious recommendation was the requirement for candidates seeking direct recruitment as Civil Judge (Junior Division) to have a minimum of three years of legal practice at the Bar.
The reasoning behind this experience requirement stemmed from concerns about the maturity and competence of judges. The Court noted that fresh law graduates often lack the necessary courtroom experience, familiarity with procedures, and ethical grounding essential for the judicial role. By requiring prior legal practice, the judiciary aimed to ensure that newly appointed judges have a practical grasp of litigation, decision-making skills, and real-world insights into the justice system. This approach was seen as a quality control measure to improve judicial performance at the grassroots level, reflecting the belief that experience leads to better judicial judgment, independence, and accountability in a system grappling with high case backlogs and structural challenges.
RATIONALE FOR THE RULE
The Supreme Court, while deciding All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (1993), asserted that judicial officers would need to possess a degree of maturity and ground-level insight typical of no new law graduates. The Court observed that pre-exposure to court procedures gives candidates the experience of being familiar with procedural law, ethical problems, and actual litigation. Such exposure was found to be critical in helping sound judicial thinking and ethical autonomy. The bench thought that theoretical brilliance would not be enough, and actual practice inculcates the analytical acumen and ability to make decisions required for rendering timely, balanced judgments especially in a system where trial court judges constitute the first line of legal interpretation.
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE RULE
Those in favor of the three-year experience requirement hold that it improves the professional standing of the judiciary by providing that only experienced practitioners rise to the bench. Practical legal experience helps to fill the gap between theoretical education and actual application and equips judges with the skills to deal with complicated procedural matters and litigant conduct. Additionally, international comparisons lend credence to this perspective: in nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom, previous legal experience is a required element in judicial appointments. These standards make judicial officers not merely legally qualified, but socially informed and professionally proven before administering justice.
COUNTERARGUMENTS AND CRITICISM
Against the rule is argued that it worsens judicial vacancies and creates avoidable hurdles for young, talented graduates. Numerous new law graduates have the intellectual challenge and potential for the judiciary but are now compelled to postpone their careers, usually without funding or professional direction. This has burdened most disproportionately candidates from underprivileged backgrounds, namely first-generation practitioners and women, who might not have means to support unpaid legal practice. Lastly, there is no conclusive empirical research proving that there is a relationship between previous experience in law and improved judicial performance. The norm, despite being well-intentioned, may consequently compromise inclusivity without ensuring competence.
RECRUITMENT ISSUES
India’s subordinate judiciary suffers from recruitment problems, motivated by delay in procedures and gaps in administration. Statistics from the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) and Law Commission Reports indicate thousands of vacancies in states. Exams get postponed or postponed, especially in states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. State Public Service Commissions and High Courts, tasked with holding judicial exams, often face coordination, transparency, and time-bound implementation problems. The three-year experience rule contributes to this backlogging since it limits the number of candidates available. Additionally, logistical inefficiencies in ascertaining Bar experience make the hiring process more cumbersome, dragging out judicial capacity-building.
CASE LAWS
1. All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 288
This is the genesis of the three-year Bar experience as a requirement for appointment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division). The Supreme Court, by this verdict, dealt with a broad gamut of reforms related to the subordinate judiciary ranging from pay scales to promotion, working conditions to recruitment standards. The Court noted that judicial officers need to have pragmatic legal knowledge as well as ethical maturity, which recent graduates don’t have. Therefore, it suggested that only those who are of three years’ standing in practice should be considered for direct recruitment. The decision was made in a bid to professionalise the lower judiciary and enhance its overall quality and autonomy.
2. Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (AIR 1966 SC 1987)
This case gave a constitutional interpretation to Article 233 of the Indian Constitution, which regulates the appointment of district judges. The Supreme Court made it clear that appointments should strictly be made from among eligible advocates and the process should include consultation between the Governor and the concerned High Court. This case continues to hold importance in highlighting the separation of powers and preventing executive overreach from undermining judicial independence in appointments.
3. State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah, AIR 2000 SC 1296
In this ruling, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for meritocracy and transparency in judge appointment. It ruled that any opaque or arbitrary method of selection would harm the credibility of the judiciary. The case is frequently referred to while campaigning for judicial selection process reforms, such as the requirement of clearly established eligibility guidelines, like previous practice, to ensure quality and fairness.
4. Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission, (2006) 9 SCC 507
This case was a reaction to the common delays in judicial recruitment throughout India. Identifying the increasing backlog of vacancy in the subordinate judiciary, the Supreme Court established binding timeframes and uniform procedures for holding judicial service examinations. The Court instructed High Courts and State Public Service Commissions to work in an efficient manner so as to prevent recruitment delays. This case is especially topical nowadays, because the experience requirement comes into contact with already tight recruitment systems.
5. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2005) 8 SCC 202
This case was about the broader question of judicial accountability and transparency in appointment, including to higher courts. The Court recognized mounting public alarm at the absence of transparency in the process of judicial appointments and demanded more institutional integrity. Although the case touched upon appointments to higher judiciary mainly, its focus on transparency, scrutiny, and merit applies equally to debate on first-level judicial appointments.
REFORMS SUGGESTED
Recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of the three-year legal practice requirement, many experts and judicial reform advocates have proposed alternative or complementary methods to improve the quality of the subordinate judiciary without imposing unnecessary hurdles.
One popular suggestion is the establishment of judicial training academies, like the National Judicial Academy (NJA) in India. These institutions offer intensive training programs after candidates are selected, focusing on practical skills, ethics, courtroom management, and legal reasoning. The goal is to equip new recruits regardless of their previous legal experience with the essential tools they need to perform effectively on the bench. This approach highlights the importance of structured, standardized training that can help bridge the gap for fresh graduates who may lack courtroom exposure.
Another exciting alternative is the introduction of entry-level internships or clerkships for those aspiring to become judges. In this model, candidates would receive supervised, practical training within courts or legal offices for a set period before their appointment. This hands-on experience could either replace or complement the three years of Bar practice by offering targeted judicial exposure without the financial and professional risks associated with independent legal practice. A balanced or mixed model is also under consideration, which would merge minimum experience requirements with rigorous performance evaluations.
In this scenario, a candidate’s legal skills, ethical understanding, and academic achievements demonstrated through competitive exams and interviews would be valued alongside practical experience. This hybrid approach aims to widen the eligibility pool while ensuring that standards of competence and readiness are upheld, ultimately fostering both inclusivity and quality in judicial appointments.
CONCLUSION
The three- time practice rule of law formulated in All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India was conceived as a medium of quality control to guarantee that judges at the entry- position come into the bar mature, immorally sound, and familiar with courts. Though the idea of the reform was good, its practical operation has shown it to be fraught with substantial difficulties, similar as judicial vacuities, denial of openings to talented youthful graduates, and reversals of gender and social diversity. The contestation over the rule highlights an issue of broader compass Is experience inescapably judicial excellence? It indicates that experience is salutary, but can not be the exclusive measure of capability. Rather, a broader and further balanced strategy integrating structured training, cloths, and strong reclamation systems will more effectively advance the binary points of quality and availability. Judicial reform should aim for a system that promotes both merit and diversity, without making it too hard for people to enter the field. It’s important to rethink strict grading systems and adopt more flexible, evidence-based approaches that take into account local contexts and realities. This is essential if India’s legal system is to provide timely and fair justice.
FAQS
Q1 Why did the Supreme Court rule you must have 3 times of practice to be a judge?
Ans. The Court believed that law practice would give individualities with on- the- job training, so they would be more competent to manage situations in the courtroom and make unprejudiced opinions.
Q2 Is this law complied with in all countries?
Ans. Some countries cleave to it rigorously, whereas others still permit law graduates to apply directly upon acquiring their degree.
Q3 Has this rule bettered judges for their work?
Ans. There is no direct substantiation. Actually, utmost countries have smaller aspirants for judgeships, and vacuities are on the rise.
Q4 Are fresh graduates allowed to apply as judges?
Ans. Yes, but only in countries where the rule has noway been executed. There’s also an trouble at a middle- ground result that involves training and mentoring.
Q5 What’s the volition to the 3- time experience rule?
Ans. A binary- track system — one permitting educated attorneys and top- of- the- class graduates to both apply, followed by high- quality training programs to develop capability.
