Author: NAINA KHAPARDE
College: GURU GHASIDAS VISHWAVIDALAYA
ABSTRACT
The introduction of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Ordinance, 2026, which raised the sanctioned number of puisne judges from 33 to 37 resulting in a total of 38 including the Chief Justice of India—by modifying Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956, has sparked important constitutional concerns regarding the separation of powers, judicial independence, and the use of executive authority through the issuance of an ordinance.
This decision, intended to tackle the backlog of cases, needs to be evaluated within the context of Article 124 of the Constitution of India, which empowers the President to appoint judges in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and other judges as the President considers necessary.
Although Parliament has the authority under Entry 77 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to regulate the number of judges, the use of an ordinance under Article 123, when Parliament was not in session, warrants scrutiny to determine if it fulfills the constitutional criterion of “circumstances which render it necessary for the President to take immediate action.” Judicial rulings have consistently stressed that ordinances should not serve as a substitute for the legislative process and should only be used in genuine emergencies (as seen in R.C.Cooper v.Union of India (1970) and Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) 3 SCC 1).
TO THE POINT
From the standpoint of judicial independence, this expansion handles upon the collegium system, which was affirmed in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v.Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 and the Fourth Judges Case (2015) 5 SCC 1
These rulings established that judicial appointments should be insulated from executive control.While adding more judges might help the Court manage its workload more effectively, it could also create concerns about executive influence on the judiciary’s structure, especially if the process lacks thorough consultation.Additionally, the speedy notification of the ordinance and the possibility of parliamentary approval later raise questions about the balance of power, particularly whether this undermines the judiciary’s role in deciding its own operational needs.
This concludes that the measure fulfills pragmatic needs arising out of the backlog, but requires safeguards to ensure the constitutional balance between supremacy and subordination. Increased numerical strength without a corresponding change of the system could cause public loss of faith in the top court as the protector of the Constitution. The analysis highlights the importance of a balanced approach that prioritizes efficiency while also respecting the basic structure doctrine established by Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 which lays down the principles of independence.
USE OF LEGAL JARGON
The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Ordinance, 2026, promulgated under Article 123 of the Constitution of India, constitutes a significant judicial reform measure. It amends Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956, substituting “thirty-three” with “thirty-seven” for the number of puisne judges, thereby enhancing the total sanctioned strength to 38 (including the Chief Justice of India).
This amendment mainly aims to strengthen judicial capacity to handle the growing pendency exceeding 93,000 matters, facilitating expeditious dispensation of justice and reducing arrears through augmented bench formations. By expanding institutional bandwidth, the ensure the Court’s adjudicatory efficacy without altering the substantive constitutional architecture under Article 124.
However, the ordinance route raises concerns regarding institutional integrity. While legislative competence vests in Parliament (Entry 77, List I, Seventh Schedule), recourse to Article 123 demands satisfaction of “immediate action” circumstances, subject to judicial scrutiny as underscored in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) 3 SCC 1. The expansion engages the collegium system (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, 2015) necessitating transparent recommendations to safeguard judicial independence and prevent any perception of executive overreach that could impinge upon the basic structure doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973).
Ultimately, while the reform strengthens judicial capacity, its maintenance of institutional integrity through rigorous consultative processes and complementary systemic measures.
THE PROOF
In March 2026, the Supreme Court of India had recorded 93,143 pending cases, which is the highest figure ever, breaking the 93,000 record. This is a gradual increase from July 2025 (87,115 cases) to late 2025 (92,000+ cases) and continued through January 2026 (92,828
cases). There are monthly increases like 510 cases in January 2026 and 1,141 cases in March 2026, which shows that the number of cases in the institutions is continuously higher than the number of cases being disposed of, thus placing strain on the judicial capacity.
Official figures from the National Judicial Data Grid confirm that there are around 93,676 pending cases, of which 72,661 are civil and 21,015 criminal cases, many of which are older cases that need to be expedited. This backlog goes to the very core of the right to speedy justice guaranteed by Article 21 and therefore, the need of doubling the judges to 37 Puisne judges.
A series of constitutional expansions of the Supreme Court bench from 1938 to 1956 have been accompanied by better disposal rates and more efficient handling of the workload. The existing ordinance recognizes this omission in evidence by increasing the “Bandwidth” of the institutions, so that more Division Benches can be constituted without affecting the system of appointments based on collegium and the basic structure doctrine.
This data-driven reform helps maintain judicial capacity and the integrity of the institution, and allows the Supreme Court to fulfil its constitutional duty in the face of growing pending cases. This specific increase is a measured reaction of which is based on actual pendency statistics, which enables for a faster justice delivery without losing balance and equilibrium of the constitution
CASE LAWS
There is no single supreme court judgment that directly ordered an increase in the number of supreme court judges from 33 to 37. The power to increase the court’s strength lies with parliament under article 124(1) and the Supreme Court ( Number of judges) Act,1956.However, several landmark cases and judicial pronouncement on pendency, judicial manpower, and access to justice have provided the jurisprudential basis for increasing judicial strength.
- All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India
This is the most important precedent concerning judicial manpower. Supreme Court gave the importance of lack of judges and told the government to beef up judges in a phased manner. Access to speedy justice however cannot be secured if there is lacking of judicial capacity, the court said. This case is the one that the Department of Justice itself admits it was the best case for strengthening judges.
Relevance: Forms the strongest judicial foundation for increasing the sanctioned strength of courts, including the Supreme Court.
- Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission
The Supreme Court discussed the issue of the chronic vacancy in the judiciary and laid down a time frame for the appointment and recruitment. The Court connected judicial vacancies to the increased number of pending cases and called for expedient appointments.
Relevance: Judicial manpower strengthening is a matter of the constitution to reduce pendency.
- Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar
It was a landmark judgment, which established that the right to speedy trial is part of Article 21 of the Constitution. Undue delays in adjudication were held to be an infringement of fundamental rights.
Relevance: Pendency and shortage of judges have a direct impact on the constitutional rights to speedy justice.
- Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh.
The Court discussed judicial delays and emphasized the importance of scientific evaluation of the strength of the judges and judicial infrastructure for timely disposal of cases.
Relevance: It is often mentioned in the context of judicial reform and judicial capacity building.
Connection with the 2026 Ordinance The Ordinance to increase the sanctioned strength of the Supreme Court from 34 to 38 judges, including the Chief Justice of India, was justified mainly on the ground of the growing pendency of cases which had reached about 93,000, and to improve the judicial capacity and efficiency of the Supreme Court. The power of Parliament to increase the strength of the Court comes from directly from Article 124(1). Suggested Academic Argument A legislative measure, not a judicial dictate, the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Ordinance, 2026 has its rationale found in judicial decisions like All India Judges’ Association, Malik Mazhar Sultan, Hussainara Khatoon, and Imtiyaz Ahmad, each of which established that lack of judicial manpower has adversely affected the constitutional pledge of timely justice and the need to periodically strengthen judicial capacity.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the increase in the Supreme Court’s judge strength to 37 via the 2026 ordinance stands as a decisive judicial reform aimed at overcoming chronic docket overload. The amendment will also free up institutional bandwidth to directly address issues of arrears, which have long been a challenge to timely adjudication, and enhance bench formation and speedy disposal of complex constitutional, civil and criminal cases.
This step will enhance judicial capacity and be firmly rooted in the legislative powers of Parliament and the consultative appointment process under the collegium system. The need for structural changes to ensure the Court can exercise its function of the final interpreter of the Constitution without undermining its fundamental independence and the doctrine of basic structure have been highlighted in a number of precedents.
The ordinance’s process, which must go back to parliament for ratification, reflects a balanced use of constitutional powers and a greater emphasis on efficiency than that of the executive. Its long-term effects on institutional integrity, however, will depend on transparent implementation, avoiding the selection of appointments and bringing in other changes like technology and case management systems.
In the end, this is the added value this improvement can provide to the supreme court to meet the needs of a vibrant democracy. It serves as a testament to the resilience and dedication of the judiciary, ensuring that justice remains accessible to all, while also affirming the judiciary’s autonomy, which is essential for its role in upholding justice and serving the public interest.
FAQ
How does this relate to the right to speedy justice? By bolstering institutional bandwidth, the reform supports the fundamental right to timely justice under Article 21, responding to concerns repeatedly highlighted in cases such as Common Cause v. Union of India (1996) and P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002).
What will determine the long-term success of this reform? Success depends on transparent implementation through the collegium, integration with case management refrms, and avoidance of any perception of executive influence, thereby safeguarding institutional integrity.
What does the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Ordinance, 2026, actually do? It amends Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956, increasing the number of puisne judges from 33 to 37, resulting in a total sanctioned strength of 38 judges including the Chief Justice of India.
Why was this increase in judge strength necessary? The expansion addresses the severe backlog at the apex court. As of March 2026, over 93,143 cases were pending, with institutions consistently outpacing disposals. This move enhances judicial capacity for more Division Benches and f aster adjudication.
Is the use of an Ordinance constitutionally valid for increasing judge numbers? Yes. Parliament has legislative competence under Entry 77, List I of the Seventh Schedule. Article 123
permits the President to promulgate ordinances when Parliament is not in session, provided circumstances require immediate action. The Ordinance requires subsequent parliamentary approval.
Does this expansion threaten judicial independence? The measure does not alter the collegium system of appointments. It preserves judicial primacy as affirmed in the Second Judges Case (1993) and Fourth Judges Case (2015), while adhering to the basic structure doctrine laid down in Kesavananda Bharati (1973).
