Author: Shreya Rajeev Warrier, G.J. Advani Law College, Mumbai
TO THE POINT
The position of the Governor in India has always occupied a unique and delicate space within the federal architecture. Originally envisioned by the Constitution as a ceremonial head and a vital constitutional link between the Union and the States, the role has increasingly become contentious. From withholding assent to bills to refusing to summon Assembly sessions, several recent episodes have reignited debates around the discretionary powers of the Governor and their potential misuse.
The real concern arises not just from isolated incidents but from a pattern, a series of decisions by various Governors across parties and states that signal a shift in the balance of power. Critics argue, these actions often align with the interests of the Central Government, leading to allegations that Governors act more as political agents than neutral constitutional functionaries. This is particularly alarming in a democracy that promises cooperative federalism, where State autonomy is constitutionally safeguarded.
This article critically examines this tension by scrutinizing the constitutional framework, recent judicial responses, and with recommendations. In doing so, it argues for an urgent realignment of gubernatorial conduct in consonance with constitutional morality and the spirit of federalism.
USE OF LEGAL JARGON
Understanding the constitutional and political debates around the Governor’s role requires familiarity with key legal doctrines and terms like –
Discretionary powers that refer to the limited set of actions that a Governor may undertake without the binding advice of the State Council of Ministers. As outlined in Article 163(1) of the Indian Constitution, such discretion is permitted only in cases where the Constitution explicitly allows it. One prominent example is Article 200, which empowers the Governor to reserve a Bill for the President’s consideration or to withhold assent. However, this discretionary scope has often been mired in controversy, particularly when invoked in politically sensitive matters.
Complementing this is the Aid and Advice Clause under Article 163(1), which mandates that the Governor is generally bound to act on the advice of the State Council of Ministers. This provision ensures that the real executive power lies with the democratically elected government, thereby reinforcing the federal structure and principles of parliamentary democracy.
To reconcile potential conflicts between such provisions, the judiciary often relies on the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction. This interpretative principle aims to ensure that different constitutional articles operate in a cohesive and consistent manner. For instance, when Articles 154 (executive power of the state), 163 (aid and advice), and 200 (Governor’s assent to Bills) seem at odds, courts have applied this doctrine to affirm that the Governor’s discretionary role is narrow and subordinate to democratic governance. Thus, this doctrine serves as a constitutional safeguard against the misuse of gubernatorial discretion.
Each of these legal terms reflects deeper questions about constitutional accountability, federal power-sharing, and democratic legitimacy. As the courts and legal scholars in 2025 continue to scrutinize the Governor’s role, these doctrines will remain central to determining whether the office is a constitutional facilitator or a political instrument.
THE PROOF
Recent events across multiple Indian states highlight growing friction between Governors and elected governments, primarily over the misuse of discretionary powers. These instances reflect constitutional ambiguities, political overreach, and an urgent need to revisit the balance of power.
Tamil Nadu (2023–24): Assent Withheld on NEET Bill
Governor R.N. Ravi withheld assent to multiple bills, including the NEET exemption bill, despite its passage twice by the Assembly. The standoff triggered a resolution accusing the Governor of violating his constitutional duties.
Kerala (2023): Legislative Paralysis
Governor Arif Mohammad Khan delayed assent to bills and publicly criticized ministers. Experts argued this breached constitutional trust and raised calls for judicial review of mala fide gubernatorial conduct.
Punjab (2023): Budget Session Blocked
Governor Purohit refused to summon the Budget Session, prompting the Supreme Court to intervene.
West Bengal: Interference in Universities
Governor Dhankhar clashed with the state over university appointments, contrary to Punchhi Commission recommendations.
Maharashtra (2022–23): Controversial Government Formation
Governor Bhagat Singh Koshyari’s role in installing Eknath Shinde post-Shiv Sena split was legally challenged. The Supreme Court, referencing S.R. Bommai (1994), criticized the decision for bypassing a floor test and warned against politically motivated actions.
Emerging Pattern (2023–25):
Governors across opposition-ruled states have delayed bills, refused to summon assemblies, interfered in administration, and made partisan remarks, fuelling concerns of systemic misuse and politicization of the office.
The cumulative effect of these actions has triggered significant constitutional and political concerns. The judiciary has repeatedly emphasized that the Governor must act as a non-partisan figure, yet real-world practice often departs from this principle.
At the core of the controversy lies the conflict between constitutional morality and political expediency. While legal provisions may permit certain actions, their use in a manner that undermines federal autonomy, legislative functioning, and public accountability weakens the democratic fabric of India’s governance.
As of 2025, India stands at a constitutional crossroads. The existing model requires urgent recalibration. The recommendations of the Sarkaria (1988) and Punchhi (2010) Commissions on ensuring apolitical appointments, fixed tenures, and constitutional accountability are more relevant than ever. Without decisive reforms, the risk persists that the Governor’s office may continue to function not as a constitutional sentinel, but as an instrument of central dominance, eroding the foundational ideal of cooperative federalism.
CASE LAWS
Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974)
The Governor is a constitutional head, bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in all matters, except those expressly stated. Limited the Governor’s independent discretion; reinforced parliamentary democracy at the state level.
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)
Federalism is part of the basic structure; misuse of Article 356 is justiciable. Governors must act objectively, not politically. Floor test is the only valid method to prove majority and this curbs arbitrary decisions during government formation or dismissal.
Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006)
Premature dissolution of the Bihar Assembly based on Governor’s subjective satisfaction was unconstitutional. Governor’s actions are reviewable if motivated by political bias.
Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016)
The Governor cannot act without or against ministerial advice; discretion is not absolute. Clarified Article 163; prevents misuse of Governor’s power to summon, prorogue, or dissolve the Assembly.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Codify Limits on Article 200
Introduce a statutory time frame (e.g., 30 days) within which the Governor must act on a bill assent, return, or refer to the President. This prevents indefinite withholding.
Transparent Criteria for Gubernatorial Appointments
Adopt the Punchhi Commission’s recommendation: base appointments on constitutional competence, not political loyalty; consult the Chief Minister before selection.
Clarify Discretion Under Article 163
Enumerate the exact scenarios where discretion applies, limiting its scope and allowing for judicial review in cases of misuse.
Revisit Sarkaria & Punchhi Commission Reports
Implement long-pending reforms that aim to depoliticize the office, secure tenure, and reinforce accountability mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
The increasing tensions between Governors and elected State governments represent more than mere political skirmishes; They reveal a systemic fault line in India’s federal structure. While the Constitution provides for a ceremonial head to ensure constitutional functioning, ambiguous discretionary powers have opened the door to political manipulation.
If such trends continue unchecked, the very principle of cooperative federalism, enshrined in the constitutional scheme, is at risk of erosion.
Ultimately, the Governor’s role is to facilitate constitutional governance, not to obstruct or influence it. As India evolves into a more decentralized and diverse federation in 2025 and beyond, restoring the integrity of the Governor’s office is no longer a political choice—it is a constitutional necessity.
FAQS
Q1: What powers does a Governor have over state bills?
A: Under Article 200, the Governor can give assent, withhold assent, return a bill (once), or reserve it for the President. However, these powers are meant to be used sparingly and with constitutional restraint.
Q2: Can the Governor act independently of the State Government?
A: Only in a few situations defined under Article 163 where discretion is explicitly allowed. In most matters, the Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
Q3: Are there any checks on the Governor’s powers?
A: Yes. The Supreme Court can review actions if they violate constitutional provisions or are exercised with mala fide intent, as seen in several landmark cases.
Q4: Can a Governor be removed?
A: Yes, the President (on the advice of the Union Cabinet) can remove a Governor at any time. However, such removals have also faced criticism for being politically motivated.
Q5: What reforms have been recommended regarding Governors?
A: The Sarkaria Commission (1988) and Punchhi Commission (2010) both recommended:
Apolitical appointments
Security of tenure
Consulting the Chief Minister before appointment
Restricting discretionary powers
