Author: Gauri Aggarwal, a student at Symbiosis Law School, Pune
To the Point
The Right to Information Act, 2005 was envisioned as a democratic tool empowering citizens to hold public authorities accountable through transparent access to information. Central to this framework are the Information Commissions—quasi-judicial bodies meant to adjudicate second appeals and complaints. However, these institutions are now facing structural decay. Chronic vacancies, administrative inertia, and lack of enforcement have paralyzed their functioning. Despite statutory mandates, several State Commissions have remained defunct for months, and the Central Information Commission operates far below its sanctioned strength. The 2019 amendment to the RTI Act further diluted the independence of these bodies by giving the Central Government the power to determine their tenure and service conditions. The number of pending appeals and complaints as of mid-2024 crosses 4.05 Lakh in number, putting the RTI mechanism at a risk of collapse. This paper examines how the erosion of institutional capacity, compounded by executive apathy and inadequate legal safeguards, has undermined the right to information in India. Based on judicial decisions, government records, and findings from civil society organizations, this paper emphasizes the pressing need for reforms aimed at reviving the independence, functionality, and public trust in Information Commissions.
Abstract
The Right to Information Act, 2005 empowered citizens and institutionalized transparency through Information Commissions. However, the failure to fill vacancies, rising pendency, and administrative inaction have severely undermined these bodies. Several commissions remain non-functional, and many cases are delayed for years or dismissed on technical grounds. Drawing on data, judicial pronouncements, and civil society reports, this article highlights how such systemic decay jeopardizes the RTI framework. It calls for legally binding timelines for appointments, structural reforms, and stronger enforcement mechanisms to preserve citizens’ right to know.
Keywords: Right to Information Act, 2005; Information Commissions; Pendency; Vacancies; Transparency; Judicial Oversight; RTI Reforms.
Use of Legal Jargon
The Right to Information Act, 2005, is a rights-based legislation grounded in the “constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a)”. It creates a dual-tier adjudicatory system comprising the Central and State Information Commissions, which are quasi-judicial bodies with statutory powers under Sections 18, 19, and 20 of the Act. These provisions authorize the commissions to inquire into complaints, decide second appeals, and impose penalties on defaulting public authorities or officers.
The RTI framework is built on key administrative law principles such as reasonableness, procedural fairness, and the duty to act without delay. However, the absence of explicit statutory timelines for filling vacancies and the vague criteria for appointing commissioners—phrased in broad terms like “persons of eminence in public life”—creates significant interpretative ambiguity. This undermines the objective standards expected under public law and opens the door to arbitrariness.
Additionally, the 2019 amendment to the RTI Act altered the service conditions of Information Commissioners by delegating their determination to executive rulemaking. This shift challenges the original legislative intent of insulating these bodies from political influence and raises structural concerns under the doctrine of institutional independence. The statutory silence on internal performance benchmarks, disposal timelines, and minimum staffing ratios further reflects a legal vacuum that allows persistent administrative non-compliance without violating the letter of the law.
The Commission’s failure to publish mandatory annual reports, along with the widespread non-implementation of proactive disclosure norms under Section 4, highlights systemic legal non-performance. In practical terms, this transforms a legally enforceable framework into a discretionary regime, diluting the effectiveness of statutory rights. Thus, while the RTI Act appears robust on paper, the weakening of its institutional architecture reveals significant doctrinal and procedural gaps that demand legal reform.
The Proof
Empirical data highlights the growing disconnect between the RTI Act’s legal objectives and the ground-level functioning of Information Commissions. Reports by civil society groups indicate that, by mid-2024, the number of unresolved second appeals and complaints across Central and State Commissions had exceeded 4.05 lakh. This backlog is not a temporary aberration but a systemic pattern sustained by prolonged vacancies, under-resourced secretariats, and erratic disposal rates.
The failure to adhere to internal timelines is further compounded by the lack of digital infrastructure—only a few commissions allow for online filing, and fewer still publish up-to-date cause lists or hearing schedules. According to the 2023 Satark Nagrik Sangathan report, 26% of commissions had not imposed a single penalty in the previous year, despite large volumes of unresolved or mishandled RTI requests, reflecting an institutional reluctance to enforce compliance under Section 20.
Moreover, transparency mechanisms mandated under Section 25—such as the publication of annual reports—remain largely non-operational. The Central Information Commission has not released any annual performance report since 2018, and a third of State Commissions failed to make such data publicly available. This undermines both “public accountability and parliamentary oversight”. In states like Jharkhand, Tripura, and Goa, the commissions were entirely non-functional for extended periods, making the legal remedy of second appeal effectively unavailable for citizens.
Together, these indicators expose a deep disconnect between the promise of the RTI Act and the institutional architecture meant to enforce it. The failure to act on statutory obligations—ranging from timely hearings to proactive disclosure—has transformed many commissions into bottlenecks rather than enablers of transparency. Without structural reform, these patterns are likely to persist, eroding the normative foundations of the right to information in India.
Case Laws
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745
The quasi-judicial nature of the Information Commissions was examined by the Supreme Court in this case. The petitioner contended that these bodies, while adjudicating second appeals and complaints, exercised powers akin to courts and therefore should include members with judicial qualifications. The Court initially ruled that every bench of the Central and State Commissions must comprise one judicial member, recognizing the importance of independence, procedural rigour, and adherence to principles of natural justice. Though the judgment was later modified to make judicial background desirable rather than mandatory, it nonetheless affirmed that Information Commissions are not merely administrative bodies—they are quasi-judicial institutions whose decisions have far-reaching consequences for transparency and governance. This precedent reinforces the argument that the appointment of Commissioners should be guided by competence and independence, not political considerations.
Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 436/2018
Filed by RTI activists, the Union and State governments’ persistent failure to fill vacancies in Information Commissions. The petitioners highlighted how long-standing vacancies led to massive pendency, causing severe delays and defeating the statutory right to information. The Supreme Court responded by issuing binding directions for a transparent and time-bound appointment process, stressing the importance of maintaining the functionality and independence of these bodies. The case continues under the doctrine of continuing mandamus, with the Court periodically monitoring compliance. Despite the clear judicial will, ground-level implementation has remained weak, illustrating the institutional inertia and executive apathy that this article critiques.
Subhash Chandra Agarwal v. Union of India, (2019)
The Court emphasized that the Chief Information Commissioner must have a meaningful role in the appointment process for Commissioners. This reinforces the principle of institutional autonomy and insulation from executive dominance—both of which have been weakened post the 2019 amendment that centralized control over tenure and service conditions.
Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294
Though not an RTI case per se, this decision is foundational in affirming that the right to know is a part of the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The case laid the normative basis for later statutory recognition of RTI and continues to serve as a benchmark for assessing the erosion of that right due to administrative dysfunction.
People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (2004) 2 SCC 476
This case also recognized that access to information is intrinsic to democratic governance and meaningful public participation. The current breakdown of the RTI appellate mechanism—through delays, pendency, and vacancies—runs contrary to the democratic ideals reaffirmed in PUCL.
Conclusion
The Right to Information Act, 2005, was crafted as a democratic safeguard to empower citizens, ensure administrative transparency, and foster government accountability. However, the persistent institutional decay of Information Commissions—manifested through chronic vacancies, delayed appointments, procedural opacity, and massive pendency—has significantly weakened the Act’s effectiveness. While the legal framework remains intact on paper, its enforcement mechanism is steadily collapsing due to executive inaction and inadequate structural safeguards.
Judicial interventions, although well-intentioned, have yielded limited systemic correction in the absence of strict enforcement. Furthermore, the 2019 amendments have diluted the autonomy of the Commissions, threatening their quasi-judicial character. Without timely and legally binding reforms—such as mandated appointment timelines, independent staffing, and enhanced oversight—the RTI regime risks becoming a hollow shell. Reviving the credibility of Information Commissions is not merely a matter of governance reform, but a constitutional imperative to uphold the citizen’s right to know.
FAQS
What are Information Commissions under the RTI Act?
Established under Sections 12 and 15 of the RTI Act, 2005, Information Commissions function as independent statutory authorities at both the Central and State levels. They are entrusted with adjudicating second appeals, investigating complaints, and enforcing compliance by imposing penalties where necessary.
Why is pendency a serious concern in RTI enforcement?
Pendency of appeals and complaints—now exceeding 4.05 lakh cases—means that citizens face delays of months or years before receiving a response. This undermines the core objective of the RTI Act, which was to establish a prompt and easily accessible mechanism for obtaining information.
How has the RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019 impacted the independence of Commissions?
The amendment vested the Central Government with the authority to decide the tenure, remuneration, and service conditions of Information Commissioners, shifting this control away from the statutory framework. This shift undermines their autonomy and may lead to executive influence over quasi-judicial bodies.
Are there statutory deadlines for appointing Information Commissioners?
No, the RTI Act does not currently specify any mandatory deadlines for filling vacancies in Information Commissions. This legislative gap has been exploited by successive governments, leading to prolonged vacancies—even in critical posts like the Chief Information Commissioner.
Although the Supreme Court in Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India emphasized the need for a transparent and timely appointment process for Information Commissioners, compliance has varied widely across states. The lack of legislatively mandated deadlines has played a significant role in escalating pendency and weakening the structural integrity of the RTI appellate system.
What reforms are needed to restore the functioning of Information Commissions?
To revive the RTI regime, comprehensive legal and administrative reforms are necessary. These include:
(a) amending the RTI Act to introduce mandatory timelines (e.g., 30–45 days) for filling vacancies in Commissions;
(b) making the selection process for Commissioners transparent, consultative, and merit-based, with clear eligibility criteria;
(c) mandating the publication of annual reports and disposal statistics to ensure accountability. These reforms are essential to uphold the citizen’s right to know and prevent the RTI law from becoming functionally ineffective.
