Author: Nikita Patidar, Institute
of Law, Nirma University
TO THE POINT
India’s green tech and EV industries need effective access to patents and collaboration. While patent pools could be innovation-booster and cost-reducer, India has no explicit legal framework under the Patents Act 1970 and the Competition Act 2002 to govern them. This absence generates uncertainty on fair competition, royalty stacking, and exclusion of new entrants. In the absence of CCI guidelines or judicial precedent, patent pools would be anti-competitive. In order to meet this, India needs to put in place clear-cut policies, expedite green patenting, and encourage open, government-sponsored pooling frameworks to reconcile innovation and access to the market.
ABSTRACT
The paper discusses the changing role of patent pools in India’s green technology and electric vehicle (EV) market from an antitrust point of view. It emphasizes the lack of overt statutory provisions in the Patents Act, 1970, and the Competition Act, 2002, for the regulation of patent pools. While patent pools have the ability to speed technology diffusion and eliminate transactional cost burdens, misapplication can result in anti-competitive effects like market foreclosure and royalty stacking. The research calls for targeted CCI guidelines, active judicial interpretation, and possible government intervention, including fast-tracked green patents or public-interest patent pools, to provide a pro-competitive and innovation-promoting atmosphere.
USE OF LEGAL
The paper uses different legal concepts and terminologies applicable to intellectual property law as well as competition law. Concepts like “patent pools”, “royalty stacking”, and “standard-essential patents (SEPs)” form the core area of debate, especially with regards to technology licensing. The notion of “compulsory licensing”, borrowed from Section 84 of the Patents Act, 1970, has been referred to in order to make a statement regarding state action in patent use for public good.
Jargon in competition law involves “appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC” as a test applied under Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 to analyse anti-competitive agreements. The article also employs other expressions such as “market foreclosure”, “horizontal agreements”, “dominant position”, and “exclusionary practices” to characterize anti-competitive dangers coming from unregulated patent pooling.
In addition, policy and procedural words like “fast-tracking” of green patents, “government-regulated patent pools”, “judicial interpretation”, and “statutory ambiguity” are used to reflect the legal-policy analysis of the paper. Global legal terms like “FRAND licensing” (Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) are also adopted to mainstream Indian policy language along international IP standards.
THE PROOF
The conclusions are drawn from the identified gaps in the document Antitrust Scrutiny of Patent Pools in India. It draws attention to the fact that the Patents Act, 1970 has no explicit provision regarding patent pools, and Section 140 speaks only of restrictive licensing, and not of collaborative agreements. Likewise, the Competition Act, 2002 authorises the CCI to examine anti-competitive agreements but fails to provide special guidance on patent pools, leaving room for legal uncertainty. The report also mentions threats like royalty stacking, foreclosure of the market, and exclusion of small innovators, particularly in the EV and green tech industries where access to standard-essential patents is vital. As a solution, it suggests guidelines from CCI, judicial interpretation, and government measures like fast-tracked green patents (Rule 24C, Patent Rules 2021) and state-regulated patent pools. These proposals seek to balance innovation, honest competition, and public interest in India’s emerging clean technology sector.
INTRODUCTION
The fast-expanding Indian green technology and electric vehicle (EV) industries have increased attention on patent pools as tools for the diffusion of technology and cooperative innovation. Patent pools, which bring together patents from several owners to a consolidated licensing platform, provide considerable efficiencies by lowering transaction costs, speeding up access to indispensable technologies, and perhaps hastening the implementation of environmentally friendly innovations. But the Indian law has significant regulatory lacunae: the Patents Act, 1970 remains mute on the functioning and regulation of patent pools so that innovators and market players lack explicit statutory direction on how they can be formed, conducted, or regulated.
From an antitrust viewpoint, the Competition Act, 2002, more so Section 3(3), assumes some horizontal arrangements—such as those involving patent pooling schemes—to cause an appreciable anti-competitive effect. This increases the risk of patent pools being used to enable price-fixing, market division, or exclusionary conduct, particularly in technology fields that are moving quickly, such as green technology and EVs, where access to leading-edge innovation is essential to entering and expanding the marketplace. The absence of clear-cut regulatory guidelines or court precedents on patent pools also makes it difficult to comply and enforce, leaving local and foreign stakeholders uncertain about how to harness collaborative IP schemes in India’s green economy.
With ambitious environmental and industrial policy objectives, India is now under pressure to adopt a balanced regulatory framework. These legislative and enforcement loopholes need to be bridged by policymakers so that patent pools remain pro-competitive technology diffusion tools, and not collusion or foreclosure vehicles. A sound legal and policy infrastructure—defining what is allowed collaboration-wise, and offering direction on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing—will help ensure that incentives for innovation are brought into consonance with competition policy as well as public interest in India’s green tech as well as EV markets.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PATENT POOLS IN INDIA: STATUTORY GAPS AND REGULATORY AMBIGUITY
India does not have a specific statutory regime controlling patent pools. The Patents Act 1970 does not specifically cover the creation, function, or regulation of such collaborative license schemes. Section 140 notwithstanding, which forbids the imposition of certain restrictive licensing terms, it does not offer guidance on the legal status or form of patent pools. This lack of clarity constitutes legal uncertainty, especially in technologically advanced fields such as green technology and electric vehicles (EVs), where interoperability of patents is important.
The Competition Act 2002 further introduces uncertainty. While Section 3 disfavours anti-competitive agreements, it does not provide specific guidance on assessing patent pools. Unlike this, the US Supreme Court in Broadcast Music Inc. v CBS used a “rule of reason” to approach joint licensing, recognizing their benefits. Likewise, the EU Technology Transfer Guidelines make a distinction between legal pools and those that can potentially limit competition. India does not have such specificity, making stakeholders uncertain whether efforts at pooling would lead to antitrust concerns.
Considering India’s green transition objectives, the lack of clarity regarding patent pools has the potential to choke innovation and discourage collaborative R&D. A clear regulatory framework is necessary to balance competition issues against encouraging collaborative innovation.
PATENT POOLING, CROSS-LICENSING AND SECTION 3(3) OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002: ANTITRUST RISKS AND ENFORCEMENT
Patent cross-licensing and patent pooling arrangements, though they encourage innovation and lower transaction costs, invite stringent antitrust examination under Indian law. Section 3(3) of the Competition Act, 2002 prohibits agreements between enterprises carrying on similar business that can or are likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India. Patent pools, by grouping together patents belonging to different owners, can make it easier to access key technologies in areas such as green technology and electric vehicles. But if not properly framed, these types of arrangements can enable collusive behavior, such as fixing prices, dividing up markets, or excluding rivals, and thus raise the presumption of anti-competitive activity under Section 3(3).
Though Section 3(5) of the Competition Act grants a limited exemption for reasonable conditions that are indispensable to enable intellectual property rights, this is not an absolute protection. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has made it clear that only restrictions directly associated with the valid exercise of patent rights are exempt. Pools or cross-licensing arrangements requiring restrictions that have no relation to patent protection or carry exclusivity beyond the life of the patent are enforceable under antitrust.
The CCI assesses such agreements on a case-by-case basis, considering factors like the inclusion of substitute patents, openness of the pool, and the presence of fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms. In the absence of explicit statutory guidance in the Patents Act, 1970, the CCI’s vigilant oversight is crucial to prevent anti-competitive conduct while promoting technology diffusion. Finally, a balanced approach must be struck to enable patent pooling and cross-licensing to promote innovation and public interest without facilitating collusion or foreclosure of the market in India’s vibrant green technology and EV markets.
BALANCING TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION AND MARKET COMPETITION: POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE GREEN AND EV SECTORS
The shift to India toward sustainable technologies in green energy and electric vehicles (EVs) requires broad access to patented innovations. Collaborative intellectual property models in the form of patent pools are increasingly advocated to accelerate speedy diffusion of technology and lower transactional costs. By making collective licensing of foundational patents possible, such models can avert fragmentation and speed up standardisation across EV platforms and renewable technologies.
But patent pools also present serious competition law issues. Unduly structured pools can lead to market foreclosure, particularly when dominant companies utilize these arrangements to shut out new entrants and competitors from gaining access to important technologies. Second, royalty stacking, wherein several patent holders seek royalties on a single product, can drive up costs and erode affordability, especially in price-sensitive markets such as India. Strategic patenting and over-membership of non-core patents in pools can also limit downstream innovation and infringe on competition norms under Section 3(3) of the Competition Act 2002.
International regulatory systems try to find a balance. European Commission’s Technology Transfer Guidelines state that patent pools must be open, transparent, and comprised of essential patents only to prevent anti-competitive impacts. India does not have guidelines or jurisprudence prescribing how patent pooling arrangements need to be evaluated, especially regarding public interest technologies like clean energy. Such a regulatory vacuum leads to uncertainty for investors, inventors, and regulators alike.
In order to balance technology diffusion with market equity, India needs to have a sector-specific policy approach that promotes collaborative licensing while putting into place protection against anti-competitive practices. This reform is critical to ensure that IP regimes facilitate—not restrict—the development of sustainable and inclusive technology markets.
THE ROLE OF REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT: TOWARDS A PRO-COMPETITIVE PATENT POOLING REGIME
As India moves towards decarbonisation and clean mobility, the potential of patent pools in facilitating access to green technology is highly relevant. But with no clear regulatory and judicial guidance, such collaborative frameworks could be used for anti-competitive purposes or to delay innovation. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has the mandate to examine under Section 3 potentially anti-competitive agreements under the Competition Act 2002 but has not issued any special guidelines specific to patent pools. The void in the regulatory sphere creates uncertainty for actors who want to form or become part of such arrangements in emerging technologies such as EVs and renewables.
Judicial interpretation is also restricted. Contrary to the US and EU, where courts and regulators have made it clear that only standard-compliant, essential patents should be the constituents of pools, Indian law has not seriously addressed the competitive aspects of patent pooling. The lack of a rational legal framework is hence pressing.
Government action may provide more definition. Indian Patent Office fast-tracking of green patents is a step in the right direction, but stronger steps—like government-sponsored patent pools or standard-setting programs—can assure private IP rights better match public interest objectives. Such activities, if paired with bright-line antitrust thresholds, would make patent pools pro-competitive and pro-innovation.
Overall, concerted action on the part of the CCI, judiciary, and executive is needed to create a transparent and fair patent ecosystem in Indian green technology.
CONCLUSION
With India speeding its shift towards green energy and electric mobility, intellectual property and competition law intersect in a very important way. Patent pools provide a strategic means of simplifying access to key technologies, lowering licensing friction, and facilitating interoperability. The lack of a clear statutory provision in the Patents Act 1970 and no custom-made guidelines by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) leaves the field in a regulatory void, rendering stakeholders vulnerable to legal risks. Anticompetitive behaviour in the form of royalty stacking, market foreclosure, or exclusion of little players makes prompt oversight mechanisms imperative.
Administrative and judicial transparency is essential. The courts and the CCI will have to develop jurisprudence in conformity with international best practice, like the EU’s Technology Transfer Guidelines and the U.S. “rule of reason” test for assessing patent pools. Moreover, public initiatives, like expedited green patents and public-interest patent pooling, could reconcile private rights with the general interest of climate and development objectives.
Finally, pro-competitive patent pooling needs to happen through a tripartite initiative: legislative change, active antitrust enforcement, and policy encouragement of open innovation. Failing such an integrated initiative, India risks slowing the diffusion of technologies that are necessary for a green and a just future.
FAQS
1. What is a patent pool and why is it of interest to green tech and EVs?
A patent pool is a group in which several patent holders license their patents in common. In green and EV industries, pools simplify licensing and speed up tech uptake.
2. Does Indian law recognize patent pools?
No. The Patents Act, 1970 does not deal with patent pools and the Competition Act, 2002 does not give a clear picture of their antitrust implications.
3. What are the dangers of unregulated patent pools?
Dangers are market foreclosure, royalty stacking, exclusion of small participants, and risk of anti-competitive practices.
4. What changes are required?
India requires CCI guidelines, judicial interpretation, and policy tools such as green patents in fast track mode and government-regulated pools to promote effective competition and public welfare.
