Author: Utsab Sengupta, Siksha o Anusandhan National Institute of Law
ABSTRACT
A turning point in constitutional jurisprudence was reached in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), wherein the right to privacy was acknowledged as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. This ruling has implications for many areas of law, including criminal procedure, even though its primary focus was on informational and decisional privacy. The complex relationship between the right to privacy and state-permitted searches under the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) is examined in this article. The application of Puttaswamy principles to search and seizure powers under the CrPC is still unclear, despite the fact that criminal law allows the state to restrict some individual rights in the interest of justice and public order.
This article critically examines how Indian courts might interpret and strike a balance between a person’s fundamental right to privacy and the state’s interests in criminal investigations. In order to provide interpretive clarity regarding the constitutionality and proportionality of search-related actions by state authorities in criminal matters, the article will examine statutory provisions, judicial trends, and comparative perspectives. Finally, it highlights that in order to prevent procedural safeguards from becoming illusory in the post-Puttaswamy constitutional framework, search provisions must be interpreted with privacy in mind.
TO THE POINT
The field of criminal law frequently places the individual in direct conflict with the coercive authority of the state. The ability to perform searches and seizures—a necessary tool for efficient law enforcement but one that runs the risk of seriously infringing on individual liberties—is one of the most invasive of these powers. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), a landmark ruling, reshaped the constitutional landscape by upholding the right to privacy as an essential component of the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21. The relationship between the right to privacy and state-authorized searches in criminal investigations is still unclear and understudied, despite this landmark decision.
With an emphasis on the search and seizure provisions of the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), this article falls under the category of criminal procedure. The CrPC does not always establish particular privacy protections, even though it gives the state the authority to conduct searches in order to gather evidence and deter crime. The Puttaswamy ruling forces a reexamination of whether these clauses satisfy the necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness requirements of the constitution.
This article is classified as criminal procedure, with a focus on the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure’s (CrPC) search and seizure provisions. Although the CrPC grants the state the right to conduct searches in order to obtain evidence and prevent crime, it does not always create specific privacy protections. The Puttaswamy ruling compels a reexamination of whether these clauses meet the constitutional requirements for necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness.
The State and the accused have a serious conflict of interest when it comes to criminal law. While the accused tries to defend themselves and claim their innocence, the State, usually represented by the prosecution, aims to prove the accused’s guilt and uphold law and order. Different interests naturally arise from the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings. To guarantee that the accused is given a fair chance to be heard and to defend themselves, a balance must be maintained. The accused’s right to privacy, which frequently conflicts with the interests of law enforcement, is one of the most delicate and contentious parts of this balance.
A fundamental component of individual freedom and dignity, the right to privacy is safeguarded in many democracies. However, this right is often violated in the name of justice. To obtain evidence, investigative agencies may collect personal information, conduct searches, and intercept communications. Such measures raise significant concerns regarding the degree to which the State can encroach on a person’s private life, even though they are occasionally required to maintain justice. The Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model are two conceptual models that aid in framing the issue of how to strike a balance between privacy and efficient law enforcement.
The Crime Control Model, which was influenced by Herbert Packer’s work and is linked to academics like Kent Roach, places a strong emphasis on the prompt and effective administration of justice. It places a higher priority on apprehending and punishing offenders and sees procedural protections as possible roadblocks to efficient law enforcement. According to this viewpoint, sacrificing privacy may be justified or even required in order to deter crime and maintain public safety. For example, warrantless searches or invasive surveillance may be appropriate in the name of crime prevention or national security. But this strategy can result in power abuses and jeopardize fundamental rights. In the name of efficiency, the State may be granted unbridled power, which could undermine civil liberties and undermine public confidence in the legal system.
The Due Process Model, on the other hand, strongly emphasizes procedural justice, legal protections, and individual rights. It guarantees that no one is punished without a fair trial and works to stop the abuse of state power. The right to privacy is given top priority in this model, and any infringement must be appropriate, justified, and subject to legal scrutiny. This is consistent with Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which recognizes the right to privacy as a fundamental right. This was confirmed in the historic ruling in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017). The Due Process Model may slow down the legal process and give guilty people the opportunity to take advantage of legal loopholes, even though it offers strong protection for the accused.
In conclusion, a balanced approach is necessary to the criminal law doctrine of privacy. An overly protective approach that impedes law enforcement is not desirable, nor is the total subordination of privacy rights to State interests. To protect justice, protect liberty, and uphold the rule of law, a legal framework that combines the effectiveness of the Crime Control Model with the equity of the Due Process Model is necessary.
USE OF LEGAL JARGOON
right to privacy post-Puttaswamy has become a key concept in the field of constitutional juridence. Even though privacy was elevated to the status of a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution by the ratio decidendi of the historic Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) case, its enforcement is frequently illusory. Despite having many dicta, judicial pronouncements have no precedents for using coercion to stop arbitrary executive action. The lack of formalised due process in digital tracking and data surveillance leads to unrestricted State discretion, which violates informational self-determination and decisional autonomy.
Furthermore, enforcement agencies circumvent the proportionality principle established in Puttaswamy by using plenary powers under general statutes like the Telegraph Act or the Information Technology Act in the absence of a specific legislative framework. Without enforceable procedural safeguards, terms like “reasonable restriction,” “compelling state interest,” and “least intrusive means” remain merely rhetorical. The State’s use of national security frequently has a chilling effect on individual liberties, even though the Court acknowledged privacy as essential to dignity and liberty under Article 21. Therefore, privacy jurisprudence after Puttaswamy teeters on a precarious pedestal, lacking jurisprudential bite in practical enforcement, despite having a strong constitutional vocabulary.
PROOF
Although the Puttaswamy ruling upheld the right to privacy as a fundamental right, its implementation has frequently turned out to be more symbolic than practical. Cases such as Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020), in which internet bans in Jammu & Kashmir were maintained in spite of privacy concerns, demonstrated this. The discrepancy between declaration and enforcement is demonstrated by the Court’s hesitation to provide robust remedies. Additionally, digital privacy is now at risk due to the protracted lack of a strong data protection law. Despite being a positive step, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, weakens Puttaswamy’s spirit by giving the executive broad discretionary powers without an independent oversight mechanism. Clause 18 exemptions, for instance, undermine informational privacy by enabling the government to get around restrictions on data processing and consent requirements.
The Supreme Court established a technical committee in response to the Pegasus snooping allegations, but it chose not to issue a strong ruling. When compared to state surveillance, this restraint shows the judiciary’s reluctance to convert Puttaswamy’s doctrine into legally enforceable rights. Therefore, even though Puttaswamy enshrined privacy in the constitution, systemic resistance is evident in its post-judgment implementation. Without strong institutional and legal protections, the right to privacy runs the risk of becoming a paper tiger, acknowledged in theory but lacking in real-world application.
CASE LAWS AND EVOLUTION
Legal Decisions and Evolution In Indian law, the notion of search and seizure has undergone substantial development, primarily due to judicial interpretation rather than clear constitutional language. The Supreme Court ruled in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) that since search and seizure do not entail testimonial compulsion, they do not violate Article 20(3) (protection against self-incrimination). This decision supported the argument that the right to privacy was not then expressly protected by the Indian Constitution. The Court further explained in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961) that obtaining samples of handwriting or fingerprints is not regarded as compelled testimony. It allowed the gathering of tangible evidence by making a distinction between “being a witness” (testimonial) and “furnishing evidence” (non-testimonial).
While the majority of surveillance measures were maintained in Kharak Singh v. State of UP (1963), the Court invalidated domiciliary visits on the grounds that they violated Article 21’s protection of personal liberty. Future expansion was made possible by Justice Subba Rao’s dissent, which alluded to privacy as a fundamental right. The 1975 case of Govind v. State of MP cautiously recognised privacy as a fundamental right, albeit one that is not absolute. This was reaffirmed in the 1997 case of PUCL v. Union of India, where it was decided that telephone tapping violated privacy unless done with due process. Last but not least, P.R. Metrani v. CIT (2006) highlighted procedural protections by declaring that search authority must be used in accordance with the law and documented justifications.
CONCLUSION
From State-centric investigative powers to a more citizen-focused, rights-based approach, the Indian judiciary’s position on search and seizure has gradually changed. Prioritising investigative needs over individual liberties was a feature of early rulings such as M.P. Sharma. Later decisions like PUCL and P.R. Metrani, however, brought procedural accountability and constitutional protections as a result of growing awareness of privacy issues. Subsequent interpretations under Article 21 began to acknowledge privacy as crucial to personal liberty, despite early rulings that denied the existence of a fundamental right to privacy. These events led to the Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) ruling, in which a nine-judge panel explicitly proclaimed privacy a fundamental right, overturning previous rulings.
Nevertheless, there are still legal shortcomings. Numerous statutes provide extensive search and seizure authority, frequently with inconsistent protections. A thorough legislative framework that governs data protection, digital privacy, and surveillance in accordance with constitutional principles is lacking. Consequently, additional legislative clarity and checks are required, even though the judiciary has been instrumental in the development of this area of law. In order to ensure that constitutional guarantees are respected in both letter and spirit, India must carefully balance effective investigation with individual rights going forward
FAQS
What was decided by the Puttaswamy ruling?
It stated that, in accordance with Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, the right to privacy is a fundamental right.
Is privacy more important than national security?
No. Subject to the proportionality test, the right may be limited for reasons such as public order and national security.
Does India have a post-Puttaswamy data protection law?
Indeed. Although the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 was passed, it has drawn criticism for giving the government excessive authority.
Has Puttaswamy modified the laws pertaining to surveillance?
Not efficiently. Broad surveillance with little judicial oversight is still allowed by laws like the Telegraph Act and the IT Act.
Can the right to privacy be upheld in Court
Indeed, but enforcement remain without strong statutory backing
