Reaffirming Judicial Excellence: All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (W.P.(C) 1022/1989)

Author: Swaraj Pandey, Amity University Lucknow AUUP


Background and Immediate Relevance
Since its first filing in 1989, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1022 of 1989, brought by the All-India Judges’ Association (AIJA), has served as the cornerstone for judicial service reform in India. This case has continued to survive over the decades as it has changed according to the demands of the system of justice delivery and demands of constitutional government. No sooner was this saga almost over, than on May 20, 2025, the Supreme Court presented another landmark decision in this ongoing case. A bench that comprised three judges, namely the Chief Justice B. R. Gavai, and Justices A. G. Masih and K. Vinod Chandran delivered a judgment in an attempt to strengthen the institutional competence of the lower judiciaries as well as the functional authority of the court.
Among the most important attributes of the ruling was the reinstatement of the three-year minimum requirement of bar practice by aspiring civil judges. The action is aimed at protecting the aspect of new people being tapped to join the judicial service not just because they have graduated out of the law firm, but they have the knowledge of how to work in a courtroom. Equally significant was the Court’s restructuring of the in-house promotion system, particularly under the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) route. Those developments can be explained in terms of the values of meritocracy, judicial independence, and practical legal training, as further attempts by the judiciary to make the lower rank professional and to free it of politics.


Key Legal Developments in the 2025 Judgment
In 2025, when the Supreme Court ruled that the three-year min working advocacy experience (or equivalent law clerk) prerequisite to direct appointment to the judiciary had to be restored, this amounted to a significant policy course correction. This was initially abolished after the subsequent directions in 2002 which approved the Shetty Commission by changing the focus to new law graduates in the direct entry to the judicial service. But with time, there also emerged an anxiety about the waning courtroom experience and litigation real-world draft-footing at entry-level new recruits. This ruling addresses that gap head-on.
The Court referred to the growth in the number of candidates who are registering with the bar council just so that they become eligible, but due to lack of exposure in real litigation practice they never take up the actual litigation practice. The court also pointed out that it takes more than registration or presence of law degree to be adequately prepared as a lawyer. The kind of learning that occurs in courtrooms through drafting, arguing, observing court dynamics, and interacting with clients cannot be replaced by the gruelling law school training.
According to this decision, state governments and High Courts must modify their recruitment regulations to re-embark this condition of eligibility. Nevertheless, as a procedurally fair act, the Court made it clear that this rule will be prospective it will not impact the current recruitment campaigns but will regulate all future selections.
In addition to this, the judgment also established a process through which authentic practice will be checked. Hopefuls will hence be required to advance valid evidence of real legal practice- approvals in senior advocates cases, or overseer magistrates in selected instances- to prove that they have court room practical experience and have been effectively engaged in litigation or law related tasks. This is not just a bureaucratic procedure that one takes as a formality but rather a commitment of the judiciary as an entity to perfect the professional competence and court room preparedness of future judges and make them not just legally literate but also seasoned with practice.


Institutional Reforms in Judicial Promotions
In tandem with its stance on direct recruitment from the Bar, the Supreme Court in the 2025 ruling also comprehensively restructured the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) scheme. This career is important as it provides a chance to the in-service judicial officers to rise to the rank of District Judge without necessarily resting on seniority or waiting to be decades old in their service. In its 2002 directions, the Court had initially required 25 percent of the District Judge vacancies to be filled by means of LDCE. Nonetheless, an earlier 2010 order had silently watered-down this directive by lowering the quota to 10 percent–dramatically weakening the internal promotional process and curtailing the reach of ambitions of officials of the judicial service.
This trend was strongly overturned by the 2025 ruling, which restored the original conception of the 25 percent quota. It also stipulated clear eligibility terms: a judicial officer is required to have a total of at least seven years’ experience with minimum of three years as a Senior Civil Judge. This makes people who do not have significant contact with judicial work ineligible to have a higher responsibility. The Court didn’t stop there. It also solved the stagnation on the level of the Junior Civil Judge to the level of the Senior Civil Judge, by making it a justifiable measure to have an exclusive 10 percent departmental examination quota. The action increases the likelihood of the younger and more capable judges rising through the ranks based on merits rather than being limited by the seniority rules.
Notably, the new framework is different than the plain length of service. Under these categories promotions are currently demanding a difficult evaluation of suitability. This includes evaluating the candidate’s judgment quality, legal reasoning, ethical conduct, and overall performance through their Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). The scheme is set up to reward competence as well as consistency and could spell a major change to a more professional, responsible, and meritocratic judicial hierarchy – without compromising on the institutional wisdom imbued in seniority.


Supporting Precedents and Long-Term Context
This case is affiliated to a long and developing legal quest which is to empower the subordinate courts in India in terms of independence, dignity, and efficiency. The foundation was laid in 1991, when the Supreme Court, in the first *All India Judges’ Association* decision, mandated uniformity in pay scales, service benefits, training infrastructure, and housing for judicial officers across different states. This changed the field, and, on this point, the judiciary became a unique branch level of the government with equal treatment.
In 2002, the Court followed up by recognizing the importance of the Shetty Commission’s recommendations, which proposed substantial improvements in judges’ salaries, pensions, and service conditions. This recognition was an indicator that the Court was willing to drive at reforms that were systemic. After that, in 2010, it was shifted to infrastructure–in which the Court took concern over the poor working environment of the judges hence states were forced to offer good courtrooms, chambers and other basic facilities.
The 2025 ruling builds directly on this history. It is not only a reaction to system inertia or the dynamic nature of legal education. It is not this, however, but it fortifies the necessity of not only the experience of the Bar but also gets the strong machinery of promotion inside the system. In such a manner, it reaffirms professional independence of the judiciary and streamlines the practices of the institution with the ideals of the constitution.


The Broader Impact on the Legal System
This ruling is part of overturning the status quo of the disproportionate rearranging of the judicial recruitment and promotion structure. The Court of Appeal attempts to eliminate the practice of promoting inexperienced individuals to the bench by undermining their advancement to the lower courts through direct recruitment in favour of more experienced individuals through minimum practice requirement to direct recruitment. This is so as to be sure that individuals adjudicating have both academic as well as practical experience in the courtroom setup. Lawyering skills are necessary, but not sufficient it takes experience of the practice of law to understand how to handle the courtroom, litigants and other lawyers, temper law student acumen with the realities of the law it needs to be lived. The three-year rule of practice is therefore an essential sieve.
At the same time, the reforms to the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) route have provided a much-needed morale boost to serving judicial officers. Over the years a number of officers in the system believed they had reached dead end as they had several years of merit but had no prospect of upward mobility within the system. Not only by raising the LDCE quota, but also by saying that the lanes of promotions should not be closed by a chain of fixed seniority, the Court has recognized the desire of people already in the system who perform with integrity and diligence. As a result, the judgment supports concepts of individual drive, equity, and institutional stability.
But, as the case itself made clear, the rightness of these reforms does not guarantee their success, because effectiveness matters. States should urgently revise their hiring regulations to comply with the new directions. Bar councils should provide easy procedures with open practices regarding issuance of the practice certificate. Preemployment aptitude tests should have an objective and reasonable basis. The constitutional logic of the ruling represents the wider constitutional imperative of Article 50, which imagines a conspicuous separation of power whereby judicial institution is functional and philosophically free of executive influences. The judgment, in effect is not just a correction on procedure, nor is it a reinforcement on constitutional governance.


Critical Reflections and Challenges
Although the judgment is clear and structurally sound in terms of its legal basis, it has not gone without reproach. One fear that the legal scholars and the bar associations hold is that reinstating three-year bar practice rule would further entrench the inequalities that prevail in the law profession unintentionally. The casualties will more likely be the women candidates who regularly take breaks in their careers because of their social or family obligations. The same goes with first generation lawyers of poor or marginalized origins and who do not have the money and institutional backing to carry litigation during the span of several years before landing a secure judicial job. This decision, though guided by the need to enhance professional maturity, has the potential of bringing back the elitism unless additional protection mechanisms are put in place.
Secondly, the judgment has created disorder in the ecosystem of jail education concentrated law education, particularly in case of five years integrated law degree. The move has been criticized by many law schools especially those that have dogmatic National Law Universities and private institutions enrolling to judicial coaching pipelines with a view that the move is retrogressive. The whole curriculum of these institutions had been geared towards the creation of so-called bench-ready graduates. They criticize the Court of pushing the entrance gate further forward and destroying the sustainability of these programs together with their aspirations of the students. They claim that pedagogical success in coach and legal scholar should be recognized as a legitimate readiness to the bench.
Nonetheless, the Court remained unmoved. It reiterated that constitutional maturity and courtroom competence are not ideal virtues, it is a non-negotiable constitution to hold judicial position. The bench indicated that to raise judges not only legally competent but also of social awareness and procedurally conscious, exposure to litigation, ethical dilemmas and to living legal conflict in real time are critical.
At the promotions front, though the increase in the LDCE quota has widely been accepted, acceptability of the expanding LDCE quotas is mixed due to lack of clarity in the terms of what constitutes suitability. The judgment allows High Courts to frame rules on how merit is to be evaluated, including through annual confidential reports (ACRs) and judgment quality. Nonetheless, ACRs have been dogged with opacity and subjectivity. In the absence of a standardized national system or independent monitoring progress, which leaves the field open to disparity and even the threat of political manipulation.
Concisely, although the judgment has a valid point in strengthening the professional spine of the lower judiciary, the effects relating to inclusion, access and procedural fairness are yet to be seen. The reforms are substantial, but they need to be complemented with fair action now. The presence of an intensive monitoring mechanism, the social diversity lens, and periodic feedback systems via the bar councils and judicial academies will be important to the success of the changes not only to make the system better but not so narrow as to gatekeep.


Conclusion: A Renewed Commitment to Judicial Quality
This ruling reiterates an aspect that India has toyed with and hardly put in force, judges have to be not simply qualified but tested. The three-year practice as a bar requirement also makes sure that the entry will add practical knowledge to the post. On the same breath, possibilities of marketing through LDCE that are implemented fairly will offer a litmus way out in time to determined judges.
There is a complete circle in a long legal battle by the All-India Judges Association. The judgment balances merit, experience and structural fairness and forms a more competent, independent, and consistent judicial system in India.


Frequently Asked Questions
Q. Why did the Court reintroduce the three-year practice rule?
To ensure that aspiring civil judges have sufficient exposure to real litigation, legal reasoning, and courtroom dynamics before adjudicating disputes.
Q. Does this hurt fresh law graduates?
Yes, it delays their eligibility. They must now practice or clerk full-time for three years before applying for judge posts. However, this applies only to future exams.
Q. What is the significance of the LDCE quota change?
It promotes experienced in-service judges to higher roles more efficiently. The increase from 10% to 25% means more judges can rise based on merit, subject to rigorous screening.
Q. Is this ruling gender- or class-sensitive?
The Court did not specifically address intersectional disadvantages. Critics argue it may hinder diverse representation unless states create safeguards.
Q. What happens next?
High Courts and State Public Service Commissions must amend their rules within three months. The Ministry of Law & Justice will likely coordinate policy shifts.

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