Author : Krish Sharma, Student at Chandigarh Group of Colleges
To the Point
The intersection of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) has precipitated an unprecedented paradigm shift in copyright jurisprudence. For over three centuries, copyright frameworks globally have operated on an uncontested foundational premise: that creative expression is a uniquely human endeavor originating from human intellect, labor, and capital. However, the meteoric rise of generative AI platforms—capable of autonomously producing complex literary pieces, intricate digital artwork, symphonic musical compositions, and source codes via natural language processing—has fundamentally challenged this human-centric legal infrastructure. The core question under modern scrutiny is no longer merely theoretical; it is an active administrative and commercial emergency: when a machine converts a textual prompt into a highly creative, original output, where does the legal authorship reside?
Under traditional property doctrines, a work cannot exist in a legal vacuum. If an autonomous algorithm generates content without traceably direct human intervention, the output risks falling immediately into the public domain, leaving massive corporate investments in technology unshielded by proprietary rights. Conversely, assigning copyright ownership to the end-user who merely inputs a simplistic prompt threatens to dilute the standard of originality, effectively rewarding a mechanical instruction rather than an expressive execution. The current legal impasse forces lawmakers and the higher judiciary to delineate the exact boundaries of human mediation required to transform an algorithmic output into a protectable piece of human intellectual property. This article analyzes the emerging friction between machine autonomy and statutory authorship regimes, evaluating whether traditional copyright doctrines can withstand the automation of the creative process.
Use of Legal Jargon
Modicum of Creativity: The legal standard requiring that a work exhibit at least a minimal level of intellectual creativity and independent expressive choice to qualify for copyright protection, moving away from mere physical labor.
De Minimis Mechanical Input: A threshold indicating that a human action (such as typing a brief, non-descriptive algorithmic prompt) is legally trivial or mechanical, and therefore insufficient to establish original human authorship.
Doctrine of Originality: The fundamental legal rule dictating that a work must originate from the author through an exercise of independent skill, judgment, and intellectual labor, rather than being copied from pre-existing sources.
Computer-Generated Works: A statutory classification defining creations generated autonomously by an electronic system or software where there is no direct, real-time human author overseeing the final expressive output.
Juristic Personality: The legal status enabling a non-human entity (such as a corporation or institution) to hold statutory rights and obligations, a status currently denied to AI models under global IP frameworks.
Sweat of the Brow Doctrinal Standard: An older common law doctrine that granted copyright protection based purely on the volume of labor, effort, and expense incurred by a creator, regardless of the work’s underlying creative merit.
Skill and Judgment Test: The balanced doctrinal standard endorsed by the Supreme Court of India, which requires an author to contribute intellectual application, knowledge, and structured choice to claim statutory originality.
Derivative Work Transformation: The legal process of modifying a pre-existing base asset into a new expression, requiring a distinct, non-trivial variation to establish a separate layer of copyright protection.
The Proof
The immediate necessity for reform is documented by the operational realities of global copyright offices and international tech registries. Under Section 2(d) of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, the term “author” is explicitly defined across categories (literary, dramatic, musical, artistic) as the natural human person who created the work. While Section 2(d)(vi) includes a functional provision stating that in the case of a computer-generated work, the author is “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken,” this section was originally drafted to protect humans using static software tools (like MS Word or spreadsheets) where the machine acted as a passive conduit. Generative AI disrupts this statutory logic because the software autonomously executes the micro-level expressive choices—such as selecting color palettes, brush strokes, syntax structure, and tonal frequencies—independent of the human arranger.
The mechanical reality of this challenge is illustrated by data tracking registration applications for synthetic content. Globally, applications listing AI applications as authors or co-authors have spiked exponentially since 2023. These filings demonstrate that when humans attempt to register purely prompt-based outputs, they are providing unprotectable ideas, whereas the machine is responsible for generating the final expressive form. This distinction between an idea and its expression remains the cornerstone of copyright law. The proof of legal fragility is visible in the recent procedural withdrawals issued by the Indian Copyright Office when automated registrations initially slipped through its online portal, confirming that without an explicit legislative overhaul, the current statutory text cannot recognize an algorithm as a valid legal creator.
Abstract
The rapid evolution of generative artificial intelligence has fundamentally disrupted the traditional human-centric framework of copyright law. By enabling machines to autonomously generate highly expressive works, generative AI introduces a critical legal vacuum regarding authorship, ownership, and the statutory threshold of originality. This article provides a comprehensive legal evaluation of AI-generated content under intellectual property rights regimes, focusing specifically on the structural tension between human creative direction and machine execution. Through an analysis of statutory definitions under the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, and comparative global frameworks, this paper evaluates whether algorithmic outputs can satisfy the traditional “skill and judgment” standard necessary for copyright subsistence.
Furthermore, this study examines recent landmark case developments and administrative challenges where creators have attempted to register collaborative human-AI works. It explores the doctrinal shift away from labor-centric standards toward stricter evaluations of human creative control, illustrating how contemporary courts distinguish between a de minimis prompt and active expressive authorship. The article concludes by discussing the critical need for legislative modernization—such as the potential codification of an independent category for computer-generated works—to ensure that intellectual property law continues to incentivize innovation without undermining the core purpose of protecting human intellectual creativity.
Case Laws
1. Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1: In this landmark judgment, the Supreme Court of India officially defined the standard of originality within Indian copyright jurisprudence. The Court rejected both the English “sweat of the brow” doctrine (which favored mere labor and capital) and the strict American “modicum of creativity” standard. Instead, the Court adopted a middle path, ruling that for a work to claim copyright protection, it must demonstrate the exercise of “skill and judgment” by the author. This standard requires a non-trivial handle of intellectual application and structured choice. In the contemporary context of AI, this precedent is the primary benchmark used to determine whether a human’s prompt-crafting process involves enough independent selection and structured arrangement to meet the threshold of legal originality.
2. Thaler v. Perlmutter (D.D.C. 2023): In this seminal international precedent, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia affirmed the U.S. Copyright Office’s refusal to register a piece of visual art generated completely autonomously by Stephen Thaler’s AI system, the “Creativity Machine.” The court held that human authorship is a bedrock requirement of copyright law, deeply rooted in both statutory text and constitutional principles. The judgment clarified that copyright protection was never designed to expand to outputs generated by non-human entities lacking legal personality, establishing a clear global precedent that purely machine-generated works are ineligible for statutory protection and must reside in the public domain.
3. The “SURYAST” Matter (USCO Review Board / Indian Copyright Office, 2023–2025): Ankit Sahni generated a two-dimensional digital artwork titled “SURYAST” using the RAGHAV Artificial Intelligence Painting App. The process involved inputting an original photograph taken by Sahni as a base layer, inputting Vincent van Gogh’s The Starry Night as a style template, and choosing a specific variable weighting for the style application. The U.S. Copyright Office Review Board officially refused registration, concluding that the final expressive elements were generated entirely by the algorithm, reducing the human’s contribution to a mechanical selection of inputs and an unprotectable idea. In parallel, while the Indian Copyright Office initially issued a registration listing the human and the AI as co-authors, it subsequently issued a notice of withdrawal to correct the entry, demonstrating the domestic resistance to recognizing non-human co-authorship.
4. Naruto v. Slater (9th Cir. 2018): Commonly referred to as the “Monkey Selfie” case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that non-human entities—specifically animals—lack statutory standing to file copyright claims under the Copyright Act. The court emphasized that references to “authors” and “owners” in statutory language imply natural human persons unless explicitly modified by the legislature. This case serves as a vital jurisprudential foundation in AI debates, confirming that the higher judiciary consistently resists expanding intellectual property protections to non-human actors, whether organic or algorithmic, in the absence of express statutory authorization.
5. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 12 SCC 489: While primarily recognized for striking down Section 66A of the IT Act, this case remains critical for its interpretation of electronic data transmission and online platform compliance mechanisms. In the realm of AI and copyright, this precedent reinforces that platforms cannot be held strictly liable for automated data scraping or output generation unless they possess “actual knowledge” of an infringement via a formal court order or government notification. This protects generative AI developers from immediate, automated liability while systemic frameworks for data mining licenses are being negotiated.
Conclusion
The intersection of generative artificial intelligence and copyright law represents a pivotal moment in the history of intellectual property rights. By breaking the historic dependency between creative output and human physical execution, AI has exposed deep structural limitations in current statutes like the Copyright Act, 1957. The consistent refusal of global courts and registries to grant authorship status to autonomous algorithms confirms that the legal system remains fiercely committed to protecting human intellect. However, a rigid refusal to protect any work involving AI tools threatens to stifle commercial innovation, as modern industries increasingly rely on automated workflows to produce high-value digital assets.
In my legal opinion, the solution does not lie in distorting the definition of a “natural person” to accommodate machines, nor does it lie in lowering the threshold of originality to reward simple textual prompts. Instead, India must proactively modernize its legislative framework by introducing a distinct, tier-based classification for computer-assisted works. If a human can demonstrate significant creative control over the output through advanced iterative prompting, structural editing, and curated input selection, they should be recognized as the sole legal author under the established “skill and judgment” standard. Conversely, purely autonomous machine outputs must remain in the public domain to protect the shared cultural pool. The future of Indian IPR will depend on its ability to craft a balanced, technology-neutral architecture that incentivizes technological investment while preserving the fundamental dignity of human creativity.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Q1: Can an Artificial Intelligence program be legally named as a co-author of a work in India?
A1: No. Under the current framework of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, an author must be a natural human person or, in specific corporate contexts, a recognized juristic entity. Because an AI model lacks independent juristic personality, it cannot hold statutory rights, assume legal obligations, or be assigned co-authorship status. Any registration application that names an algorithm as a co-creator is legally invalid and subject to a notice of withdrawal by the Copyright Office, as demonstrated in the domestic handling of the “SURYAST” case.
Q2: Does typing a detailed text prompt into a generative AI tool give the user copyright over the final output?
A2: Generally, no. Under the “skill and judgment” test established in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, copyright protection requires intellectual application and expressive choices. Typing a prompt is legally categorized as providing an unprotectable idea or a de minimis mechanical input. Because the AI tool autonomously makes the final creative and expressive decisions (such as shading, pixel arrangement, and syntax generation), the human prompter lacks the direct creative control required to claim original human authorship over the final output.
Q3: What is the legal status of an artwork or text generated entirely by an AI without any human editing?
A3: Purely autonomous AI-generated works currently reside in the public domain. Because copyright law globally requires a human author to establish originality, works created without direct human mediation fail to meet the baseline statutory criteria for copyright subsistence. This means that such content lacks proprietary protection, allowing any member of the public to freely copy, distribute, or commercially exploit the material without risking statutory copyright infringement claims.
Q4: How does Indian law currently protect works that are created with the assistance of a computer program?
A4: Section 2(d)(vi) of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, explicitly states that for computer-generated works, the author is taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken. However, this provision applies primarily to computer-assisted creations where the software functions as a passive tool (such as graphic design applications or word processors). If the software begins to make autonomous creative decisions, the user must prove they exercised substantial skill and judgment in directing, curating, and modifying the tool’s processes to maintain valid copyright ownership.