Author: Anand Pandey , Atal Bihari Vajpayee School of Legal Studies, CSJM University
CASE DETAILS
Court: Supreme court of India
Citation: (2010) 7 SCC 263
Bench: Justice K.G. Balakrishnan (CJI), Justice R.V. Raveendran, Justice J.M. Panchal
Decided:05.05 2010
Case type: Criminal Type
BACKGROUND OF CASE
The background of Selvi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka involves appeals by individuals convicted based on evidence from involuntary narcoanalysis, polygraph (lie detector), and Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) tests, challenging these techniques as violations of fundamental fights in India, particularly the right against self-incrimination (Article 20(3)) and the right to privacy/liberty (Article 21). The Supreme Court examined whether these scientific methods, used to aid investigations, infringed upon personal autonomy, leading to a landmark ruling that their involuntary administration is unconstitutional.
FACTS OF THE CASE
In 2004, Smt. Selvi and others instituted the first batch of criminal appeals, which were subsequently followed by additional appeals in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010. These appeals were consolidated and heard together by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India as Special Leave Petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution, culminating in a final hearing on 5 May 2010.
The central legal questions arising in this batch of criminal appeals concerned the involuntary administration of certain scientific investigative techniques, namely narco-analysis, polygraph examination, and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test, which were employed with the objective of enhancing the effectiveness of criminal investigaions.
This issue has attracted considerable judicial and public attention, as it involves a delicate balance between the need for efficient and effective criminal investigation and the protection of individual liberties. While the traditional judicial function involves adjudicating competing claims between parties, the present matter transcends an ordinary dispute. It raises fundamental constitutional questions regarding the nature, scope, and content of fundamental rights guaranteed to all citizens.
Serious objections have been raised in cases where accused persons, suspects, or witnesses were subjected to these scientific techniques without their free and informed consent. The use of such measures has been justified by investigative agencies on, the ground that they are essential for eliciting crucial information, particularly in situations where conventional methods of investigation prove inadequate, and where such information may assist in preventing future criminal activity.
The involuntary administration of the impugned techniques squarely raises concerns regarding the protective ambit of the right against self-incrimination as enshrined in Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, necessitating a careful constitutional examination.
ISSUES OF CASE
The main legal issues that were raised in the court regarding this appeal were
Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques violate the ‘right against self-incrimination’ enumerated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution?
Whether the investigative use of the impugned techniques create a likelihood of incrimination for the subject?
Whether the results derived from the impugned techniques amount to ‘testimonial compulsion’ thereby attracting the bar of Article 20(3)?
Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques is a reasonable restriction on ‘personal liberty’ as understood in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution?
LAWS APPLIED
Article 20(3) Constitution of India – It provides for the protection against the self incrimination to the accused.
Article 21 Constitution of India- It deals with the Right to Protection of Life and Personal Liberty.
CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONER
The petitioners contended that the forcible and non-consensual administration of neuro-scientific investigative techniques, including narco-analysis, polygraph examination, and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test, constitutes a direct infringement of the constitutional protection against self-incrimination enshrined under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, inasmuch as individuals are compelled to disclose information against their will.
It was further submitted that the impugned techniques lack established scientific reliability and evidentiary validity, being at best confirmatory tools rather than determinative investigative methods. Consequently, any information procured through such techniques is inherently unreliable and incapable of forming a legally sustainable basis for criminal culpability.
The petitioners argued that the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 necessarily incorporates the principle of substantive due process, which dates that any procedure affecting life or liberty must be fair, just, and reasonable. The involuntary administration of the impugned techniques, it was submitted, fails to satisfy this constitutional threshold.
It was further contended that the ambit of Article 21 encompasses protection against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and that compelling individuals to undergo the impugned neuro-scientific procedures amounts to a violation of human dignity and bodily integrity, thereby infringing this constitutional safeguard.
CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT
The respondents contended that the impugned techniques serve as legitimate and effective investigative aids, enabling law enforcement agencies to unearth vital information and prevent future criminal activity, particularly in cases where traditional investigative methods prove inadequate or ineffective.
It was further argued that the administration of these techniques does not result in any physical injury or bodily harm, and that the information obtained mere from is intended solely to assist investigative processes. The respondents emphasized that such information would not be relied upon as substantive evidence during the trial stage.
The respondents additionally submitted that the information elicited through the impugned techniques cannot be equated with testimonial compulsion, as the subject is not required to make conscious verbal or written statements. Accordingly, it was argued that the use of such techniques does not fall within the prohibitive scope of Article 20(3) of Constitution.
JUDGEMENT ISSUE WISE
Right to Remain Silent of the Accused Article 20(3) Right Against Self-Incrimination under
Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India enjoys a high constitutional standing and embodies a fundamental safeguard available to an accused person. It not only guarantees the right to refuse to answer questions that may result in self-incrimination, but also prohibits the drawing of any adverse inference from the exercise of such right to silence.
The privilege against self-incrimination has gradually evolved as a procedural safeguard under the common law and is closely associated with the right to a fair trial. It reinforces the principle that the burden of proving guilt lies upon the prosecution, and that an accused cannot be compelled to contribute to his or her own conviction.
Investigative Use of Impugned Techniques and the Risk of Incrimination
Any act of furnishing information or giving evidence that is likely to have an incriminating effect amounts to being a witness against oneself. Article 20(3) does not, by its express language, confine its application solely to the trial stage. Rather, it must be interpreted to extend to all stages of the criminal process where information is elicited or material is collected.
This includes the investigative stage. Conducted by the police, where the possibility of compulsion is most pronounted. Therefore, investigative practices that compel individuals to disclose information capable of leading to their own incrimination fall squarely within the protective ambit of Article 20(3).
Results Derived from the Impugned Techniques as ‘Testimonial Compulsion’ under Article 20(3)- The results obtained from the impugned techniques-narco-analysis, polygraph examination, and BEAP tests-constitute testimonial compulsion and fall within the protective scope of Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
The narco-analysis test relies substantially on verbal statements made by the subject in a drug-induced state, and its involuntary administration cannot be distinguished from compelled oral testimony during interrogation. While polygraph and BEAP tests primarily measure physiological or neurological responses, rather than verbal answers, they nonetheless disclose the subject’s personal knowledge of relevant facts, and even minimal verbal input in some polygraph tests is secondary to the physiological measurements. Article 20(3) is not confined to oral testimony but extends to non-verbal acts conveying personal knowledge, such as the production of documents or intelligible gestures. Consequently, the involuntary administration of these techniques amounts to compulsion to provide evidence against oneself, thereby attracting the constitutional bar under Article 20(3).
The involuntary administration of the impugned techniques a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.
Administering such tests involves the physical restraint and confinement of the subject, and any restriction on personal liberty, however minimal, must have a valid legal basis. Furthermore, under the principle of the interrelationship of fundamental rights, the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) is an integral component of the broader right to personal liberty protected by Article 21. Accordingly, the right to privacy, particularly mental and bodily privacy, must be understood in conjunction with Article 20(3), as involuntary neuro-scientific testing constitution a significant intrusion into both physical and cognitive autonomy.
