Author: Riya S. Rane, Hindi Vidya Prachar Samiti’s College of Law
To the Point
Investigative agencies such as the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED) are statutory bodies entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring accountability, transparency, and rule of law. However, allegations of their selective deployment against political opponents have raised serious constitutional and democratic concerns. This article critically examines whether the alleged misuse of investigative agencies for political vendetta violates constitutional guarantees, undermines institutional independence, and erodes public confidence in the criminal justice system.
Use of Legal Jargon
The discourse surrounding the politicisation of investigative agencies invokes constitutional doctrines such as rule of law, separation of powers, federalism, arbitrariness, malice in law, and procedural impropriety. Terms like selective prosecution, colourable exercise of power, institutional bias, abuse of discretion, and executive overreach are central to understanding the legal ramifications of such misuse.
The Proof
Statistical trends, judicial observations, and empirical data provide prima facie evidence of selective enforcement. A disproportionate number of cases initiated by the CBI and ED have targeted opposition leaders, particularly during election cycles or regime changes. Conviction rates in ED cases remain strikingly low, despite a surge in arrests and asset attachments.
Further, frequent invocation of stringent statutes such as the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), which reverses the burden of proof and imposes strict bail conditions, raises concerns of coercive investigation rather than bona fide prosecution. Judicial remands often rely heavily on agency narratives, thereby amplifying the coercive potential of executive-controlled bodies.
Abstract
This article analyses the constitutional validity of the alleged misuse of central investigative agencies for political vendetta in India. It explores the statutory framework governing the CBI and ED, examines judicial precedents on agency independence, and evaluates the impact of politicised investigations on democracy and federalism. The article argues that unchecked executive control over investigative agencies violates Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution and calls for structural reforms to safeguard institutional autonomy.
Case Laws
1. Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998)
The Supreme Court held that investigative agencies must function free from extraneous pressures and political interference. The Court laid down guidelines to insulate the CBI from executive control, emphasising that independence is integral to the rule of law.
2. State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010)
The Court recognised that misuse of investigative agencies could threaten federalism. It permitted constitutional courts to order CBI investigations without state consent in exceptional circumstances to protect fundamental rights.
3. Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary (2014)
The Court reiterated that selective investigation undermines public confidence and constitutes an abuse of power. Fairness and impartiality were held to be essential components of criminal investigation.
4. P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2019)
While upholding the ED’s statutory powers, the Supreme Court cautioned against their arbitrary exercise and stressed that liberty cannot be sacrificed at the altar of political expediency.
5. Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra (2020)
The Court warned against the use of criminal law as a tool for harassment, observing that courts must act as sentinels against state excesses.
Conclusion
The increasing perception that investigative agencies are being weaponised for political vendetta poses a serious threat to constitutional governance. While combating corruption is a legitimate state objective, selective prosecution corrodes democratic values, weakens institutional credibility, and violates fundamental rights.
Judicial oversight alone is insufficient. Structural reforms—such as independent appointment mechanisms, fixed tenures, parliamentary accountability, and statutory safeguards against executive interference—are imperative. Upholding the independence of investigative agencies is not merely an administrative necessity but a constitutional mandate essential for preserving the rule of law.
FAQS
Q1. Are CBI and ED constitutionally independent bodies?
No. They are statutory bodies functioning under executive control, though constitutional courts have emphasised the need for functional autonomy.
Q2. Can courts intervene if agencies are misused politically?
Yes. High Courts and the Supreme Court can intervene under Articles 226 and 32 to prevent abuse of power and protect fundamental rights.
Q3. Does selective prosecution violate the Constitution?
Yes. Selective prosecution may violate Article 14 (equality before law) and Article 21 (due process).
Q4. Is misuse of PMLA legally challengeable?
Yes. Arbitrary arrests, prolonged custody, and denial of bail under PMLA can be judicially reviewed for proportionality and fairness.
Q5. What reforms are suggested to prevent misuse?
Independent appointment committees, parliamentary oversight, fixed tenures, and judicial review of coercive actions are commonly suggested reforms.
